THE MARATHAS IN RAJASTHAN IN THE 18TH CENTURY: A STUDY OF SOCIO-ECONOMIC RELATIONSHIPS

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CERTIFICATE

This is to certify that the thesis entitled ***The Marathas in Rajasthan in the 18th Century: A Study of Socio-economic Relationships*** submitted by **Mr. Vipul Singh** in fulfillment of the requirement for the degree of **Doctor of Philosophy** of this University is his bonafide work to the best of our knowledge and may be placed before the examiners for evaluation.

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INTRODUCTION

During the 18th century the Maratha incursion started in Rajasthan and it continued throughout the century. This was a completely different territory, both politically and ecologically, for the Marathas. It was never easy for the powerful Mughals and it would not have been easier for the Marathas as well. It is well known that the Marathas remained in this area as a political force for almost a century, but their activities in Rajasthan were rather ravaging, exploitative and environmentally destructive as compared to the Mughal suzerainty in the 17th and the 18th centuries. Not much has been done on the socio- economic relationships after the Maratha incursion. Here is a humble attempt to work out the dynamics of the Rajput- Maratha relations during the 18th century taking Mewar and Marwar as case studies.

The socio-economic approach needs some explanation. It is to be noted that this approach has been one of the main trends of historical studies over the past few decades. Consequently this study not only confines to the change in economy as a result of the Maratha infiltration in Rajasthan, but it goes beyond that. There is no denying the fact that economy is the base of every social and political structure and all human activities -political, social and cultural-have their basis in the economy. But at the same time, the economy itself is a result of human activity. The pursuit of power, whether at the local level or at a larger level of state, is the product of human mentality, which in

turn also influences the economy. In other words, the economy of a particular stage of development of a society is the basis of the prevailing mentality. Further, the economy is always in close correlation with the characteristics of social relationships in a given society. In the socio-economic approach of historical writing, especially of the 18th century, the primary source for which is majorly the official records and accounts, the state shows a lurking presence. Even if one tries to distance oneself from the state, it is not possible to go ahead without questioning the local features of state power.

There is no doubt that there has been a shift in academic practice over the last few decades and the historians have tried to abandon the state and economy and moved into social and cultural studies. But the problem is that such purely social and cultural studies are not possible at all without taking into consideration the available official accounts and other statistical data. Folklores[1] are of course available to us in abundance, but we can use them only as supportive evidence and not as an alternative source for our area of

[1] Folklores cannot provide the authentic data independently for the reconstruction of history It is very difficult to frame the time period when these folklores were invented and became part of the popular culture. In the case of Rajasthani tradition, oral literature seeped into written literature in a massive way and then in course of time the elements from written literature were again transmitted into the field of oral literature. Therefore, it is impossible to separate the oral from written and the written from oral elements. Similarly, it is impossible to know exactly when these folklores were formulated and became part of written literature without any addition or subtraction. Further, folklores might have to go through a test of time before it could be accepted by the people in general and transmitted through oral tradition. Infact, the test of time lays an essential embargo on all elements of folklore before they are regarded as a part of folklore. B. Malionowski's observation is fruitful in this connection. He says 'The stories live in native life and not on paper, and when a scholar jots them down without being able to evoke the atmosphere in which they flourish he has given us but a mutilated bit of reality.' See B.Malinowski, *Myth in Primitive Psychlogy,* Oxford University Dictionary, New York, 1955, p.24.

research. The reason why we cannot use folklore as alternative source of reconstructing history for 18th century Rajasthan is that it is very difficult to frame the time period when these folklores were invented and became part of the popular culture. However, the folklores and its text complement the archival sources to a great extent, but without knowing the context and response of the people its role remains subordinate as a source of history. It is, therefore, imperative to use folklores and songs to substantiate our view in various chapters of our thesis that has been done wherever necessary. At the same time extensive use of the official contemporary accounts preserved in Rajasthan State Archives, Bikaner, and at the Bharat Itihas Sanshodak Mandal, Pune, has been made.

Many secondary works are available on the Rajput- Maratha relation but most of them are in the form of narratives dealing with political interactions. Few of them are 'Rajput Maratha Relations' by R. Singh in A. Pawar (ed.), *Maratha History Semínar Papers,* Kolhapur, 1971; K.S. Gupta, *Mewar and the Maratha Relations (1735-1818 A.D.)*, New Delhi, 1971; R.K.Saxena, *Maratha Relations with Rajputana (1761- 1818),* 1973; G.R.Parihar, *Maratha- Marwar Sambandh (1724-1843),* 1977; and Beni Prasad, *Maratha Penetration into Rajasthan,* Research, Delhi, 1979. Relations may have been more complex than is generally conceded in these writings, including situations of military stand off between the major powers and the lesser powers and also between the intruding Maratha power and the disparate lesser powers at different

levels. It is plausible to examine the possibility in term of some kind of affiliation, understanding and even deal in a situation where the incorporative macro political structure, both of the Rajputs and the Marathas, might have allowed for dispersed forces of power to exist in their own right. The dynamics and the forces contributing towards these interwoven relationships need to be contextualised. The above questions are significant because the first half of the 18th century was crucial for the emergence of regional powers with the declining Mughal state structure. Further, it is important to look for the impact of the exploitative Maratha raids on the economy and ecology of Rajasthan.

In his two books *The New Cambridge History of India: The Marathas 1600-1818*, N.Delhi, 1993: and *Marathas, Marauders, and State Formation in Eighteenth Century India*, Delhi, 1994; Stewart Gordon talks primarily of Maratha occupation of Malwa where the Peshwa had direct role to play and infact much of the territory was assigned by him to the *kamvisdars* to collect revenue. He believes that by 1745 Malwa had come full circle and Maratha revenue collecting apparatus was the exact antithesis of the marauding raids of the early decades of the 18th century. But the structure obtained in Malwa cannot be validly applied to Maratha *sardars'* occupation and administration in Mewar and Marwar in the 18th century.

Sources of Research

The thesis is mainly based on the primary documents collected from Rajasthan State Archives, Bikaner, National Archives of India, N.Delhi, and

Bhartiya Itihas Sanshodhak Mandal, Pune. In Rajasthan State Archives the records have been catalogued state-wise and the richest of these is the Jaipur Records. However, we have largely depended upon Jodhpur Records.

JODHPUR RECORDS (Rajasthan State Archives): These records have been found in different forms like *Kharitas* collected in Port Folio, *Hath Bahi, Khas Rukka Bahi, Arzi Bahi, Basta Records, Sanad Parwana Bahi,* etc.

Kharitas: Kharitas of Port Folio are collected in Dastari. It mainly contains the letters written to Jodhpur rulers by the rulers of different other states of Rajasthan and even of outside Rajasthan. These Kharitas cover the reign of Maharaja Ajit Singh to Man Singh, but Folio Nos. 1 to 10 are of relevance to our area of study. Each of the Folio Records is arranged according to the chronology of the rulers of Marwar. On many an occasion the *Kharitas* are only complementary and enquire about rulers' health but in general they inform us of the real moves of the rulers and their political maneuverings.

Hath Bahi: These are five in number and give detailed information on the payments given by Marwar state to the Marathas. *Hath Bahi No.2* is of special relevance because it gives the account of payments made to Mahadji Sindhia from v.s.1835 to 1839 (1778 to 1782 A.D.).

Khas Rukka Bahi: Khas Rukka Bahi are mainly the collection of orders given by the rulers of Marwar to their officers, *thikanedars* and clansmen. They are helpful in providing us information on the measures taken by the state to check

the Marathas and even give reference to orders given by the state to collect extra revenue in order to make payments to the Marathas.

Arzi Bahi: Out of the seven available *Arzi Bahis, Bahi No.4* is useful for our period and field of research. They contain the letters of correspondence between the rulers of Marwar and the Marathas for the period 1754 to 1843A.D. There are many letters written by the Marwar rulers to the Peshwas, the Sindhias and the Holkars either for some kind of support or for some relief of payments to be made to the Maratha *sardars*. The letters written by Maharaja Vijay Singh after the battle of Merta in 1790 regarding the agreements are also available in *Arzi Bahi no.4*. In totality this document gives a picture of the relations of various Maratha *sardars* with the state of Marwar.

Sanad Parwana Bahi: There are a total of 82 such *Bahis*, which cover the period from V.S.1821 to V.S.1857 (1764 to 1800A.D.). Each of the *Sanad Parwana Bahi* contains the detail of different *parganas* in Marwar. These give a good account of the measures being taken by the states.

KHYAT LITERATURE: These are the contemporary accounts of Marwar state and were written on the basis of the contemporary official records. There are a number of such *Khyats* but only the following have been used in the thesis- *Muhanta Nainsi- ri- Khyat, Marwar- ri- Khyat, Dayaldas- ri- Khyat, Bankidas- ri- Khyat* and *Maharaja Vijaysinghji- ri- Khyat, Ajit Vilas.*

Annals and Antiquities of Rajasthan by Col. James Tod is also an important source of information. We have made use of accounted of James

Tod given of his own times for a period just before him. Tod himself was witness to Maratha domination of the region could be taken at its face value. The deep aversion that he developed to the Marathas which is reflected in his could be writings considered as the popular perception of the times. We have used these literatures to give flavour to the historical reality[2].

PESHWA DAFTAR RECORDS (Selections from Peshwa Daftar), Compiled by G.S.Sardesai, Bombay, 1927-32. G.S.Sardesai has collected the *Peshwa Daftar Records* and after editing got them published in 45 volumes entitled as *Selections from Peshwa Daftar.* These records are mainly letters written by the Peshwas to their representatives and *sardars* all over India between the period 1724 and 1781. There are many letters in these records that give reference to the Maratha incursion in Rajasthan.

Marathachyan Itihasachi Sadhne, edited by V.K.Rajwade, 1838-1902. The work is one among twenty-two historical documents edited by V.K.Rajwade. The documents collected in volumes 1, 2, 6 and 7 are relevant to the study of Maratha movement towards north. We get many references to the instructions

[2] Many of the modern historiography have blamed Tod for his pre-conceived idea of the highly idealised Rajput states. He is also said to have developed the romantic concept of the identity of Rajasthan. The problem with his interpretation of Rajput states is that they are mainly based in the existing historiographical tradition of bards and genealogists attached to the Rajput families. He based his historical reconstructions on long poems which were compilations from ancient chronicals, put together by bards at much more recent dates There is a great possibility of concealment of some truth and false glorification of a ruler. We too have used khyat literature, which were written under royal patronage, but again the information provided by them have been included to substantiate our understanding based on primary accounts.

given by the Peshwa to the Maratha *sardars* regarding their expeditions in Mewar and Marwar and the demands in terms of *peshkash, mamlat,* etc.

Records available in the National Archives of India: The agents and officers of the British Government at Pune, Delhi, Ajmer and Jodhpur wrote letters to the Governor-Generals from time to time informing them about the political developments in Marwar and other parts of Rajasthan. The Governor-Generals in turn also gave instructions and orders to these officers. These letters and records have been collected at the National Archives and cover the period from 1785 to 1843 A.D. They have been classified as - 1. Rajasthan Agency Office Files; 2. Foreign Secret Consultations; 3. Foreign Political Consultations; 4. Proceedings of the Board of Directors. *Rajputana Agency Records, File No. 467-6/1946*, National Archives of India, N. Delhi is particularly significant because it gives information on the trend of having the land uncultivated for three to four years in Marwar.

The work has been divided into five chapters, each of which takes up the problem in question. To begin with, area study has been undertaken to find out the background to the Maratha entry into Rajasthan. The geographical features of Rajasthan and Maharashtra have, among other things, tremendously influenced the social, political and economic life of these regions. Hence, a study of the geographical configuration in understanding the history of the two locations is essential. In this process a detailed analysis of the historical geography of the two regions- Rajasthan and Maharashtra, has

been done. However, the emphasis has mainly revolved around the developments and change in the physical features in the context of the Rajput-Maratha relation. Through micro study an attempt has been made to locate the areas where changes have taken place and especially how the political map of Rajasthan began to change rapidly with the declining Mughal Empire.

Other questions taken up in this chapter are - why the Marathas had the tendency to expand beyond Marathwada in the north; why did they capture Malwa and then move towards Rajasthan; was there any difference in the nature of their expansionist attitude towards Malwa, Rajasthan, Bengal[3], Orissa[4] and Delhi; what was the role of geographical setting of Marathwada, Malwa and Rajasthan in the whole design? In other words, what role did the geographical location and environmental setting of Maharashtra play in the Maratha expansion and how was geography of Malwa and Rajasthan helpful or an obstacle in the expansion for the Marathas?

The area of study is confined to two powerful Rajput states of Mewar and Marwar. These areas, especially Marwar, have very little vegetation consisting mainly of thorny bushes and are sparsely populated. Climatological studies have found abnormal rainfall in this region as common. Droughts

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[3] It is mainly the collection of Chauth that drew the Marathas to Bengal. Transakar Banerjee, 'Maratha Invasions of Bengal, 1742-44,' A in A. Pawars (ed.) *Maratha History Seminar Papers,* Shivaji University, Kolhapur, 1971, pp. 177-189.

[4] Orissa was bought under tributary status by the Marathas. There were small states in Orissa held by tributary chiefs and the Marathas alowed them to maintain their territories and in return expected allegiance to the Maratha govt. See B.C. Ray, 'Maratha Policy in Orissa, in A. Pawar (ed), *op. cit.* pp. 307-315

leading to agricultural failures and famines have occurred throughout the historical period of settlement. The water tables in Western Rajasthan are low and range from 60 to more than 100 meters and ground water tends to be saline, brackish, and unfit for drinking or irrigation. The soil of this region is light-textured, gray-brown desert soil, which are alkaline and saline and thus is not suitable to agricultural production. The soil type is sandy in majority of the region except near water sources where we find light alluvium type soil. Such soil type is highly susceptible to wind erosion. The wind erosion in many areas tends to destroy the newly- germinated crops. The little vegetation that is possible in this area throughout the year is that of *khejri* and we get reference to *khejri* in many historical documents.

The Maratha penetration has mainly taken place in the states falling east of the Aravali range, i.e. Mewar, Jaipur, Kota & Bundi and only one state west of the Aravali, that of Jodhpur. It is basically because of the geographical setting and location that states like Bikaner remained safe. Its physical features came to its rescue.

The climate of Maharashtra is of 'tropical monsoon type' and so the temperature is uniformly high throughout the year. Even in the hills it does not fall below 18^0 centigrade in the coldest month. As the alluvial fertile soils are mainly confined to the flood plains of the streams (in the river valley), only small area is fit for cultivation. The red soil along the Western Ghats is highly leached and unfit for continuous cultivation. In the northern side of the

Konkan, the soils are generally black as they are developed on basalt. The soils on the hills are shallow and poor. Therefore, the region has since ancient times remained scarce in fodder and food production. Today only 29 per cent of the Konkan area is under cultivation which must have been even lesser in the medieval times. And as a result the ruling authority in this region had to look beyond its territory.

Chapter 2 is divided in two sections, the first of which revolves around the theme of the Maratha movement in the context of Rajasthan. The first half of the 18th Century witnessed the decline of the Mughal Empire and gradually it lost her well-knit control over the distant territories. At the same time, the Marathas had already started creating disturbance in the Deccan area in last quarter of the 17th Century. As soon as the Marathas saw the centralized authority waning, they started raiding the rich province of Malwa and went up to parts of Rajasthan. Malwa was both politically and economically situated on a strategic location and her neighbouring Mewar and Marwar states in Rajasthan were potentially lucrative territories.

The 18th Century went through a phase of tremendous increase in the power and authority of the Peshwas in Maharashtra and the gradual decline of the authority of the Maratha king. The Maratha power expanded in different areas like Malwa, Gujarat, Delhi, Orissa, and Rajasthan, etc. during the 18th century. But the question arises as to whether the Peshwas tried to implement their administrative system in the expanded territory. Was the authority of the

Peshwa able to create a sovereign Maratha state in the 18th century to be termed as an empire? To some extent Malwa came under direct control of the Peshwa, but in Rajasthan Maratha were not able to implement their administrative system.

In the 18th century collection of *Chauth, Sardeshmukhi* and *Khandani* remained the fulcrum of Maratha expansion to the north. The expansion of the Marathas into Malwa, Gujarat, Rajasthan and other northern territories was mainly for extraction of more and more revenue, thereby exploiting the peasantry to the hilt. The Marathas were able to implement their administrative system of *Swarajya* in the expanded territories of Malwa and Gujrat, but were not able to do the same in Rajasthan.

The dire need of the Marathas for money to finance their military expeditions could have been solved only through a stable revenue policy even outside the *Swarajya*. But that could not be done and so raiding the territories or getting them involved in local internecine rivalries in areas like Rajasthan etc. to collect money in return for help remained the only option. This was the central idea for all the Maratha *sardars* flowing from the *Peshwa*, but such a common purpose and idea could not have possibly created an empire. Further, a state to be called a centralized one needed permanent source of wealth and revenue. And it is only the sound institutions with uniform application allover like the agrarian system of the Mughals, which could have provided the needed fund. But the fact of the matter is that the Marathas

remained poor and could not find enough money for good administration that after all, primarily needs sufficient funds.[5] The *Peshwas* and the Maratha *Sardars* were alike in distress for want of funds and the mode of collection of revenue under the Marathas in itself indicates their sorry situation.

The Maratha *sardars* did not act on many occasions as members of the confederacy. The Maratha *sardars* had their own internal feuds, jealousy and rivalry. Few of the historians, however, talk of emotional bonding of the Marathas.[6] But it is hard to believe that emotion prevailed over power politics. When booty was the main consideration, emotional unity might have stood weak and secondary. We have shown in the second section of this chapter that contrary to this notion the different aspirants to the throne of Rajput states approached different Maratha *sardars* for support.

Another issue taken up in this chapter is as to how and why the Marathas were getting success after success in the north and neither the Mughals nor the Rajput rulers were able to check them because of their internal feuds.

The main emphasis of chapter 3 is on the impact of Maratha demands on the economy of Marwar. The decline of the Mughal power gave opportunity to different regional centers to enhance their own authority at the expense of the Mughal power. The Rajputs in Rajasthan and the Marathas in Maharashtra

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[5] G.H. Khare, 'The Marathas as Freebooters', in A. Pawar (ed.), *Maratha History Seminar Papers*, Kolhapur, 1971, p. 217.

[6] Andre Wink, *Land and Sovereignty in India under the 18th Century Maratha Swarajya*, Cambridge, 1987.

were no exception to this. The Rajput states in Rajasthan resumed their earlier process of conquest and expansion which had actually stopped during the second half of the 16th and 17th century under strong centralized Mughal rule. This led to a rivalry between Jai Singh of Jaipur and Ajit Singh of Marwar. Taking advantage of the declining power of the Mughals the Marathas also started their gradual movement and activity in the north and captured Gujarat and Malwa. They frequently raided Rajasthan even reached upto Delhi. In Rajasthan they collected *chauth* and *khandani* from the Rajput rajas. These raids for revenue collection became very frequent during the second half of the 18th century and adversely affected the economy of the states like Marwar and Mewar. The effect was highly disastrous in an arid zone like Marwar.

The financial status of Marwar state was already depressing because of the geographical factor as well as the decrease in the extra revenue coming to the state in the form of *tankhwa Jagir*. The declining political and socio economic condition created a disastrous situation for the agrarian system and the land use in Marwar. The production distribution and exchange relations between the landowners and the land users became all the more exploitative. The land use pattern it encouraged was not related to the land use capabilities and hence was over exploitative. The net result was that the need for preventing very intensive use of land was completely overlooked and the conservation needs of the resource base never figure in the agrarian system and measures of the Rajput rulers. These phenomena were further

aggravated by large scale migration of cultivators, especially the *raiyatis* to the more prosperous areas of Malwa, Hissar, Sirsa and Harouti, leading to an increasing the number of villages classified as *Ujar*, i.e. desolated.[7] It was a normal tendency of the cultivators to leave fallow the poorer quality land in such a situation.[8] The situation was all the more alarming in the region west of the Aravali ranges. The climate in this region was quite arid and there were frequent famines.

In the early 18th century after the death of Ajit Singh, the political situation in Marwar became very fragile. His successor Abhay Singh had to face opposition from within the Rathor nobility. Because of these internal revolts Maharaja Abhay Singh could not render any service to the Mughal emperor outside Marwar. This affected the economy of the state since *tankhwa jagir* outside Marwar as some sort of bonus for the state. These changes were observed more after Abhay Singh is death under Maharaja Vijay Singh. By his time the Maratha raids had become more frequent. Abhay Singh had introduced a new practice in the land rights. He started collecting lump sum amounts from the *pattadars* to pay a huge amount to the Marathas and to maintain his own internal administrative expenses. [9]

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[7] Dilbagh Singh, *The State, Landlords and Peasants:Rajasthan in the 18th Century*, Manohar, Delhi, 1990, p. 199.

[8] Marcia J. Frost, 'Coping with Scarcity: Wild Woods and Common Land: Kheda District (Gujrat,India), 1824/ 5', *Indian Economic and Social History Review (IESHR)*, Vol. 37, No. 3, July-September 2000, p. 311.

[9] Shyamal Das, *Vir Vinod*, Udaipur Raj Yantralaya, Udaipur, 1886, pp. 1218-21.

Maratha interference had already started in the second quarter of the 18th century in various states of Rajasthan. But this had not reached to such a proportion so as to affect the economy of these states directly during this period. There are stray references of the Marathas getting money in return for their help to either of the aspirants to the throne of the Rajput states, but these were not regular payments and did not force the rulers of Mewar or Marwar to introduce any new major and policy to increase the revenue of the state to adjust the extra expenditure incurred on account of their payments (demands of) to the Marathas till the first half of the 18th century. It is only in the second half of the 18th century that we start getting regular account of payments to the Marathas in terms of *mamlat, Nazrana, Barat, Lashkar Kharch, Fauz Kharch, Darbar Kharch, Khasa Sawari,* etc. All the payments made to the Marathas is mentioned in *Portfolio files (Kharitas), Hath Bahi No. 2, Arzi Bahi No.4,* Jodhpur Records. The Marathas squeezed the revenue resources by their frequent demands for money. The overall pressure on the economy was relatively greater in comparison to eastern Rajasthan owing to the geographical location of the state. The state fell in semi-arid and arid zone of Western Rajasthan and the agricultural land available here was very limited. These agricultural lands had a limited production capacity owing to the total dependence on rain and non-introduction of new agricultural technology during these years.

The huge regular payments to the Marathas left the treasury of Marwar empty. The ruler was not in a situation to pay the amount in cash and so he started making payments in terms of *hundi.* In 1765 Vijay Singh agreed to pay Rs.ten lakh as *hundi.* On many a occasion the Marwar ruler asked the *Sahukars* and *Mahajans* to pay the dues to the Marathas and the state used to pay such loans to these merchants later on. The Jodhpur Records of the period give reference to such payments by the *Mahajans* and *Sahukars.* In 1766 A.D. Nandvana Bohra gave Rs. one lakh ten thousand and in 1806 A.D. Kushalchand gave Rs. fifty thousand as loan to Marwar state.[10] *Maharaja Vijay Singhji - ri- Khyat* also mentions that Vijay Singh took loan from local *Bohras* on high interest rate.[11]

Thus, the economy of Marwar had reached to such a low that the state had to look out for financial help from the Mahajans. But this was not enough for the continuous interference of the Marathas and in turn the demand for money. Earlier Abhay Singh had started the practice of collecting lump sum amount from the *pattadars* to pay the Marathas.[12] After him Vijay Singh also continued this practice and infact imposed a lump sum amount of Rs. three hundred for every one thousand *rekh* from the *pattadars* and termed it as *mutallab.* In 1765 Vijay Singh further introduced a new tax called *'Rekhbab'.*[13]

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[10] *Arzi Bahi,* No. 4, *Jodhpur Records,* 1824 V.S. (1767 A.D.), p. 286.
[11] Brajesh Kumar Singh (ed.), *Maharaja Vijay Singh jiri-khyat,* Rajasthan, Prachya Vidya Pratishthan, Jodhpur,1997, p. 72.
[12] *Vir Vinod,* pp. 1218-21.
[13] *Maharaja Vijay Singhji-ri-khyat,* p. 72; *Marwar-ri-khyat,* Vol. III, p. 41.

The continuous battle fought between 1752 and 1756 had completely crumbled down the economy of Marwar. The treasury became empty. *Khalisa* land could not be cultivated during these years since the cultivators deserted the area with fear, and as a result a huge source of the income of the state was lost. Jalore *pargana* was given to Ram Singh after the treaty of 1756 where a huge a treasury of the Rathors was lying for years. Ajmer, Taragarh and Sambhar also went away to the Marathas by the same treaty. These regions were a major source of income for the state through the salt duties and other trade duties on various goods. Further the whole of southeast Marwar, which was agriculturally more fertile as compared to other regions of Marwar, went over to Ram Singh. Now Vijay Singh was left with relatively productive areas of only Jodhpur and a major part of semi- arid zone. Thus, on the one hand the income of the state was on decline, whereas the expenditure of Marwar increased by leaps and bounds due to continuous war with the Marathas, internal disturbance and huge Maratha demands.

Chapter 4 shows how the clan system[14] of the Rajputs prevented effective united action against their common enemy, the Marathas. While one faction of a particular Rajput ruling house sought help from the Peshwa or the Peshwa's local agent, the Holkars, the opposite faction asked for help from Holkar's rival Sindhia. The end result of all this was growing pressure on the

[14] The clan system had gave into oblivion under *Pax-Mughalica*, but after the decline of the Mughal empire again surfaced on the political horizon of Rajasthan.

economy of the state, because after every bit of help from the Marathas, the Rajputs promised to pay large sums of money to them. An effort has been made to allocate whether these political understandings with the Maratha *sardars* by different Rajput rajas or nobles are in any way reflection of rebellion within.

It is pertinent to know the intricacies of these political understandings, which in turn would raise the issue whether these were directly challenging the sovereignty of the ruler of a particular Rajput state, viz. Marwar, etc. Should the alliances of the nobles or of the family members of the ruler against the wishes of the latter be considered as a rebellion? This question is significant because many of the Rajputs holding *Jagirs* in a particular state were directly related to the reigning clan and the ruler enjoyed his strength through their solidarity. There were frequent conflicts within the reigning dynasty to capture the throne among the ruler's uncle, brothers and sons. The repression of these rebellions was mainly in two forms- one, by breaking off relations with the Raja and offering allegiance to other rulers or the Maratha *sardar* and secondly, sometimes they simply appropriated rights and status symbols that would normally be the prerogative of the ruler, and if the ruler tried to reassert they would oppose him openly. In both the cases the ruler perceived it as a mark of disrespect. And he like any Rajput was quick to regard the slightest sign of disrespect towards him as the worst kind of offense. The basic objective of such rebellions was to gain more and more *jagirdari* right through conciliation.

The analysis of these revolts has not been narrowed down to a clash between the ruler and his family members for more and more power. One important thing to understand here is that apart from the one that is leading the revolt there were many others who gave him support. So the real significance lies in the fact that they brought many other kinds of ties into play. A Rajput rebel always needed armed forces in order to challenge the sovereignty of the ruler and put pressure on him. And the numbers and strength of the armed forces to a large extent depended on the rebel's own resources. Normally, these family members fighting to take the throne were holders of large territories and fought the battle or sought the Maratha help out of the revenue collected from these areas. Thus, in Rajasthan political acts leading to rebellion did constitute one of the most important factors at work during the 18th century after the decline of the Mughal Empire. There is no denying the fact that there is occurrence of such revolts even before the 18th century, but they were very less.

The last chapter of the thesis explains the image the Marathas carried inside Rajasthan. When the Mughals were accepted as rulers then even Marathas would have been easily accepted and got adjusted in the society. But it was never so. The people of Rajasthan kept quoting the Marathas as 'Daccani' without any respect and this was primarily due to their ravaging and exploitative activities in the region.

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Abstract

In Rajasthan political acts leading to rebellion against the ruler constituted one of the important factors at work during the 18th century after the decline of the Mughal empire. However, efforts were always made by the Rajput rulers to accomodate the opposing Rajput clansmen and breathem to avoid conflict in the face of increasing Maratha interference. The Rajputs as ruling class had the liberal attitude to include other caste groups into politics and administration. The lower status of the Marathas in society (as they of

A district change is observed in the perception of the Marathas in the 18th century as compared to the earlier century when the Marathas were politically not so powerful and did not interfere in the affairs of the Rajput states. The Marathas had completely alienated themselves in Rajasthan by thier ravaging activities by the and 18th century. Therefore, the Rajputs did not hesitate even to side with foreign invader like Ahmad Shah Abdali against the Marathas and later on with the British to oust the Marathas from Rajasthan.

The last chapter of the thesis explains the image the Marathas carried inside Rajasthan. When the Mughals were accepted as rulers then even Marathas would have been easily accepted and got adjusted in the society. But it was never so. The people of Rajasthan kept quoting the Marathas as 'Daccani' without any respect and this was primarily due to their ravaging and exploitative activities in the region.

CHAPTER : I

ECOLOGY AND HISTORICAL GEOGRAPHY

History is said to be geography set in motion. And quite truely, the geographical features of Rajasthan and Maharashtra have, among other things, tremendously influenced the social, political and economic life of these regions. Hence, a study of the geographical configuration in understanding the history of the two locations is essential. In this process we shall go into the details of the historical geography of the two regions - Rajasthan and Maharashtra. However, our emphasis will mainly revolve around the developments and change in the physical features in the context of the Rajput - Maratha relation. Through our micro study we shall try to locate the areas where changes have taken place and specially how the political map of Rajasthan began to change rapidly with the declining Mughai empire.

Historical geography is not a new field of study for the historians. In the second half of the nineteenth century it was conceived as a branch of geography, which should be concerned, with the interrelationship of phenomena in space in a particular period or with the geography of the past period, and the influence of geographical factors on history.[1] But today historical geography also means the control, effect and the influence of the

[1] C.T. Smith, 'Historical Geography: Current Trends and Prospects', *Frontiers in Geographical Teaching* (ed.) R.J. Chorley and P. Haggett, London, 1965, pp. 118-143.

physical environment on man's activity in the past or on history and historical events. It is in this line of thought that the present chapter is intended.

The central issue of a majority of the works undertaken on the history of Maratha penetration in Rajasthan has been the political intrigues and decline of the Rajput power. There has also been a general tendency to see the developments in history of different regions in the mode of production framework, i.e. emphasis has largely been on economic interpretation of history. Many Marxist medieval India historians have found the concept of modes of production fruitful while classifying societies according to their technologies and relations of productions. There has been a relative lack of emphasis in this scheme on political structures and struggles and its impact on environment. The desire to identify modes of production, modes of power, and their attendant relations of production prevented agrarian studies from looking at the environment. The attempt to pinpoint the conditions under which different modes articulated, or were superseded, drew agrarian studies to regions where these phenomena appeared most developed.[2] Even if political problems have been discussed they are linked with depopulation, decline in productivity, dissolving impacts of external trade, etc., and have been termed as the problem of class struggle.[3] Our intention here is not to outrightly reject the utility of these works or to overlook the merits of the mode of production

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[2] Arun Agrawal and K.Sivaramakrishnan(eds.), *Social Nature: Resources, Representations, and Rule in India*, New Delhi, 2001,p.4

[3] Parth Chatterjee,' More on Modes of Power and the Peasantry' in Ranjit Guha(ed.)*Subaltern Studies II*, OUP, Delhi, 1983, p.314.

concept. But we also need to look beyond this concept when we are trying to interpret differences in the religious, cultural and ideological attributes of different societies. Similarly, the role of ecology and environmental setting of a particular region cannot be given less of an importance. In other words, how far have the human activities over a period of time led to the ecological degradation needs to be explored? Madhav Gadgil and Ramchandra Guha say that the most major lacuna in existing scholarship is an inadequate appreciation of the ecological infrastructure of human society.[4] For the holistic study of a society we need to investigate the ecological context as well, i.e. the soil, water, animal, mineral and vegetative bases of society in which the infrastructure is embedded. It is important to mention here that though Subaltern scholarship criticizes the other writings on later medieval Indian history for its overemphasis on revenue derived from agrarian surplus, the impact of technology on socio-economic structure, etc., and ignoring environmental history, they themselves have failed to evolve a somewhat distinct environmental history. This was mainly because Subaltern studies remained caught up in debates about semi-feudal remnants, pre-capitalist community, and other such symbols of important class formation in rural India.[5] Madhav Gadgil and Ramchandra Guha believe that even for environmental history, the study of the spatial distribution of agrarian and non-

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[4] Madhav Gadgil and Ramchandra Guha,*This Fissured Land: An Ecological History of India*,OUP,Delhi,1992,pp.12-13.
[5] Arun Agrawal and K.Sivaramakrishnan, *Social Nature*,p.5.

agrarian social formation is adequately required. [6]

So here in this chapter ahead once we explain the historical geography of the regions of our concern, we can discuss certain pertinent question such as why the Marathas have had this tendency to expand beyond Marathwada in the north? Why did they capture Malwa and then move towards Rajasthan? Was there any difference in the nature of their expansionist attitude towards Malwa, Rajasthan, Orissa and Delhi? What was the role of geographical setting of Marathwada, Malwa and Rajasthan in the whole design? In other words, what role did the geographical location and environmental setting of Marathawada play in the Maratha expansion and how was geography of Malwa and Rajasthan helpful or an obstacle in the expansion for the Marathas?

ECOLOGY

George Thomas was the first person to have called the geographical region in the western part of India as 'Rajputana' in 1800A.D.[7] Col. James Tod gave it the name 'Rajasthan' which included 21 princely states-Udaipur, Dungarpur, Banswara, Pratapgarh, Shahpura, Karauli, Jaisalmer, Bundi, Kota, Sirohi, Jaipur, Alwar, Jodhpur, Bikaner, Kishangarh, Danta, Jhalawad, Bharatpur, Dholpur, Palanpur, Tonk.[8] Rajasthan before the 17th Century was not known

[6] Madhav Gadgil and Ramchandra Guha (eds.), *op.cit*, p.13.
[7] William Franklin, *Military Memoirs of George Thomas*, London, 1805,p.347.
[8] Col. Tod, *Annals and Antiquities of Rajasthan*, vol1, p.1

by any single common name for long. The Mughals knew it as *Suba* Ajmer.[9] The first mention of Rajasthan as compact land of the princes with territorial divisions, plains and mountains occur in the Inscription of 1708 A.D.[10] The inscription has these lines-

देश धर्म क्षेत्र सागर सपवित्र क्षेत्र तनमध्ये,
मेरु शिखर सराज विजय राजस्थान सनृप्पनिवासः।

The British gave the name Rajputana for the administrative purposes to a huge area which included eighteen native states-Jaisalmer, Jodhpur, Bikaner, Alwar, Jaipur, Bharatpur, Dholpur, Karauli, Bundi, Kotah, Jhalawar, Pratapgarh, Banswara, Dungarpur, Udaipur, Sirohi, Kishangarh and Tonk, two chiefships of Shahpura and Lawa [11] and the British district of Ajmer-Merwara. The word Rajputana was an adopted form from Rajputan, the plural of Rajputs in Persian.[12]

Thus, here, by 18th century Rajasthan we mean administrative unit, which included Suba Ajmer of the Mughals as well as independent and semi-independent principalities. Deryck O. Lodrick says that this treatment of Rajasthan as an administrative region is an intellectual concept with some purpose of thought, but since here in this chapter we are trying to trace the

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[9] Irfan Habib, *An Atlas of the Mughal Empire*, OUP, Delhi, 1982,p.viii.
[10] The Sardar Museum, *MS*, Jodhpur.
[11] W.W.Hunter, *The Imperial Gazetteers of Rajputana*, Rajputana Province, Oxford, 1921,p.1.
[12] G.N. Sharma, *Social life in Medieval Rajasthan (1500-1800 A.D.)*, Agra, 1968, p.1.

contribution of state towards land degradation we cannot do away with it.[13]

Although Deryck O. Lodrick has given a somewhat distinct explanation for the creation of Rajasthan as a region, he says that the desert, the dress of the people, and the Rajput clans have not only helped in creating an image of Rajasthan, they are also elements of a specific environmental setting, cultural tradition and social structure that have all played a significant role in shaping the character of modern Rajasthan.

The geographical location of Rajasthan is between 23^0 3' to 300 12' in the north and 67 30' to 78 18' in the east. Roughly, the shape of Rajasthan is like irregular rhombus. The territory is integrated diagonally into two parts by the Aravali range running from northeast to southwest. However, there is a little break in the Aravali range where the city of Ajmer is situated. The upper part or the Western part (we may call it) occupies about two third of the area of Rajasthan and includes the states of Jodhpur, Bikaner and Jaisalmer. This western part, which is an assemblage of many states, is comparatively well drained and fertile.[14] In the eastern side of Jodhpur lies the state of the Kachwahas with its independent offshoots, the Shekhawati state and Alwar. In the southern part of Rajasthan lies the historic land of Mewar with the vassal states of Dungarpur, Banswara and Pratapgarh. In the southeast along side Mewar is Harauti, which includes the states of Kota and Bundi. G.N. Sharma

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[13] 'Rajasthan as a Region: Myth or Reality' in Karine Schomer, Joan L. Erdman, Deryck O. Lodrick and Lloyd I. Rudolph (eds.), *The Idea of Rajasthan: Explorations in Regional Identity*, Vol.I, Manohar, New Delhi, 1994 p.2.

[14] S.S. Dhabriya, *Eco-Crisis in the Aravalli Hill Region*, Environmentalist, Jaipur, 1988, p.1.

18th CENTURY RAJASTHAN

says that Rajasthan during the 18th century comprised independent and semi-independent principalities like Jodhpur, Jaisalmer, Bikaner, Ajmer, Nagor, Sirohi, Udaipur, Dungarpur, Jaipur, Alwar, Bharatpur and Bundi, which were known as Maru, Mada, Jangaldesh, Ahicchatrapur, Arbud, Medpat, Vagad, Dhundhar, Mewat and Hadoti respectively during the early medieval period.[15] He has been able to dig out the earlier names of other areas as well. He says that the tract on the Mahi River around Pratapgarh was called Kanthal. It was so called because it formed the border (*Kanth*) between Mewar on the north, Vagad on the west, and Malwa on the east and the south.The land between Devaliya (Pratapgarh) and Banswara consisted of fifty six groups of villages and, therefore, that tract of land was called Chappan. The land between Dungarpur and Banswara was called Mewal. The area between Devaliya and Mewal was called Mundal.The area between the Jarga and Rahagra Mountains was called Deseharo (land covered with green grass). Another name for the area around Udaipur was Girwa, land surrounded by *giri* or mountains.

Physically, Rajasthan has four divisions - (a) the western sandy plains, (b) the Aravali range and hilly region, (c) the eastern plains and (d) the southeastern plateau. The Thar Desert makes up the western plains of Rajasthan, which spreads from the western slopes of the Aravali up to Sind. These areas have very little vegetation consisting mainly of thorny bushes and are sparsely populated. Climatological studies have found abnormal rainfall in

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15 G.N.Sharma,*Social Life in Medieval Rajasthan (1500-1800)*,Agra, 1968,p.2.

this region as common. Monsoon failures occur during 40 per cent of years, and normal rainfall during monsoon occurs only during 26 per cent of the weeks when it is expected.[16] Droughts leading to agricultural failures and famines [See Appendix 3.1] have occurred throughout the historical period of settlement.[17] The annual rainfall averages from 250 mm to 350 mm and so crop cultivation in this part is carried out for subsistence production of food and fodder, along with livestock rearing. The water tables in Western Rajasthan are low and range from 60 to more than 100 meters and ground water tends to be saline, brackish, and unfit for drinking or irrigation.[18] The soil of this region is light-textured, gray-brown desert soil, which are alkaline and saline and thus is not suitable to agricultural production. The soil type is sandy in majority of the region except near water sources where we find light alluvium type soil. Such soil type is highly susceptible to wind erosion. The wind erosion in many areas tends to destroy the newly-germinated crops. The little vegetation that is possible in this area throughout the year is that of *khejri* and we get reference to *khejri* in many historical documents. Luni is the only major river of semi-permanent nature in this area and flows during the rainy season only. The Aravali range and hilly region extends from Sirohi to Khetri and stretches up to

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[16] *India· Case Study on Desertification*, Luni Development Block, United Natios Conference on Desertification, August-September 1977, central Arid Zone Research Institute. Jodhpur,1977.

[17] L.A. Ramdas, 'Monsoon and Rainfall Pattern in Indian Sub-continent', in B.C.Law (ed.), *Mountains and Rivers of India*, National Committee for Geography, Calcutta, 1968.

[18] Carol Henderson, 'Famines and Droughts in Western Rajasthan: Desert Cultivaators and Periodic Resource Stress', in Karine Schomer and others (eds.), *op. cit.*, Vol.II, p.4.

Delhi. Geologically it is one of the most ancient hill ranges of the world.[19] It covers sirohi, Udaipur, Banswara and Dungarpur districts. The Aravali hill system has greatly influenced the climate of Rajasthan and has also been a check against the process of desertification from the western side of Rajasthan to the eastern. But the hill only acted as a constraint and checked the spread of desert till it remained green and well forested.[20]

The eastern plains extend from the east of Aravali range to the plains of the rivers Ganga and Yamuna. Its eastern boundary is marked by the eastern edge of the Aravali up to the north of Udaipur. The Vindhyan plateau marks the south–eastern limit of the plains. The area is comparatively well off in agricultural production. In fact the Maratha penetration has mainly taken place in these states falling east of the Aravali range, i.e. Mewar, Jaipur, Kota & Bundi and only one state west of the Aravali, that of Jodhpur. It is basically because of this geographical setting and location of Aravali range that states like Bikaner remained safe. Its physical features came to its rescue[21]. In view of the obstruction offered by the physical features and the climate of the State of Bikaner,outsiders might never have felt tempted to come to the area and the history of Bikaner might have passed mostly as record of uneventful events confined usually to issues of local importance alone. The Rathore principality

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[19] K.S. Singh, *People of India:Rajasthan*, Vol. xxxviii, part I, Anthropological Survey of India, Popular Prakashan, Mumbai, 1998, p.1

[20] S.S. Dhabriya, *Eco-Crisis-the Aravalli Hill Region*, p.7.

[21] Karni Singh, *The Relation of the House of Bikaner with the Central Powers [1465-1949)*, Munshiram Manohar Lal, New Delhi, *1974, p.6.*

of Bikaner offered so inhospitable a region that only a few outsiders dared penetrate the sand dunes and disturb the peace of the area. The Bikaner State remained immune from attacks from outside. Neither the Maratha nor the Pindaris ever disturbed the peace.This offered a very great security to the area from external attacks and allowed the rulers of Bikaner to shape the destiny of their principality independently. It meant an autonomy well suited for the growth of an indigenous culture and undisturbed harmony. The sense of security provided to the people residing in the area had primarily been responsible for the prosperity of *Seths, Sahukars* and other mercantile communities though in every other respect the waste lands of Bikaner offered practically no opportunities for any prosperity to flourish. The *Seth* and *Sahukars* of Bikaner who conducted trade on all India basis and resided mostly outside the state in distant places like Calcutta and Bombay kept their wealth hoarded in Bikaner primarily because of the security provided by the physical features. The security provided by nature induced literary people to shift their manuscripts to this area and that explains the presence of thousands of manuscripts even today in the Bikaner state Archives.

Rajasthan was economically underdeveloped during the late medieval period as compared to the neighboring Malwa, Gujarat, Delhi and Agra because of ecological limitations. Nevertheless, its geographical situation made it strategically important to any ruling authority. During the Mughal period its close proximity to the heartland of the Mughal Empire had made the

control over it crucial for the Mughal Central Government. The economic signification of the region lay in the trade routes connecting the upper Gangetic plain with the seaports of Gujarat passed through its territories. The close integration of Eastern Rajasthan with the Mughal state structure and economic processes at work during the 17th century brought about a marked growth in its economy. [22]But, the decline of the Mughal Empire in the century majorly affected the socio-economic structure of Rajasthan. The political map of Rajasthan began to change rapidly with the ever-increasing weakness of the Mughal state structure after the death of Aurangzeb. Each of the various Khalisa *parganas* in the Ajmer *Suba* was either being granted in *Jagir* or was forcibly being occupied and acquired on lease by the powerful Rajput rulers of the states like Mewar, Marwar, and Amber, etc. As mentioned in the introduction chapter we have confined our research to only two of the powerful Rajput states Mewar & Marwar. Let us start our discussion with the historical geography of Mewar taking into consideration the plans and action of the Rajput rulers.

MEWAR

Mewar is considered the oldest state of Rajasthan.[23] The land was known as Medpat in Sanskrit works of ancient period. The boundaries of Mewar kingdom changed from time to time. During the period when its power and prosperity

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[22] Dilbagh Singh, *The State, Landlords and Peasants: Rajasthan in the 18th Century*, N.Delhi, 1990, p.2.
[23] G.H. Ojha, *History of Rajputana*, Vol.I, Vedic Yantralya, Ajmer, 1931, p.1.


Map of
UDAIPUR
OR
MEWAR STATE
Scale 1 Inch = 16 Miles
Miles
REFERENCES
1 Udaipur
2 Merwara
3 Shahpura
4 Gwalior
5 Indore
6 Tonk
7 Jhalawar
DUNGARPUR
BANSWARA
PARTABGARH
SHAHPURA
JAIPUR
TONK
INDORE
MEWAR

was at its peak, the Mewar state extended up to Bayana in the northeast, Rewakantha in the south, and Malwa in the southeast.[24] But as a result of repeated external invasion its boundary shrunk till Neemuch, Bundi and Kota in the east; Ajmer in the north; Jodhpur and Sirohi in the west and Banswara, Dungarpur and Pratapgarh in the south. The Aravalli hills acted as a natural frontier for Mewar in the southwest. The territory as it existed in the early 18th century, constituted a long narrow strip of land covered with thick forests and rugged valleys. The northeastern part of Mewar is plain and fertile and is good for cultivation. The agricultural production from this region was quite profiting for the state. The rulers of Mewar (Ranas) like Maharana Pratap were successful in defending their homeland, despite intense pressure of the Mughal state, largely due to the richmen and resources of this region. Mewar is one state of Rajasthan which is fortunate to have the flow of several small rivers, like Banas, Khari, Kothari, etc., and this adds to the fertility of its soil. Irrigation facility were also provided by the state and we have reference to various canals and lakes for such purposes built during the 17th century-Gyan Sagar (1664), Raj Samudra (1676), Jai Samudra (1676).[25] The northern and the eastern parts of Mewar consist generally of an elevated plateau. There are long strips of waste and rocky patches of single hills rising here and there in the plains. The southern and western parts are mostly covered with rocks, hills

[24] K.S. Gupta, *Mewar and the Maratha Relations (1735-1818 A.D.)*, S. Chand and Company, N. Delhi, 1971, p.1.
[25] G.N. Sharma, *Mewar and the Mughal Emperors*, p.195.

and dense jungle. It has been roughly estimated that nearly two-third of the state is plains and the rest one-third is hilly and mountaineous.[26] The greatest elevation of the tableland is about 2000 feet above the level of the sea and has a very gradual slope towards the northeast. However, towards the south the descent is quite rapid between 40 to 50 feet per mile and the area is broken into numerous low ranges of hills with narrow valleys between them.

This wild tract is locally known as the '*Chappan*'[27] The Aravalli range enters Mewar state from Merwara at a height of about 2,383 feet with not so wide breadth. The hills continue in a south - westerly direction with the height gradually increasing and reaching a height of 4315 feet near Kumbhalgarh. When we move further south the height of the hills decreases but it spreads out majorly in breadth by about sixty mile. In the south-west Mewar the Aravallis extends to the valley of the Son River near Dungarpur and of the Mahi River near Banswara. The slopes of the hills are covered with forest trees and jungle and thus formed a barrier for traffic on wheels before the 19th century.

However, the Aravalli range in Mewar has few passes through which horsemen might have moved. There are passes like Pagalia Nal leading down to Desuri in Jodhpur, Hathidara Nal leading down to Ghaneras in Jodhpur, Someshwar Nal and Sadri pass. The Aravalli hills found in the rest of the area

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[26] K.L.Verma, 'Allied Geography of Mewar', in suresh K. Sharma and Usha Sharma (eds.), *Rajasthan through the Ages*, Vol.1, Deep and Deep Publications, New Delhi, 1999, p.20.
[27] *Ibid.*, p.20.

of Mewar are comparatively scattered. In the southeast, there is a range from Bari Sadri to the Jakam River. Chittorgarh fort itself is situated on the hills and to the east of Chittor is a series of hills running in north-south direction and form narrow valleys parrelled to each other. On the eastern border of Mewar is another fort of Mandalgarh situated on the hills. The most important river in Mewar is the Chambal and its tributory the Banas. The ancient name of the Chambal was Charmavati.[28] The Chambal river rises in Central India and enters Mewar from the eastern side near the fort of Charasgarh. Then it moves to Bhainsrorgarh. From Bhainsrorgarh the Chambal river flows towards north-east and runs along the borders of Bundi, Kota, Jaipur, Dholpur and Gwalior states. The banas is the tributary of the Chambal Rivers. It literally means 'hope of the forest' and is said to have been named after a chaste shepherdess.[29] While the shepherdess was disporting in its waters an intruder was attracted on her charms and then she prayed for aid to the almighty and was metamorphosed into the stream. The Banas river rises in the Aravalli hills about three miles from the fort Kumbhalgarh and then flows southerwards until it meets the Gogunda plateau. It is on the banks of the Banas River that the famous Vaishnava shrine of Nathdwara is situated. Here, mother of Peshwas Bajirao had paid visit during the first half of the 18th century and the event had far-reaching political significance about which we shall discuss in the Chapter 2 ahead. The river forms a boundary between Udaipur and a portion of

[28] K.L. Varma, 'Allied Geography of Mewar', *op. cit.*, vol.1, p. 21.
[29] *ibid.*, p.22.

Gwalior territory. It also runs along the prodder's of Ajmer, Jaipur, Jaipur, Bundi, Tonk and Karauli states and eventually falls into the Chambal rivers. The Banas is not a perennial river and in the summer normally contains only pools of water. But in Mewar region since the riverbed is hard and rocky, so the waters as retained for a longer time under the surface to percolate through the wells sunk everywhere on either side of the riverbanks. Another river of Mewar of little significance is the Berach River. It rises in the hills north of Udaipur and is known locally as Ahar after the name of a village in that area. It flows to the southeast direction and flows into the Udai Sagar lake near Udaipur. Once it enters into the open plain area it is recognized as the Berach. The climate of Mewar, as compared to Marwar, is generally healthy and the summer temperature does not go very high as it happens in the northwestern parts of Rajasthan. Mewar is one of the regions in Rajasthan, which has not much shortage of rainfall. The area receives rains not only from the southwest monsoon coming from the Indian Ocean, but also from the moisture coming from the Bay of Bengal in the southeast. Sometimes when the southwest monsoon fails, the monsoon from southeast comes to the rescue of Mewar lakes in the season. Of course, for the poor peasant the situation is not very favourable, but they donot have to face extreme drought like states of Western Rajasthan.

Thus, Mewar being a prosperous state had to face various attacks from different fronts over a period of time. Mahendraji II, better known as Bapa

Rawal in 734 A.D, founded the State or Kingdom, known as Mewar. The historical records are very scanty for the next 500 years after him. Karan Singh ruled the state towards the end of the 12th century and during his time the ruling family was divided into two branches. The senior branch ruled at Chittor with the title of Rawal and the junior branch settled in the village of Sisodia and took the title of Rana.[30] During the 12th and 13th centuries, attempts were frequently made to capture Mewar under the Delhi Sultanate rulers. In 1303 A.D. Allauddin Khalji was successful in capturing Chittor from Rawal Rattan Singh I. He then named the fort as Khizirabad after the name of his son Khizir Khan. However, the Mewar ruler soon recaptured Chittor. Rawal Ratan Singh had no heir to the throne and so the rulership of Chittor passed on to the Rana family. The Ranas repulsed the attacks of Mohammad bin Tughluq and the rulers of Malwa during the 14th and 15th centuries. Rana Hammir Singh defeated Mohammed bin Tughluq and Mohammed Khalji was challenged by Rana Kumbha in 1437A.D.[31]

MEWAR DURING THE MUGHAL PERIOD

Maharana Sangram Singh (popularly known as Rana Sanga) was the contemporary of Babar, the first Mughal emperor. Mewar was at the height of its glory and splendor under his rulership. Rana Sanga had infact emerged as

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[30] *Imperial Gazetteer of India*, Vol.XXIV, p.88.
[31] Col.JamesTod, *Annals and Antiquities of Rajasthan*, Vol.I, London, 1957,p.241.



RAJASTHAN DURING THE MUGHAL PERIOD
[Known as Suba AJMER]

the leader of the Rajput chiefs of Rajasthan and with the combined forces of various Rajput rulers he won over the territories of Malwa and Gujarat. He also defeated the ruler of Delhi Sultanate, Ibrahim Lodi, and thus came up as the most powerful ruler of northern & western India. However, at the same time Babar was threatening to take control of northern India. Babar had already defeated Ibrahim Lodi in the First Battle of Panipat and the time had come to stop him from further expanding. Few historians believe that Rana Sanga himself had invited Babar to come to India. And defeat Ibrahim Lodi. And this understanding of historian is based on the reference of Rana Sanga ditching Babar in the first battle of Panipat in *Babarnama*. But this is a very simplistic explanation of a primary record. We should note that Babar had his own problems in Central Asia with the Uzbegs i.e. – they were threatening his authority. And so he had to move to Kabul and northwestern regions of India. His movement down south had actually started many years before the Battle of Panipat in 1526. However, we may conclude that Rana Sanga had not been able to predict the future. He might have seen Babar's invasions to different northwestern territories as temporary ones like any other invasions of the early 11th century Muslim invaders. So he never bothered to stop Babar and neither preferred to remain as silent observer. But when he realized that his own powers and existence are being threatened, he became serious about checking Babar's expansion. Rana Sanga fought a battle with Babar at Khanwa in 1527. In the beginning Babar seems to have had lost his control

over the war, but he continued to fight heroically and kept on inspiring his soldiers. He vowed not to drink wine in future, presenting himself as a pious Islam follower. Babar won the battle against Rana Sanga at last, but this victory was mainly due to his use of gun-powder in the battle. The defeat of Rana Sanga sealed his fate of becoming the supreme authority in India, although Mewar continued to enjoy its independent status. After the death of Babar, Humayun became the Mughal Emperor but he hardly got any time to look towards Mewar. However, he did get a letter from Rani Karnavati of Chittor asking for help as Bahadurshah of Gujarat had besieged the fort of Chittor. When Akbar became the rulers and escaped the regency period (1556-60), he started expanding the Mughal forces and authority. In 1567 he marched against Chittor. Rana Udai Singh was the ruler of Mewar at that time. He did not bow before Akbar and left the fort of Chittor and took refuge in the hills of Mewar. Jaimal and Patta fought valiantly against the advancing Mughal army and died defending the fort. Akbar had come out with a policy of making matrimonial alliances with the daughter of the Rajput ruling houses. For many others he forced them to accept his sovereignty. Although Chittor fort was lost, but Mewar, now under Maharana Pratap Singh, did not relent. He recaptured all the forts of Mewar, except Chittor & Mandalgarh. Jahangir continued the same policy that his father Akbar had followed against the Rajput rulers. From the very beginning of his rulership, Jahangir set his target at Mewar. The successor of Rana Pratap, Rana Amar Singh was faced with the problem of

severe economic and political crisis and so accepted the Mughal sovereignty in 1614 A.D. However, Mewar paid only nominal allegiance to the Mughal emperor. Rana Amar Singh was exempted from attending the court, but his son had to provide imperial service at the Mughal court. Chittor was once again given to Amar Singh on the condition that it would not be fortified or repaired. The successor of Amar Singh, Karan Singh enjoyed a friendly relation with the Mughals. When Aurangzeb became the Mughal emperor, his relation with the Mewar began to breakaway. Mewar tried to strengthen his position when Aurangzeb got himself engaged in the Deccan area. In fact, Maharana Raj Singh supported the cause of the infant prince of Jodhpur against the wishes of Aurangzeb. The last clash of the Mewar rulers with the Mughal emperor took place in 1711, when Bahadurshah was the ruler at Delhi. Ram Baz Khan and his younger brother Nahar Khan are said to have marched into the Mewar terretories and the battle took place upto the Mughals and the Mewar rules near Bandanwara.[32] The Mughals lost this battle. But Mewar after this had to face the ever-expanding Marathas, who had already penetrated into the Malwa region and could threaten the Mewar authority. At the same time the weakness of the Mughal empire during the early half of the 18th century gave the Rajput rulers an opportunity to forcibly require the Mughal territory in Rajasthan or to acquire land on lease. Mewar occupied the *parganas* of Pur, Mandol and those lying to the east of them, which had

[32] Shyamal Das, *Vir Vinod*, pp.939-42.

MARWAR IN THE 18th CENTURY



previously been under the Mewar rule.[33] In 1717A.D., the Maharana of Mewar also secured the Rampura *pargana* by means of an imperial grant and reasserted the dominance of Mewar over the neighbouring states of Dungarpur, Banswara and Deolia Pratapgarh. The *Pargana* of Idar was secured on lease *(theka)* from Maharaja Abhay Singh of Marwar in 1727 A.D. However, Mewar could not retain Idar for very long, but the adjoining hilly areas were included within the Mewar territories for good and have continued to be so thereafter.

MARWAR

Marwar is a corrupt form of Maroowar, meaning the region of death[34] and it came to be known as Jodhpur only after the city of Jodhpur was founded in 1459 A.D. Marwar is placed in the western part of Rajasthan and lies between the latitude 24^0 36'—27^0 40' and longitude 20^0 4'-75^0 23'. It is the largest Rajput state of Rajasthan and bounded on the north by Bikaner and Shekhawati, on the north-west by Jaisalmer, on the east by Jaipur, Kishangarh and Ajmer, and on the south by Udaipur and Sirohi. Physical diversity is one of the many features of Marwar with a basic contrast in geographical set-up of the western and the southeastern parts.The western portion is purely a desert whereas the other half is relatively more fertile.R.C.Sharma uses the term 'little

[31] Raghubir Sinh, *Studies on Maratha and Rajput History*, Jodhpur, 1989,p.130.
[34] R.K. Sharma, *Maratha Relations with Major States of Rajputana*, N. Delhi, 1973, p.18.

desert' for the later part.[35]The pattern of settlement in area such as this largely depended on the character of water supply. Since the eastern and the southeastern portions has higher water-table, the settlement tended to be denser than the remaining parts where it was much lower.[36]

Traditionally the Rathors have been the rulers of Jodhpur state. They claim their descent from Rama of Ayodhya and the original name of their clan was Rashtrakuta, which later on crystallised into the word Rathor.[37] The Rashtrakutas ruled over the Deecan area during the 9th and 10th centuries, but were ousted by the Chalukyas in 973 A.D. and so they moved to Kannauj. Here they founded a new dynasty of Gahadwala (Gaharwar). The last of the Gahadwala rulers, Jai Chand, was defeated in 1194 A.D. by Mohammed Ghori. Siaji and Sait Ram were the two grandsons of Jai Chand and they decided to give their services to the chief of Kolumund near Bikaner. This was the period when the small principalities of Western Rajasthan were constantly fighting with each other. Gradually, the Rathor Rajputs won the confidence of the rulers of Pali by giving their services, as they were quite successful in maintaining order (*Zabta*) in Pali territories. The disturbances posed by the Mer tribesmen were also reduced. Rathor sardars were given land in the neighbouring areas and with the matter of time they gained so much strength

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[35] R.C.Sharma, *Settlement Geography of the Indian Desert*, New Delhi, 1972,pp.7-10.

[36] B.L.Bhadani, *Peasants, Artisans and Entrepreneurs: Economy of Marwar in the Seventeenth Century*, Rawat Publication, Jaipur, 1999, pp.20-27.

[37] The Ruling Princes, Chiefs and leading Personages in Rajputana and Ajmer, Govt. of India c.f. R.K. Saxena, *Maratha Relations with Major State of Rajasthana*, p.18.

that they captured many surrounding areas by the time of Raw Chand (C.1383 to 1432 A.D.), the Rathore chief, they ruled over Pali, Khed, Bhadrajeen, Kodna, Mahawa (Mallani), Barmer and some areas of Bikaner.[38] Rao Chand had made Mandor the Capital in 1381 A.D., but in the time of Rao Jodha the seat of government was shifted to Jodhpur 1459 A.D. Thus, the period of 13th and 14th Centuries that started with mutual agreement between the Rathor Princess and the local chiefs of Pali got transformed into Rathor dominance and sovereignty at the end. In the process of their expansion the Rathors followed the practice of bhai-bant.[39] Under it, the sons and brothers of the ruler used to occupy various territories won over by them and these territories were termed as *thikanas* [See Appendix 1.1 for the name of the *thikanas* in Marwar]. These *thikanedars* had a kind of political and normal obligation to provide military service to the state. But obviously one cannot expect very strong and honest service by the *thikana* holders to the state throughout the medieval period. To a large extent it depended on the strength and competency of the individual ruler and how far he was able to keep his clan members in good humor. In normal circumstances, the system of *bhai-bant* might form a true political entity, able to acquire and maintain some sort of rule within the state and even beyond the state borders. But this process was in no way automatic and so simple to achieve for a ruler. The ruler to be successful would never

[38] G.D. Sharma, *Rajput Polity, A Study of Politics and Administration of the State of Marwar, 1638-1749*, Manohar, New Delhi, 1977, p.3.
[39] *Ibid*, p.5.

grant any members of his clan a domain large enough to challenge his authority. At the same time he needed these clan members because without them he would have no chance of withstanding the claims of neighbouring states. The Rathore sardars also allowed the Rajputs of other clans and the Jats to settle in their *thikanas*.[40] The logic behind insisting these new groups in the conquired areas was probably to increase the numbers of people loyal to them and to extend the area under cultivation. As said earlier, the political set-up of the Marwar state was such that only a strong and diplomatic ruler could keep the *thikanedars* united and obidient to the state. The Rathor *sardar* could declare themselves independent under a weak ruler and infact such a situation arose in the state after the death of Rao Jodha in 1484 A.D.[41] It is only when Rao Maldeo becme the ruler in 1532 A.D. that the political environment of the state changed considerably as he was very strong. He added forty parganas to his hereditary dominion of Jodhpur which included Ajmer, Barmer, Didwana, Bikaner, Jodhpur, Sanchor,Jalor, Jaisalmer, Sojhat, and Merta.[42] He even conquered the neighboring Bikaner state in 1541 A.D. Although Rao Maldeo's power was reduced after his defeat at the hands of Sher Shah and he lost Sambhar, Didwane, Lalsot, Chetsu, etc, but regained these areas after Sher Shah's death and occupied Barmer, Kotada and some parts of Jaisalmer

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[40] Narain Singh Bhati (ed.), *Marwar-ra-Pargana-ri-Vigat* by Munhat Nainsi, Vol.II, 1969,p.p. 40-42.
[41] *Ibid*, vol.I, 1968, p.38.
[42] Munhta Nainsi, *Marwar-ra-pargana ri-Vigat*, Narain Singh Bhati (ed.), Vol.I, 1968, p.p.42-44.

territory. Rao Maldeo had so much increased his power that he started the practice of assigning *pattas* ,i.e. land revenue grants to his Rathor kingsmen who served in his army. There was a difference in assigning *thikanas* and giving *patta* grant to his supporters. Under the *thikanas*, the Rathor *sardars* had some kind of autonomy for internal administration, whereas the *pattas* were assigned purely in lieu of their service. The *pattadar (patta* holder) was responsible for the collection of revenue and civil and judicial administration. If we look at the functioning of the *pattadari* system it looks very much similar to the *Iqtadari* system of the Delhi Sultanate. But there is a major difference. The nature of the holdings of Rathor *pattadari* was more permanent in nature because of their kingship ties and clan-solidarity. But again the *patta* system could be successful only when the ruler was powerful enough to keep the *pattadars* under control. Rao Maldeo was able to handle both the *thikanedars* and the *pattadars* very successfully. But Rao Maldeo's death in 1562A.D. led to political instability in Marwar as his sons started fighting with each other for *gaddi* of Jodhpur. This was the period when the Mughal Empire under Akbar was trying to take control of the neighbouring territories. Akbar had earlier brought Jaitaran and Merta in Rajasthan under his rule[43] and now he got the opportunity to intervene in Jodhpur state as well. Among Rao Maldeo's sons- Rao Ram, Udai Singh and Ravimal, Rao Ram was the first to approach Akbar for support. Akbar recognised the hereditary right of Rao Ram and sent

[43] Akbar captured Merta in 1562 Abul Fazl, *Akbarnama*, Maulawi Abdur Rahim (ed.),Vol.II, Calcutta,1879, pp.161-62

Hussain Quli Khan to march against Jodhpur along with Rao Ram. They first captured Sojat and then Seized Jodhpur. Gradually, Akbar brought whole Jodhpur territory under the *Khalisa* and gave *Jagir* to various Rathore Sardars. He even discontinued the hereditary claims of a ruling family over the *gaddi* of Jodhpur. He made it clear before the Rathore *sardars* that as a sovereign ruler it was his prerogative to choose the person for *gaddi.* Thus, the internal rivalry and conflict among the Rathor sardars had led to their downfall. However, many of the *sardars* joined the imperial service at the Mughal court during Akbar's period and were given *Mansabs* and *Jagirs.* But not all these *jagirs* were *Watan Jagirs des-ra-pargana* (ancestral territory).[44]Another kind of *Jagir* came into play called *tankhwa jagir.* When Marwar accepted the suzerainty in 1563 the then ruler had paid 4 lakh *Pirojiya* as *peshkash.*[45] And now when they were bound to obey the order of the Emperor as any other noble, the estimated revenue of the area called *jama* was adjusted against the salary of the ruler's *mansab.*[46] As *watan jagir* could not be transferred and was permanent in nature, the Rathors were given *tankhwa jagir* in lieu of the balance of their salary.

When Udai Singh ascended the throne in 1583, Akbar gave him a part of *pargana* Jodhpur.[47] Gradually he strengthened his position through

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[44] S. Nurul Hasan , *Thoughts on Agrarian Relations in Mughal India*, New Delhi, 1971. P.37.
[45] B L Bhadani, *Peasants, Artisans and Entrepreneurs: Economy of Marwar in the Seventeenth Century,* Jaipur, 1999, p.2.
[46] Irfan Habib, *Agrarian System of Mughal India*, Bombay, 1963, p.184.
[47] *Vir Vinod*, Vol.II, p.815. Also see V.S.Bhargawa, *Marwar and the Mughal Emperors*, Delhi, 1996, p.77.

matrimonial alliance with the Mughals. He married his daughter to Prince Salim.[48] Munhta Nainsi says that at the time of his accession Udai Singh was given the *mansab* rank of 1000 *zat* and 800 *sawar* and at the time of his death he reached the rank of 1500 *zat* and 1500 *sawar*.[49] The successors of Udai Singh were able to get further enhancement in their *Jagir*. Raja Suraj Singh got the *mansab* of 5000 *zat* and 5000 *sawar*. And when Gaj Singh became the Raja of Marwar he further got the *parganas* of Phalodi, Jalor, Sanchor, Merta and Nagaur.[50]

Under the rulership of Jaswant Singh (he got the *gaddi* of Jodhpur in 1638 A.D.) the Rathors began to regain their firmer hold over Marwar. Under the rulership of Shah Jahan, he gradually got the *mansab* increased for himself through his services to the Mughal state. At the time of his succession he was granted the *mansab* of 4000 *zat*/4000 *sawar*, which was raised to 7000/7000 of which 5000 were *du-aspa, sih-aspa*, by 1657 A.D. So within 20 years time he was able to get all the *parganas* of Marwar in *jagir*[51].

Jaswant Singh even got the *jagirs* outside Marwar. The following figures and graph give the clear picture of the enhanced power of Jaswant Singh:

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[48] *ibid.*, p.815.
[49] *Marwar-ra Pargana ri-Vigat*, Vol.I, p.77.
[50] *ibid.*, pp.95-106.
[51] G.D. Sharma, *Rajput Polity. op. cit.* pp.49-53.

Table 1.1

Year	*Mansab*	*Jagir* in Marwar	*Jagir* Outside Marwar
1638	4000/ 4000 *Zat/ Sawar*	3,99,80,000 *dams*	Nil
1657	7000/ 7000 *Zat/ Sarwar* (5000 *du-aspasih-asp*)	6,32,25000 dams	3,44,95000 dams
1674	7000/ 7000 *Zat/ Sawar* (5000 *du-aspsih-asp*)	7,17,52,731 *dams*	61,74,522 *dams*

Source: Based on the data available in *Marwar- ra- Pargana- ri- Vigat*, vol. II and *Jodhpur Hukumat- ri- Bahi*, Meerut, 1976





However, the problem arose when Jaswant Singh died in 1678 A.D.[52] without any heir to the throne and the succession of the *gaddi* of Jodhpur became a bone of contention. Although the Mughal emperor Aurangzeb immediately issued a *farman* stating that the *desh* Jodhpur would be given to the son of the Maharaja, who has met an untimely death, if born to one of the Ranis, but by the time a son Ajit Singh was born[53] the politics within the court had changed the situation. One of the Rathor sardars, Indra Singh, wanted to get the *jagir* of Jodhpur in his favour and in fact Aurangzeb probably moved

[52] Shivduttdan Barhat(ed.), *Ajit Vilas*, Jodhpur, 1984, p 28
[53] ibid., p.30.

away from his earlier stand of appointing Ajit Singh as the successor. Many Rathor sardars were won over to Indra Singh's side by grant of *pattas*. But Durgadas Rathor and few other sardars refused to accept Indra Singh as the ruler and were adamant on making Ajit Singh as the ruler. The presence of Durgadas and other Rathor sardars, and the fact that the young Maharaja (Ajit Singh) was in Marwar provided a favourable atmosphere for the unity of the Marwar sardars.[54] Further, the declaration of Rana Raj Singh of Mewar to support the claim of Ajit Singh drastically ignited the political environment of Mewar. Mewar ruler had his own political compulsions to support the cause. He might have feared that grant of gaddi of Marwar to Indra Singh could lead to the conversion of the territory in Khalisa and the next target of the Mughals could be the neighbouring Mewar territory. Rana Raj Singh gave protective shelter to Ajit Singh and even sent 5000 sawars to help the Rathors.[55] But the death of Rana Raj Singh in 1680 changed the scene once again. His successor Rana Jai Singh was of the belief that Mewar's support to the Rathors was needlessly souring enemity with the Mughals. So he asked the Rathor sardars to vacate Mewar.

In the mean time Prince Akbar declared himself as the emperor of the Mughal empire revolting against Aurangzeb. Marwar sardars under the leadership of Durgadas offered their support to him.[56] But the combined

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[54] G.D. Sharma, *Rajput Polity*, p.169.
[55] *Jodhpur Rajya- Ki- Khyat (MS)*, no.199, p.56, Anup Sanskrit Library, Bikaner.
[56] *Ajit Vilas*, p.49.

forces of Akbar and the Rathors were defeated by the Mughal army in 1681. Durgadas had to go to the Deccan along with Akbar. After Durgadas departure it was the Sonag Rathor who became the leader of the Rathor sardars and they started plundering the imperial posts and realized land revenue from the cultivators in Marwar. The Mughal emperor probably proposed to grant Jodhpur to Ajit Singh and a mansab of 7000/7000, but it was just to deceive the Rathors- जोधपुर वगैर मुलक ने सात हजारी मनसब, जसवत सिंहजी रा दस्तूर अजीत सिंहजी नु देसा [57] The death of Sonag Rathor again pushed the Rathors one step backward. They were once again in a look out for a leader in the absence of Durgadas. They now got the leader in Udai Singh Rathor and then the Rathors decided to bring Maharaja Ajit Singh and make public appearance, who was till now in concealment.[58]Ajit Singh along with Udai Singh Rathor and other sardars went to Ahwa, Bagari, Rajpur, Bilada, Balunda, Riyan, Asop, Lavera, Hinwsar, Kolu and other places, and accompanied by the sardars of these places proceeded to Pokaran.[59] The Rathors not only attacked various Mughal posts but also collected revenue from different areas. By now Durgadas too had come back from the Deccan to Marwar.[60]

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[57] *Ibid*, p.52.
[58] *Ajit Vilas*, p.65.
[59] c.f. G.D.Sharma, *op.cit.*, p.179.
[60] *Ajit Vilas*, p.71.

MARATHWADA

The literal meaning of Maharashtra is 'a great'. The earliest written reference to the word Maharashtra is in Varahmihira's book on astronomy written in 505 A.D. Then one of the inscriptions of Pulkeshin belonging to 611 A.D. in Badami mentions the name of the southern country as Maharashtra.[61] The Chinese traveler Huen-Tsang has also given the description of the area and its people when he visited Maharashtra in 647 A.D. 'The Maharashtra country was 6000 *Pi* in circuit and its capital, which had Barge river on its west side, was above 30 *li* in circuit. The inhabitants were proud, spirited and was like grateful for favours and revengeful for wrongs, self-sacrificing towards suppliants in distress and sanguinary to death with any who treated them insultingly. Their martial heroes who led the vanguard of the army in battle went in battle intoxicated and their war elephants were also made drunk before an engagement. Relying on the strength of his heroes and elephants the king treated the neighbouring countries with contempt. He was a Kshatriya by birth and his name was *Pu-lo-Ki-She*. The benevolent sway of this king reached far and wide, and his vassals served him with perfect loyalty. The great kings Siladitya at this time were invading east and west and countries far and near were given in allegiance to him, but *Mo-ha-la-cha* refused to become subject to him. [62]

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[61] C.K. Srinivasan, Baji Rao I: The Great Peshwa, Asia Publishing House, Bombay, 1961, p 2
[62] K.A. Nilakanta Sastri, Foreign Notices of India, pp. 105-106.

Maharashtra roughly forms a triangle, on the one side of which is the coast from Daman to Karwar and the second side runs from the seacoast eastward to the neighborhood of Nagpur. The third side stretches from Nagpur to Karwar. It is geographically divided into three sub-regions-the Konkan, the Ghatmatha and the Desh. The Konkan is about thirty miles wide coastal strip running parallel to the coast below the Sahyadri ranges. It stretches between the mouth of river Tapti in north and Goa in south. The annual rainfall is over 200 cm. mainly due to the south-west monsoon and sometimes due to cyclonic depressions originating in the Arabian sea. This coastal lowland is an emerged wave-cut platform strewn with low hills or ridges. Unlike other level coastal plains of India, this lowland is uneven and is interspersed with river valleys, creeks and ridges. The hills descend from the Western Ghats and stretch westwards, some even up to the coast, thus separating the valleys from one another. Rivers or creeks cut across this lowland at an interval of about 8 to 16 km. The hills, though irregular at places, do not permit easy access from valley to valley. During the rainy season (June-September) when rivers are in spate, movement over land becomes still more difficult. Except for a small area in the extreme south, the whole area is covered with basalt. As is usually the case with basalt countries, the hills are flat-topped and descend to the plain in terraces. The eastern side of the Konkan is marked by the West Ghats, which rise steeply to an average elevation of 600 metres and run generally parallel to the Arabian sea coast. Some peaks of the Ghats rise to

more than double that height. The streams are actively busy in cutting back the abruptly rising escarpment of the Western Ghats during the rainy season. As a result of this headward erosion, the streams have entrenched many deep valleys and gorges in the west facing steep slopes of the Western Ghats. The streams bring a lot of silt, which they deposit, in their flood plains. The rivers are, however, seasonal. They are rushing torrents during this period of rains hit dry beds after the rain is over.

The climate of the Konkan is of 'tropical monsoon type' and so the temperature is uniformly high throughout the year. Even in the hills it does not fall blow 18^0 centigrade in the coldest month. As the alluvial fertile soils are mainly confined to the flood plains of the streams (in the river valley), only small area is fit for cultivation. The red soil along the Western Ghats is highly leached and unfit for continuous cultivation. In the northern side of the Konkan, the soils are generally black as they are developed on basalt. The soils on the hills are shallow and poor. Therefore, the region has since ancient times remained scarce in fodder and food production. However, hills of the Konkan region have remained full of tropical wet forests, rich in medicinal herbs, timbers, honey, etc. Today only 29 per cent of the Konkan area is under cultivation[63] which must have been even lesser in the medieval times.

The environmental setting of Marathwada played a significant part in mouldings the character of its people and shaping the history of this land.[64]

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[63] Gopal Singh, *Regional Geography of India*. 1990, p. 324.
[64] A.R., Kulkarni, *The Marathas*, Vol III, Books and Books, New Delhi, 1996, p. 3.

The northern and southern boundaries of this region have no natural defense so as to create an obstacle for the invaders from south India as well as north India. In other words, it has remained open to invasion throughout the historical period. However, within Marathwada there are three very significant natural regions, which have influenced the mentality and history of the people residing here considerably. This threefold division has created certain 'geo-political realities'[65] for any kingdom ruling here from within and without.

[65] Stewart Gordon, *The New Cambridge History of India; The Marathas (1600-1818)*, New Delhi, 1993, p. 13.

CHAPTER - 2

THE MARATHA INCURSION

A. MARATHA POLITY AND ITS APPLICATION ON EXPANDED TERRITORY
B. MARATHAS IN MEWAR AND MARWAR

The first half of the 18th Century witnessed the decline of the Mughal Empire and gradually it lost her well-knit control over the distant territories. The Marathas had already started creating disturbance in the Deccan area in last quarter of the 17th Century. As soon as the Maratha saw the centralized authority taking a nose-dive, they started raiding the rich province of Malwa and went up to parts of Rajasthan. Malwa was both politically and economically situated on a strategic location and her neighbouring Mewar and Marwar states in Rajasthan were potentially lucrative territories.

In 1711, one of the Maratha *sardars* named Ganga crossed the Narbada river and reached up to Ujjain. On his way he is said to have exacted 25,000 rupees.[1] The advances into the Malwa region by the Marathas were alarming both for the Mughal Empire and the neighboring Mewar state. For the Mughals because Malwa was very much closer to the centre of power at Delhi, so it posed a challenge for the survival of the empire, and for Mewar because it could be the next target of attack by the Marathas as her boundaries

[1] K.S. Gupta, *Mewar and the Maratha Relations (1735-1818)*, New Delhi, 1971, p. 30

touched the Malwa region. The Mughal Empire's concern is proved by the fact that Sawai Jai Singh of Amber was appointed as Governor in Malwa. And he did actually justify his deputation there as a Governor by his victory over the Marathas in May 1715 A.D. However, just after the victory in September 1715, he was called back to the Mughal Court at Delhi as a new problem had cropped for the empire in form of the Jats. In the absence of Sawai Jai Singh, *Naib* or deputy Governor was given the charge of looking after the administration of the Malwa province. The Mughal ruler asked the Maharana of Mewar, who was the other affected party by the Maratha raids, to give all kind of military support to the *Naib* of Malwa in order to check the Maratha penetration. The Maharana in response sent one of his ministers, Bihari Das Pancholi, with a large force to participate in the campaign to oust the Maratha from Malwa. But despite this the Marathas kept raiding the territory. One of the Maratha Sardars, Dabhade raided areas like Astha, Deogarh and collected *chauth*. They captured two of the officers of Sawai Jai Singh-Rup Ram Dhabai and Bhatt Himmat Rai, but were later on released. Muhammad Aruni Khan now replaced Sawai Jai Singh as Governor. But he too could not stop the Marathas from raiding the area. These raids became all the more intensive and planned after 1720 A.D. once Baji Rao became the Peshwa. Before him, there was no concrete and systematic policy of the Marathas towards north. When he became the Peshwa he persuaded the Maratha king, Sahu to follow a systematic and well-planned policy of northward expansion. Baji Rao told

Sahu- 'Let us strike at the trunk of the withering tree and the branches will fall off themselves. By directing our efforts to Hindustan the Maratha flag shall fly from the Krishna to Attock'. He was well aware of the declining position of the Mughal Empire and wanted to reap maximum benefit out of it. But one should not accept the famous quotation of Baji Rao straight away as has been done by various historians in the past.[2] His statement does reflect his confidence of wining over the north. But was it so simple and easy to achieve? There is no doubt that as planned, the Marathas reached up to the Delhi. But did Peshwa Baji Rao predict the future in advance? If this was really so it was not possible to do that without knowing the nuance of everyday politics at the Mughal Court and the politics of the various Rajput states in contention. Baji Rao in fact had put his agent at Delhi who kept sending regular information on the political developments at the Mughal Court. Baji Rao's involvement and interest in the politics at various fronts can be correctly gathered from the large numbers of letters and official correspondence pertaining to his period. They number more than 3,500 and of these approximately 500 are from the pen of Baji Rao himself.

We shall discuss the issue as to how and why the Marathas were getting success after success in the north and neither the Mughals nor the Rajput rulers were able to check them.

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[2] K.S. Gupta, *op.cit.*

Maratha Polity and Its Application on Expanded Territory:

The 18th Century had gone through a phase of tremendous increase in the power and authority of the Peshwas in Maharashtra and the gradual decline of the authority of the Maratha king. The Maratha power expanded in different areas like Malwa, Gujarat, Delhi, Orissa, and Rajasthan, etc., during the 18th century. But the question arises as to whether the Peshwas tried to implement their administrative system in the expanded territory. If it was really so, to what extent they were successful and in which regions and why? Was the authority of the Peshwa able to create a sovereign Maratha state in the 18th century to be termed as an empire? The general pattern of administration in the Maratha *Swarajya* remained the same as it was there during Shivajee's rule.[3] But the rise of a 'new nobility'[4] that of military chiefs and their supporters affected the Maratha state and it was not easy for implementing the same administrative system outside the Maratha *Swarajya* because of its own inner contradictions. The Peshwa did not give these Maratha chiefs any financial support inside the *swarajya*. As a result they were bound to raise their own troops and maintain them through their assignments outside the *swarajya*. They were generally assigned *mokasa* and *saranjams* in the Mughal territory, which the Marathas claimed as *Chauth* and *Sardeshmukhi* area. It is important to mention here that *Sardeshmukhi* was the sole right of the Maratha king and

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[3] Satish Chandra, *Medieval India: Society, the Jagirdari Crisis and the Village*, Macmillan, Madras, Reprint 1992, p. 117.

[4] *Ibid*, p. 118.

was realized by him directly from the peasants. During Shivajee's time *Sardeshmukhi* was illegal and was not recognized as his watan. The Mughal government formally granted the rights of *chauth* and *Sardeshmukhi* of the Deccan region to the Marathas only during Sahu's rule.[5] When Shivajee had begun to rule the Maratha territory, it would have been impossible for Shivajee to finance his army and navy from the limited resources of his native land alone and so he had to get involved into more and more wars to furnish the means of war. Shivajee followed the same general philosophy of plunder, which the Rajputs and the Turkish rulers of Delhi Sultanate had been adhering to during the early medieval period. Both the Rajputs and the Turkish Sultans used to make annual raids upon the neighbouring territories at the end of the rainy season.[6] Shivajee tried to justify his policy of plunder for his compulsions to maintain a large army to fight against the Mughals.[7] But there is no doubt that his raids in the Mughal territory and the subsequent demands for *Sardeshmukhi* and *Chauth* were intended only for money. Otherwise, he would have preferred some other method of peaceful penetration so as not to ruin the condition of the peasantry in the Deccan. Shivajee never bothered for the peasantry, although he often claimed himself to be the saviour of the Hindus. A plunderer does not recognize communities, he recognizes only the booty.

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[5] Surendranath Sen, *Administrative System of the Marathas*, Calcutta, 1976, p. 66.
[6] Satish Chandra, *op.cit.*, p. 116.
[7] J.N. Sarkar, *Shivaji and His Times*, 4th edition, Calcutta, 1948, p. 354.

Shivajee used to invade the neighboring territories of his enemies and offered them the option of purchasing security or submitting to plunder. The price that he demanded for the relief was the *Sardeshmukhi* i.e. 1/10th of the amount levied by the government having control of the area. The Marathas then added another claim to the *Sardeshmukhi* and that was the *chauth*. This they demanded as 1/4th of the total government collection. Before we move on the issue of redistribution of *Sardeshmukhi* and *chauth* among the Maratha Sardars after its collection, let us look back at the nature of such collections. This would prove that how these exactions by the Marathas was purely military contribution without any moral obligation before the 18th century. We need to consider the fact that *chauth* and *Sardeshmukhi* were originally blackmail and became legitimized only in the 18th century.[8] During Shivajee's time these were a purely military contribution levied by a power without being in formal occupation of the country.[9] Andre Wink would like us to believe that *chauth* and *Sardeshmukhi* were legitimized Zamindari claims even before the 18th century,[10] but this is not true. Before him, even Ranade[11] did not consider

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[8] A similar term in use in Punjab region was *Rakhi* or *Aman* which mean protection It was a transitional arrangement signifying essentially the Sikh Chief's claim of a part of the produce from the land in return for protection afforded against all other claimants. In the second half of the 18th century by way of *Rakhi* the Sikh Chiefs built up forts near the areas thus protected. This especially happened under the *Misls*. As compared to the Sikhs, the Marathas did not built such forts near the collection area to provide effective protection to the cultivators For details see Indu Banga, *Agrarian System of the Sikhs*, Manohar, N Delhi, 1978, Also see M L Bhatia, 'Nature of Sikh Polity under Maharaja Ranjeet Singh,' in *Ranjeet Singh and His Times*, Edited by M K. Gill, N. Delhi, 2002

[9] S.N. Sen, *op.cit.* p. 66.

[10] Andre Wink, *Land & Sovereignty in India Under the 18th Century Maratha Swarajya*, Cambridge, 1987, pp 44-45.

[11] M.G.Ranade, *Rise of Maratha power*, Bombay, 1900, pp. 224-225.

chauth as a mere military contribution without any moral or legal obligation. He believed that 'the demand for *chauth* was subsequently added with the consent of the powers whose protection was undertaken against foreign aggression, on payment of fixed sums for the support of the troops maintained for such service. This was the original idea as worked out by Shivajee and it was this same idea which in the Marquis of Wellesley's hand bore such fruit a hundred and seventy five years later'. S.N. Sen questions Ranade's interpretation of *chauth* and says that Shivajee was not the originator of *chauth*, although he made it widely applicable.[12] Thus, during Shivajee's time the Marathas never bothered to protect the *chauth* paying chiefs or rulers from the invasion of a third power or to restore peace and order in their country. They exacted *chauth* without undertaking the least responsibility for the country's welfare. And that is why in the 17th century, the use of the term '*Swarajya*' is even questionable. In the late 17th century *bakhar* of *sabhasad*, there are mention of terms like *aplemulakh* (homeland) and *paramubakh* (foreign land).[13] *Swarajya* could become a general term only during the 18th century, when the Marathas began to expand at the expense of the declining Mughal rule. The Marathas got the formal statement of *Swarajya* in 1719 from the Mughal emperor. The formal recognition of Sahu as ruler of *Swarajya* defined the territory on the two sides of the Western Ghats. It extended from the river Tapti in the north to the Krishna in the south and a part of Karnataka,

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[12] S.N. Sen, *op.cit.*, footnote, p. 71.
[13] V.S. Vakashkar (ed.), *Sabhasadaci Bakhar*, Poona, 1973, p. 27.

which included Kopbal, Gadag, Bellari, Jinji, Vellore and Thnjavur. Therefore, our understanding is that the nature of the philosophy to collect *Chauth* and *Sardeshmukhi* changed after 1719 and gradually the Marathas began to take up the moral responsibility to protect and restore peace in *Swarajya*. With their increasing power and authority they began claiming and then collecting *Chauth* and *Sardeshmukhi* even outside *Swarajya*. But here also they undertook responsibility to protect the ruler who paid such levies.

Sardeshmukhi was reserved for the Maratha king and was to be realized by him directly from the peasants. But the *Chauth* was reserved for government treasury. Out of the *Chauth*, his officers like *Pratinidhi, Peshwa* and *Pant Sachiv* collected 1/4th or *babti* for the ruler.[14] The rest of the amount extracte,d i.e. 3/4th was distributed among the Maratha *Sardars* for the maintenance of their troops and was termed as *mokasa* and *saranjam* also included a share of 6 per cent of the whole *Chauth* for the *Pant Sachiv* (called *Sahotra*) and 3 per cent for different persons chosen by the ruler (called *Nadgaunda*). Satish Chandra says that though in theory the distribution *mokasa* and *saranjam* to the Maratha *sardars* were the sole discretion of the ruler, but in practice it became hereditary. This system created a number of local agents with whom the peasant had to deal. Khafi Khan too has described in detail the problems, which the peasants were facing, and the financial

[14] Surendranath Sen, *op.cit*, p. 168.

burden that fell on them in the Marathwada region.[15] Khafi Khan explains that the arrangements fell very hard upon the *raiyats*, the government officers and the *jagirdars*; and in every *mahal* two sets of Maratha agents were appointed- one called the *Kamaishdars* for collecting the *Chauth* and the other was the *gumashta* for the *Sardeshmukhi* for realizing the 10 per cent. On the roll of the collection (*baraward*) the signature of the *Sarrishta-dar* of the *Sardeshmukhi* were first placed. Apart from that they also realized the customary imports separately. Secondly, inclusive of *abwabs* called *fauzdari, shiqdari, ziafat,* etc, the Marathas were to receive merely half of the total revenue recorded in the government roll. Besides this the Maratha appointed their own collectors of *rahdari* in each district who collected twice or three times more than the *faujdars*. Thus in each district, three regular collectors of Raja Sahu were stationed with parties of horsemen and footmen at the office (*Kachahar*), where the land revenue and the *sair* was collected, at the guard house (*thanas*) for customs, and at the posts for *rahdari*.[16]

The point that we are trying to make here is that we cannot consider the Maratha expansion in the north during the 18th Century as a unified attempt. Neither was it possible for the Maratha *Peshwas* to implement their administrative system as it existed in the *Swarajya*, to all other parts where they ruled-directly or indirectly. So Andre Wink may have his own

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[15] K.S. Ahmed and W. Haig (ed.), *Muntakhab-ul-Lubab* of Khafi Khan, Vol. II, Calcutta, 1874, pp 781-90

[16] Cited in Satish Chandra, *Medieval India: Society, the Jagirdari Crisis and the Village*, p.119

interpretation on the extent of the *Swarajya*, but his interpretation does not hold ground when we take up the issue of Maratha sovereignty. Andre Wink does not want us to define *Swarajya* as an abstract, territorially circumscribed dominion complete in itself. For him *Swarajya* denoted partial or complete Maratha sovereignty anywhere in India.[17] But how can we accept this when 18th century lacked a single unified Maratha expansion.[18] Satish Chandra says that the so-called feudal system was established chiefly in the areas outside *Swarajya*, and that its net result was to pave the way for the ultimate emergence of a series of Maratha states in those areas. Thus, we should not see the 'Maratha movement' as a unified movement, but as the parallel movement of a series of feudatory chiefs and Maratha *sardars* who only cooperated with each other for some common purposes. They aligned with each other to carve out independent principalities of their own out of the Mughal territories where the Mughal emperor's control had loosened from the first quarters of the 18th century.

We shall see that the expansion of the Marathas into Malwa, Gujarat, Rajasthan and other northern territories was mainly for extraction of more and more revenue, thereby exploiting the peasantry to the hilt. The Marathas were not able to implement their administrative system of *Swarajya* in these expanded territories and the Mughal system of administration continued even

[17] Andre Wink, *Land and Sovereignty*, p. 47. Op. Cit., or Ibid.,
[18] Satish Chandra has termed it as "Maratha movement", *op.cit*, and p.119.

after their 'slow conquest'.[19] Stewart Gordon though accepts that in region like Malwa the Marathas continued with the Mughal heritage, but at the same time he does not consider Malwa to be a makeshift copy of a Mughal province. He believed that by 1760 Malwa was conquered and integrated into the Maratha state.[20] But he seems to have come to a long drawn conclusion specially when in the case of Malwa the terms of reference even after the Maratha conquest remained largely Mughal. All the taxes were called by Mughal terms, and were assessed and collected according to the Mughal pattern. The only change that we observe is the greater tax burden on the peasantry. Thus, it is doubtful if there was any fundamental difference in the working of the Maratha revenue system in central India and the Deccan from what it was in north India under the Mughals.[21]

However, we see a nominal shift in the attitude of the few Maratha ruling families in certain areas, where they work towards regular tax collection and even defied the Peshwa's authority and orders to extract tribute from these regions. But there are very stray references of such kind and they do not lead us to the long drawn generalization that the Maratha administration system was implemented uniformly in the expanded territory so as to form the 'Maratha state'. Stewart Gordon makes a generalization that there was a 'shift

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[19] Stewart Gordon, *Marathas, Marauders and State Formation in Eighteenth Century India*, Oxford University Press, Delhi, 1994, pp. 23-63.
[20] *Ibid*, p.61.
[21] Satish Chandra, *Medieval India*, p. 122

from tribute to regular tax collection in the Maratha conquered territories.'[22] It is important to mention here that we cannot regard the Maratha state, if at all a state, as an empire with highly centralized territories. *International Encyclopedia of Social Sciences* has defined the term empire as "a political system encompassing wide, relatively highly centralized territories, in which the Centre, as embedded both in person of the emperor and in the central political institutions, constituted as autonomous entity... Its basic connotation, as manifest in the Latin imperialism, is the existence of relatively concentrated authority and rule, focused in a relatively strong centre and diffusing its authority over broad territorial contours..., the existence of a centre of authority that was accepted and hallowed beyond the confines of narrow territorial kinship, or city limits'.[23]

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Among the many regional centers of power and the Mughal rule of medieval times, it is only the Mughal state that has been considered as an empire with features of a centralized state structure.[24] An attempt has been made recently by Muzaffar Alam and Subrahmanyam to cut to size the Mughal state.[25] According to these historians, a powerful centralized state could not have existed in India before the British Empire was established. Following this

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[22] Stewart Gordon, *The New Cambridge History of India*, New Delhi,1993, p.9.
[23] *International Encyclopedia of Social Sciences*, Vol. V, pp. 41-48.
[24] See M Athar Ali, 'The Mughal Empire in History', *Presidential Address, Medieval India Section*, Indian History Congress, 33rd Session, Muzaffarpur, December 1972 and also his 'Towards an Interpretation of the Mughal Empire', *Journal of Royal Asiatic Society*, 1978, pp. 38-49.
[25] Muzaffar Alam and Sanjay Subrahmanyam (eds.), *The Mughal State 1526-1750*, Delhi, 1998.

line of argument they try to present a gloomy picture and try to discover elements of continuity between the 17th and the 18th Centuries in the system of polity, governance and economy. By establishing such a notion they want to prove that the well-accepted phenomena of fragmented states of the 18th Century were also present in the 17th Century. And this in turn will automatically mean that the notion of a powerful centralized empire during the heydays of the Mughals is wrong.[26] But the arguments put forward by M. Alam and S. Subrhamanyam fall short on historical grounds. They do talk about regional autonomy in Bengal [27], but they have not been able to prove it at all that there was any regional centralization at the cost of the Mughal centralized state in the 16th and the 17th centuries. M. Athar Ali has enlisted a number of unique features to show how the Mughal Empire was different from the traditional Indian regimes and was thus a centralized empire.[28] However, at the same time he suggests that the Mughal empire should not be considered as a state similar to modern times. He says that if it had some rudiments of an unwritten constitution, it did not yet claim for itself the legislative power and functions that are the hallmarks of a modern state.[29] The Mughal state was thus the perfection of a medieval polity, which gave it stability and power.

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[26] Vipul Singh, Book-Review of *The Mughal State, 1526-1750*, in *Critique*, Vol. 2, Nos. 2-3 (New series), December 1998-March 1999, pp. 85-88.
[27] Muzaffar Alam and Sanjay Subrahmanyam (eds.), *op.cit.* p.46.
[28] M. Athar Ali, 'Towards an Interpretation of the Mughal Empire', in Hermann Kulke (ed.), *The State in India, 1000-1700*, Delhi, 1997, pp 263-277.
[29] *Ibid*, p. 277.

Placing all the features of a medieval centralized state like the Mughal empire, we do not get any visible picture of a centralized Maratha state. Although the British while confronting the Marathas in the late 18th century often used the term 'empire' for the Maratha rule. But the use of such term was in fashion during those days without deconstructing the meaning of it. For example, when Charles W. Malet uses the term 'empire' in the context of the Marathas in his letter to John Torlesse dated January 5th, 1782, he did not mean a centralized state if we read through the sentences of the letters "...the great officers and *jagirdars* of this loose ill–connected empire ...."[30] The *Peshwas* did emerge very powerful as de facto rulers of the Maratha state, but they could not satisfy the requirements of a strong centre. They had to constantly face different rival groups of the Maratha *sardars* like the Bhonsle, Scindhia, Holker and Rastia etc. Andre Wink does accept such rival groups but he would like us to believe that the *Peshwas* deliberately created rival groups of *sardars*.[31] But even if we accept that these were the deliberate moves of the *Peshwas* to limit the power of the *Chatrapati* (the Maratha King) and increase their own powers at his expense, the *Peshwa* authority still lacked the features of centralized control. On many occasions the Maratha *sardars* defied the wishes of the *Peshwa* and conquered different territories and even refused to give *Sardeshmukhi* to the Poona Ministry. There is no denying the fact that the Maratha *sardars* got united and formed alliances on

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[30] *Poona Residency Correspondence*, Extra Vol., No. 60, dated 5th January 1782.
[31] See Andre Wink, *Land and Sovereignty*, p. 74.

some occasions like on the eve of the first Anglo-Maratha war, the battle of Kharda, but here self interest rather than firm conviction in the policy of unity flowing from Poona was the guiding principle. Soon after these we find that in the second and the third Anglo-Maratha wars the authority of the *Peshwas* was denied and self-interest and disunity openly came to surface. V.S. Kadam would like us to use the word "Maratha Confederacy" for the 18th century Maratha state.[32] Truly, it was a state in which the center was weak and she may create units around it, were strong as well as aspiring to be autonomous and independent.

M.G. Ranade, however, while agreeing to the concept of 'confederated states' with many centers of power and vitality, tried to trace the similarity of the *Peshwa* authority with the ascendancy of the Prussian monarchy in German Empire.[33] To him the central authority represented more the idea than the force of the confederacy and all the confederates were animated by a common purpose and a central idea. But this is too simple an explanation to be swallowed. First of all what was the central idea? Was it to establish a centralized empire? It was not. Atleast in the 18th century collection of *Chauth*, *Sardeshmukhi* and *Khandani* remained the fulcrum of Maratha expansion to the north. As discussed earlier also, their dire need for money to finance their military expeditions could have been solved one through a stable revenue

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[32] V.S. Kadam, *Maratha Confederacy: A Study in Origin and Development*, Munshiram Manoharlal Publishers Pvt. Ltd., New Delhi, 1993, p. 7.

[33] M.G. Ranade and K T Telang, *Rise of the Maratha Power and Gleanings from Maratha Chronicles*, Bombay, 1961, p. 7

policy even outside the *Swarajya*. But that could not be done and so raiding the territories or getting them involved in local internecine rivalries in Malwa, Rajasthan, etc., to collect money in return for help remained the only option. This was the central idea for all the Maratha *sardars* and Confederates flowing from the *Peshwa*, but such a common purpose and idea could not have possibly created an empire. Further, a state to be called a centralized one needed permanent source of wealth and revenue. And it is only the sound institutions with uniform application allover like the agrarian system of the Mughals, which could have provided the needed fund. But the fact of the matter is that the Marathas remained poor and could not find enough money for good administration which, after all, primarily needs sufficient funds.[34] The *Peshwas* and the Maratha *Sardars* were alike in distress for want of funds and the mode of collection of revenue under the Marathas in itself indicates their sorry situation. The *Kamavisdars* made the actual collection of revenue under the Marathas for the *Peshwas* or the Maratha *Sardars*. Often these *Kamavisdars* had to remit the revenue before its collection, and sometimes years in advance in anticipation of collection.[35] Peshwa Baji Rao has described his pathetic indebtness himself in a letter to his guru Brahmendra Swami: "Our *Sardars* (Dabhade, Gaikwad, Bande and others) are masters of crores, while I who am devoted to you and to *Chhatrapati* Shahu, find it difficult

[34] G.H. Khare, 'The Marathas as Freebooters', in A. Pawar (ed.), *Maratha History Seminar Papers*, Kolhapur, 1971, p. 217.
[35] *Ibid*, p. 215.

to eke out a bare maintenance. I have been suffering humiliation at the hand of the money-lenders, and my forehead has suffered a lot by making apologies to the men of my army for my inability to pay them regularly".[36] Peshwa Balaji Baji Rao's condition was also the same. In one of his letters he has remarked that two rivers of gold (*Suvarna-Ganga*), one from the north and another from the south flowed Poona-wards, but both of them dried up before they could reach Maharashtra. The contents of the letter indicate that the Maratha *sardars* around Maharashtra were more affluent than the *Peshwa* and possibly dared to challenge the authority of the *Peshwa* at Poona. We have also reference to the temporary suspension of Balaji Baji Rao from the office of *Peshwa* for not paying the *Chhatrapati's* debt of about Rs. 20 lakhs. He was replaced to the position of *Peshwa* only when he accepted the responsibility of repaying the amount.[37] Thus, when such was the state of affair at Poona, how can we expect the *Peshwa* to dictate terms with the Maratha *sardars* and create a centralized Maratha state? Even if we do not try to fit in the concept of 'Maratha Sovereignty' as abstract, territorially circumscribed, dominion complete in itself as Andre Wink[38] would like us to do, the sovereignty itself, of the *Peshwa*, is questionable.

The Maratha *sardars* did not act on many occasions as members of the confederacy. It could better be described as a game of power politics. The

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[36] *Ibid*, p. 215.
[37] *Ibid*, p. 214.
[38] Andre Wink, *Land and Sovereignty*, pp. 46-47.

Maratha *sardars* had their own internal feuds, jealousy and rivalry. However, we are not sure if such a fragmented situation was evident to other ruling authorities of the period like the Mughals and the Rajputs. R.V. Oturkar believes that despite such internal feuds the others considered the Marathas as one power and there existed amongst the Marathas unity that was more emotional than constitutional.[39] But it is hard to believe that emotion prevailed over power politics. When booty was the main consideration emotional unity might have stood weak and secondary. We shall see in the later part of this chapter that contrary to this notion the different aspirants to the throne of Rajput states approached different Maratha *sardars* for support.

MARATHAS IN MEWAR

We do not have any definite information and primary records are silent over the early Maratha contacts with the rulers of Mewar in the 17th century. However, many dynasties residing in Mahrashtra claimed their origin from the land of the Rajputs in Rajasthan. For example, the Pawars claimed their lineage from the Parmars and the Bhonsle traced their origin from the Sisodias of Mewar. Before them Shivajee also claimed to have been a *Kshatriya*. The Maratha tradition traces descent of Shivajee, who ruled the Marathas during the 17th century, from the Guhil dynasty of Mewar.[40] The historicity of such a claim is doubtful and the Mudhol papers, used by Bal Krishna to prove his

[39] R.V. Oturkar, 'Nature of the Maratha Confederacy' in *Maratha History Seminar Papers*, p.283

[40] Bal Krishna, *Shivajee the Great*, pp.35-36.

point, has not been found to be authentic and are said to be spı rious.[41] But there is no doubt about it that Shivajee did actually claim *kshatriya* status and took titles like *Sinhasandhishwara, Chhatrapati, Kshatriya Kulvatansa*, etc.[42] The question arises as to why was Shivajee was so particular about the *Kshatriya* status? Satish Chandra has explained the real motive in this way. He says that Shivajee wanted to have equality status with the *deshmukhs* who were the traditional local authority.[43] And his final coronation in 1674 by Gaga Bhat, a Brahmin of Benaras, placed him on equal footing with the rulers of Bijapur and Golconda. In fact in a letter to Baji Ghorpad of Mudhol dated March 1677, Shivajee made his intention clear by saying that as an independent ruler he could talk to the Qutb Shah of Golconda on equal footing.[44]

The Marathas came in contact with the Rajputs in the times of Shivaji when Jaswant Singh, the ruler of Jodhpur, was deputed to south, with Shaista Khan, the viceroy of Deccan, to assist him. Shivajee is said to have attacked the camp of Shaista Khan and Shaista Khan was humbled. Jaswant Singh was accused of helping Shıvaji by remaining neutral. Few of the European and Persian accounts like that of Bernier and Manucci mention this point in their works.[45] But the contemporary Persian records like *Alamgirnama, Fatuhat-e-*

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[41] Sardesı, *The Main Currents of Maratha History*, p. 55
[42] *Ibid*, p 63
[43] Satısh Chandra, *Medıeval Indıa: Socıety, the Jagirdarı Crisis and the Village*, Madras, Reprint 1992, p. 143.
[44] G.S. Sardesai, *New History of the Maratha People*, Poona, 1948, pp. 240-43
[45] F.Bernıer,*Travels in the Mughal Empire(1656-68)*, Delhı, 1968,p.188.

Alamgiri, and Maasir e-Alamgiri do not illustrate any such episode negative about Jaswant Singh. They do not accuse him anywhere for such an act against the Mughal empire. It is to be noted here that Jaswant Singh was already goaded, accused and punished by Aurangzeb for his taking side of Dara Shikoh against the Mughal emperor himself.[46] It was after much difficulty that he could get recognition once again. Hence he would have been more careful in his dealings with Shivaji who was an enemy of the Mughal empire and Aurangzeb could never have spared Jaswant Singh for any such mischief again. Infact, the Persian accounts mention that it was not Jaswant Singh but Shaista Khan who was punished by Aurangzeb for his carelessness.[47] Historians like Grant Duff, Jadunath Sarkar, G.S. Sardesai, and Kincaid and Parasnis have leaned towards the balance of suspicion on Jaswant Singh, but they seem to have relied heavily on European accounts. So far as these sources are concerned none of the European authors were eyewitness to the event and the contemporary Muslim authors who were there and were probably more reliably informed of the developments in the court, did not accuse Jaswant Singh, for duplicity to the emperor. Further the Mughal army had good intelligence service and two of the commanders were always active against each other. Besides, at that time Shivaji was not in the *Desh* area where Jaswant Singh and Shaista Khan were staying in their camps. Actually he was in Konkan and was leading a life of fugitive for the last three years. So

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[46] *Marwar- ra- Pargana-ri- Vigat*, p.132.
[47] *Maasir-e-Alamgiri*, p.17.

it was not possible for Shivaji to have come in contact with .'aswant Singh to work out some plan of treachery. Hence this view of accusing Jaswant Singh for having come in contact with Shivaji holds no ground. The second time Maratha contact with the Rajputs came with Jai Singh who did his service as a representative of Mughal emperor in the Deccan and there is no doubt that Shivaji was humbled by him.

There is no disagreement among the historians over the issue that the political contacts between the Marathas and the Rajputs coincided with the period of the decline of the Mughal empire. However, the smaller states in Rajasthan were weaving a net of cordial relations with the Marathas long back. One such state was Hadauti. Hadauti being the frontier province of Rajasthan adjoining Malwa, it was but natural to have some kind of socio-political relations with Malwa. The frontier boundaries did not act as strict barrier to developing relations, rather these marked political boundaries were shadow lines for the people of the two regions. Few of the important centers where many examples of Maratha relations have been found were Kota, Bundi, Shahabad, Shergarh, Nahargarh and Bakani. As early as 1683, Rao Kishore Singh Hada of Kota appointed a Maratha Brahmin officer the son of one Sadashiv Mahadeo in his state.[48]This appears to be the oldest record of Maratha contact with the people of Rajasthan. Rao Ram Singh of Kota served

[48] Prabha Srinivasulu, *Malwa under the Marathas*, N.Delhi, 1996, p.246.

under Zulfikar K'han in Deccan and had cordial relations with the captive Sahu, son of Sambhaji and the future 'Raja' of Maratha state. It is recorded that he granted *jagirs* to Maratha Brahmins at that time.[49] In 1702 Rao Bhim Singh of Kota invited the Marathas to crush revolts in southern territory and the Marathas under Chandra Pandit and Hindu Rao are said to have helped him. But all these early contacts with the Marathas at the micro level proved insignificant when the power of the Rajput states in Rajasthan declined and simultaneously there was a decline of the mighty Mughal empire. The Rajput states were no longer safe from outside attacks. It is important to mention here that these states benefited a lot from being under the suzerainty of the Mughal rule, at least to the extent that outside forces and even the internal opposition never dared to disturb the ruling authority of the different Rajput states since this would mean challenging the authority of the Mughals. In other words, the Mughal rule before the 18th Century provided blanket protection to the Rajput states. However, with the declining Mughal authority, internal feuds surfaced in different ruling houses of Rajasthan and the newly emerging outside forces like that of the Marathas started intervening in the political affairs of Rajasthan.

The Maratha attack began in the north, specially in Malwa and Gujarat, in the first phase. In 1711 Ganga entered with a hoard of soliders upto Ujjain and was paid Rs. 25000. It was a challenge to the neighbouring states like Mewar. Hence Sawai Jai Singh approached Sangram Singh of Mewar and expressed his deep concern over the issue. Jai Singh was thought to be

[49] *ibid*, p.246.

suitable man, a commander as well as diplomat of first order, by the Emperor to be appointed as the Governor of Malwa. Thus he opposed them in 1715 A.D. in the battle of Pilsud. Mewar was asked to support the Mughal cause against the Marathas and it was in the interest of the State also. The Maharana deputed Biharidas Pancholi against Marathas with a force. The Marathas captured Rupram Dhabhai and Bhat Himmat Rai of Jai Singh's camp. Though Mewar officer were able to get them released, but this event certainly exposed the weakness of the Mughal power in Malwa.

The death of Aurangzeb spelled a death warrant to his empire also. The Mughal administration was completely paralyzed and the state of the government gave rise to nobility that was a part of the aristocratic government.[50] The imperial politics went to the lowest degree, marking the fall of ethical values. Hence this gave chance to the rise of Sayyad Brothers who rose to power as 'kingmakers'. They installed Farrukhsiar on the throne. Another result was the rise of the hopes and aspirations of the Rajputs, the Sikhs, the Jats and various other regional powers like the Marathas. The prominent Rajput profited by this situation was Maharaja Ajit Singh who had struck matrimonial relation with Farrukhsiar and hence got the Governorship of Gujarat for himself.[51] Ajit Singh became so ambitious that when the Sayyads got alarmed against him the former joined them in the scheme to depose the

[50] Satish Chandra, *Parties and Politics at the Mughal Court*, p.17.
[51] Shivduttdan Barhat (ed.), *Ajit Vilas*, Jodhpur, 1984, p.160.

ruler and asked Sayyad Abdulla to call his brother Hussain form south.[52] The Marathas engrossed by the opportunity went forward to penetrate in the imperial politics to scoop whatever they could for themselves and Balaji Vishwanath accompanied Hussain Sayyad in the north with a large Marathas force. He made contacts with Ajit Singh at Delhi and curbed the revolts in the city. Farrukhsiar was deposed and Mohammad Shah was imposed as the Mughal emperor by the efforts of the Trio.[53] The Peshwa got three *Sanads* in total. He got a legal sanction for Shivaji's '*Swarajya*', a financial support for the state and the right to collect *chauth* and *Sardeshmukhi.*

Sahu was desirous of getting the *Sanad* for Gujarat and Malwa also, but it could not be fulfilled, as things were not favorable for this. A treaty was, however, signed. Ajit Singh and Sawai Jai Singh approved the terms of the treaty as is evident from the letter sent by Ajit Singh to Chhatrapati Shahu.[54] Balaji Vishwanath in his return march from Delhi to Deccan crossed Jaipur, Sirong, Bhelsa, Sehore, Handia and then went to Deccan. It is stated that he intended to contact the Rajput chiefs to strengthen the alliance. It is believed by few that possibly Balaji tried to contact Jai Singh of Amber. J.G.Duff has mentioned that a letter from Jai Singh to Biharidas Pancholi of Mewar gives some indication of such development in which Jai Singh reported of the treaty with Balaji Pandit and informed that he was advised to leave dated Falgun

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[52] *ibid, p.161.*
[53] *Selections from Peshwa Daftar,* vol.30, Letter No.308.
[54] V.S.Bendre, *Maharashtra Itihasachi Sadhane*, Vol.II, Letter nos.558-566, pp.346-348.

Sudhi 19th, 1775 (1719 A.D.).[55] H.N.Sinha also opines that such a combination was in vogue and a net ground for Bajirao's friendship with Jai Singh was prepared.[56] However, Satish Chandra does not accept the fact and even denies the possibility of such a meeting as Jai Singh was at Amber in Sayyad regime and went to Delhi only in May 1718 A.D. to come back by Feb. 1719 A.D.[57] In view of the facts we cannot be sure of such diplomatic contacts especially when we know that the ruler of Jaipur was trying to enhance his own power by getting maximum *jagir* from the Mughal emperor. Balaji might have tried to contact the Rajput rulers but the duration of the stay and instability of Imperial politics might not have allowed him to do so as he had the ladies of Royal family, viz., Shahu's mother with him who were released only in 1719 and their safety was the first priority. The Maratha ruler, Sahu is, however, said to have distributed gifts after his return.[58] The details of these gift amounts are as follows:

Mughal Officers	1900
Sawai Jai Singh	1003
Maharana of Mewar	1000
Man Singh of Marwar	3001
Prime Minister of Jaipur	2001
Prime Minister of Mewar	2001
Others	1850

[55] James Grant Duff, *History of the Mahrattas*, vol.I, p.393.
[56] H.N.Sinha, *Rise of the Peshwa*, Indian Press, Allahabad, 1954, p.68.
[57] Satish Chandra, *Parties and Politics at the Mughal Court*, p.201.
[58] D.B.Parsanis, *Itihas Sangrah*, 'Peshwa Daftratil Sanad Patren', May- July 1915, pp.128-29

Gujarat was another springboard like Malwa. This was the area from where the Maratha could enter Rajasthan and could go further. Aravali from North East to Mewar connects Gujarat closely with Rajasthan by Marwar Desert and Mount Abu and, in the east it is marked by the forestland and plateau of Malwa providing direct route in the land through Zhabua and Amzhera entering Dhar.

Ajit Singh was deprived of his Governorship of Gujarat before his death. After the death of Ajit Singh a war of succession was fought between his sons. But in the end his son Abhay Singh was accepted unanimously as the successor by the emperor by Sawai Jai Singh of Jaipur and Maharana Sangrm Singh of Udaipur and other chiefs of Rajasthan because Abhay Singh was the eldest of the late ruler's sons.[59] Nagor was given to his second son Bakht Singh and two others, Anand Singh and Rai Singh, went to Gujarat. The territory of Gujarat adjoining the borders of Marwar, had always attracted the Rathore rulers. Ajit Singh had maintained the view that the borders of Marwar extend upto Gujarat. On the other hand, the Marathas under Dabhade, Kanthaji Kadam Bande and Pilaji Gaikwad frequently ravaged the territory. By 1723 A.D. the Maratha were able have a firm footing in that area. The previous governor Nizam Asaf I revolted against the imperial authority and signed a pact with Kanthaji Kadam Bandey, giving him the right to collect *Chauth*. The Marathas started collecting the *Chauth* but Shahu wanted the support of the

[59] *Marwar- ri- Khyat*, vol.II, p.125.

Rajput rulers so that the tribute might be collected regularly. He sent Gopal Pant and Appaji Pant to Udaipur in 1724 A.D. and another mission of Prabhu Jadurai to Mewar. The ruler of Mewar, through Sawai Jai Singh, recommended the matter to the Mughal emperor at Delhi. He proposed to grant a *Jagir* worth Rs. 10 lakhs in each province to Sahu and likewise the decision was reported to the agents of Sahu.[60] It was also suggested that if Raja Sahu would agree to present himself in the court his rights would be confirmed. But even before this proposal could be accepted the Marathas got themselves involved in war against the Nizam at Palkhed in 1727 and at Amzhera in 1728.

In such a period of political uncertainty in Gujrat and Malwa, the neighboring Rajput states of Rajasthan had to work out their own plan so that the Maratha infection does not spill over to their own territory. But the internal political situation in states like Marwar was so fluid that the Maratha interference became imminent. The Mughal Subedar and the brothers of Abhay Singh were the source of trouble for the Marwar ruler. He was threatened by his own people (his brother Rai Singh). A pact was signed between Abhay Singh and Maharana Sangram Singh by which he agreed to help the Maharana against the Maratha attack in Mewar on the condition that the Maharana would arrange for the murder of Anand Singh and Rai Singh, the brothers of Marwar ruler. Due to these intricacies of politics, plots and intrigues Anand Singh had to sign a pact with the Marathas to allow Kanthaji

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[60] V.V Thakur, *Holkarshahichya Itihasachi Sadhne*, vol.I, Letter No.8, Indore, 1944.

Kadam and and Pilaji to attack Marwar via Jalor. By 1729 A.D. the Maratha were so powerful in Gujarat that the commanders of Bajirao demanded share from Gujarat for themselves. A letter of Chimaje Appa to Bajirao mentions the demands made by Udaji, who asked for control over Surat and a share of 1 lakh 25000 from Gujarat tribute. He also demanded the annual share at the rate 35 per cent.[61] Thus, Abhay Singh had no alternative except to save his state from Maratha attack by paying them tributes.

The Maratha encountered successful attacks on Malwa. During their inroads they occasionally crossed the borders and entered Rajasthan from various routes. One such route was through Dungarpur- Banswada and another one from Bundi- Kota. The Marathi records mention that Shinde and Holkar entered these states by 1726 A.D. and when they could not get any thing, they attacked Mewar territories also.[62] Maharana Sangram Singh expressed his deep concern over it and he wrote letters to Mayaram, his agent at Delhi to impress upon the emperor to find some solution of the Maratha attacks.[63] But the Marathas entered Mewar territories by 1728 A.D. Bajirao wrote to Rawal of Dungarpur and ruler of Banswada to pay *Kharaj* to Udaji Pawar and Malhar Rao Holkar and even issued them *Sanads* to do so.[64] The dashing success of Maratha in Malwa, Mewar, and Gujarat and against

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[61] *Selections from Peshwa Daftar*, vol.13, no.54.
[62] *ibid*, vol.13, no.9.
[63] K.S.Gupta, *Mewar and the Maratha Relation (1735- 1818A.D.)*, New Delhi, 1971, p.34.
[64] Raghubir Sinh, 'Rajput-Maratha Relations', *Maratha History Seminar Papers*, Kolhapur, 1971, p.259.

Bungash in Bundelk'iad made the matter to the extent that in December 1729 Sangram Singh wrote to Jai Singh to take the matter seriously: 'The Daccanis have been regularly coming to these regions, and have been causing disturbances. When the matter was previously submitted to you, you said 'they are wanderers, and one need not worry about them.' But now they have killed the *subadar* (Governor); and if no steps are taken now, the disturbances will increase so much that Your Highness will have to think of it.'[65]

In the meanwhile, Sawai Jai Singh was appointed the Governor of Malwa to check the Maratha expansion, who even dared to capture Mandu.[66]Jai Singh sent Deep Singh and Mansa Ram Purohit as his envoys to Sahu to stop raids in Malwa. He urged the Mughal emperor to grant *jagir* in Malwa to Sahu's adopted son Khushal Singh on the condition that the Marathas would not cause any disturbance in Malwa Throughout the Maratha correspondence we note that the Marathas wanted to keep Jai Singh in good humour. In general the views and policy of the Rajput rulers show that religion had not been the point of their consideration but Jai Singh's policy was based on sound politics and practical difficulties. He thought that paying them money could appease the Marathas and thus he could control the *Suba* of Malwa. The Marathas and specially Sahu respected Jai Singh which is evident from the fact that when Jai Singh was sent to Malwa by the Mughal emperor, Sahu instructed his agents that if the later insists for the fort of Mandu to be

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[65] *Ibid*, p.260.
[66] *Selections from Peshwa Daftar*, vol.10, No.66.

evacuated it should be. In Marwar siege also it was specially instructed that the territories of Sawaiji should not be disturbed. The letters of Maratha envoys Dado Bhimsen and Mahadeo Bhatt Hingne also sound in the same way.[67] After battle of Amzera Jai Singh realized that instead of fighting battles with the Marathas it would be better to find some diplomatic solution and offered to cede a *Jagir* to Fateh Singh Bhosle against the promise to stop their activities in Malwa.[68]

One thing that might have influenced the Maratha-Rajput relations was the nature of Sahu- Peshwa relations. As discussed in part A of this chapter, there was not much of a centralized flow of policy under the Maratha rulership. The Peshwa, who was young, energetic and ambitions carved out his own policy. Sahu could not support him openly for many reasons. Sahu did not openly agree for or finally thought over the steps to be taken with regards to Malwa, specially when after the speedy success of Bajirao in Malwa, the matter of the granting of the *Saranjam* (of Malwa and Gujarat) to Peshwa was referred to him, he kept quiet. Further the reports of Peshwa's moves were not regularly sent to him and he felt the pinch of it. We get a glimpse of their drift in the collections of letters in the *Peshwa Daftar Correspondence*.The letter is dated 1730 A.D. It was even suggested that he could choose south for this purpose. It shows Sahu did not want an aggressive policy to be adopted. There were instances when he enquired about the whereabouts of Peshwa. If

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[67] *ibid*, vol.13, no.10 & 49.
[68] *Ibid*, vol.30, pp.307-309.

and when he would get such letters he would not hesitate to express his satisfaction.[69]These suggest that Shahu as a ruler did not want a clash but he had to give his consent for he needed funds and the arm and mind of Bajirao I.

It seems that in the early years of the 18th Century the Maratha did not have any definite policy of extending their sway to the northern part of India. The attacks that came from their side on the northern territories of the declining Mughal Empire were mainly intended to sever communications of the Mughal army.[70] However, when Baji Rao became the Peshwa, he definitely came out with a well-planned expansionist policy towards the north. Baji Rao attacked Malwa in 1723 and gave a mighty blow on the "Trunk of Withering tree" and levied *Chauth* here. There were a series of other raids carried on in different parts of Malwa by the Maratha and the region was brought under their total control. Mewar was one state of Rajasthan, which was the closest to the borders of Malwa, and so the region was facing the immediate threat from the Marathas. It could be their turn anytime. The rulers of Mewar at that time, Maharana Sangram Singh (1710-34), had written a letter (*Kharita*) on 24th November 1724 to Sawai Jai Singh of Amber about the threat. He wrote that the *Daccani* (Deccanies) or the Marathas always created disturbances in his territory and that they were thieves and would not give up their habits unless they were properly chastised.[71] Maharana Sangram Singh also asked

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[69] *Ibid*, Vol.17, Letter nos.28, 47, 65, 67, 68, 79. Also see Vol.14, Letter no.27.
[70] K.S. Gupta, *Mewar and the Maratha Relations*, p. 20.
[71] Jaipur State Archives (O.H.R.), No. 226/854. 'Kharita from Maharana Sangram Singh to Sawai Jai Singh', dated Posh Budi 5, 1781 i.e. 24th Nov. 1724.

Pancholi Kanha to return to Udaipur from Marwar because of the disturbances created by the Marathas. Their information is verified by a letter (*arzi*), written by Pancholi Kanha to Sawai Jai Singh on 27th March, 1725 stating that he had rushed back in obedience to Maharana's order as the Marathas were creating trouble in Mewar.[72] The Nizam of Hydrabad was also apprised of the developments. Probably the Maratha ruler, Sahu was alarmed by such understanding among the rulers of Mewar, Amber and Hydrabad and so sent his two officers Gopal Pant and Appaji Pant to Udaipur to sort out the problems.[73] We do not have any document giving information on the details of the talks with the ruler of Mewar. We may, however, assume that the Maratha officers might have come to Udaipur with certain demand or request unacceptable to the Maharana. This is proved by the fact that the Marathas continued to attack parts of Mewar territory. Maharana Sangram Singh again sent a letter (*Kharita*) dated 14th March, 1726 to Sawai Jai Singh mentioning the anger posed by the Marathas.[74] The details of this letter are as follows: 'Deccanies came this side and created great trouble, details of which will be known through Rai Maya Ram. The trouble has been particularly severe, the account of which was sent to you in my previous letter. The trouble is so severe that if they were not checked, in a year or six months, it would spread

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[72] Jaipur State Archives, No. 226/854, 'An Application from Pancholi Kanha to Sawai Jai Singh', dated Baisakh Budi 9, 1781 Vikram Samvat.

[73] B.B. Thakur, *Holkar Shahichya Itihasachin Sadhanen*, Vol. I, No. 8, Also see V.K. Rajwade, *Marathanchya Itihasachin Sadhanen*, Vol. VI, Nos. 594 and 595.

[74] Jaipur State Archives,'Kharita from Maharana Sangram Singh to Sawai Jai Singh', dated Chaitra Budi 7, 1782 Vikram Samvat.

far and wide'. It is believed that Sawai Jai Singh in turn assured the Maharana of help and persuaded Durjan Sal, the ruler of Kota to join hands with Maharana Sangram singh to check the Marathas. Durjan Sal responded positively to Sawai Jai Singh and wrote: "You have written that the Deccanies have entered into the Maharana's territory, a war between them is imminent. You have also mentioned that I shall dispatch best army to Udaipur as soon as the Maharana asks for it. I have already informed you that we have not received any such communication from the Maharana, so far. Here, I have ordered mobilization of army and we shall dispatch troops as soon as the Maharana write to us".[75] Despite such a defensive understanding and alliance of the rulers of Rajasthan against the Marathas, the Marathas continued their pursuit for wealth. In 1726 A.D. Baji Bhimrao Retrekar, who was one of the commanders of the Maratha forces, realized *Chauth* from one of the districts of Mewar.[76] In 1728, Jankoji entered Balon and Shahpura territories and wrongly demanded army expenditure from the rulers of these areas. Since the ruler of Shahpura refused to pay the amount a war took place between the two sides.[77] Although the Maratha lost the war and left the area, but such a rigid attitude of the Marathas was witnessed for the first time in Mewar. This was a warning bell for the rulers of Mewar. After this a series of letters were served

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[75] Jaipur State Archives, 'Kharita from Maharaj Durjan Sal to Sawai Jai Singh', dated Kartik Sudi 2, 1783 Vikram Samvat (25th October, 1726).
[76] Jaipur State Archives, 'Letters from Chhatra Singh of Narwar to Sawai Jai Singh', dated Agahan Sudi 13, 1783 Vikram Samvat (26th Nov 1726).
[77] Cited in K S. Gupta, *op.cit*, p. 24.

directly from the Peshwa to adjoining territories near Malwa. Malwa had already come under the control of Baji Rao and he considered it and its adjoining territories as his own sphere of activities. Baji Rao served letters of demand on Rawal Ram Singh of Dungarpur and Rawal Vishnu Singh of Banswara to pay *Khiraj* (*Khandani*) to Udaji Pawar and Malhar Rao respectively.[78] Thus, the Maratha *sardars* under the protection of Peshwa Baji Rao kept on creating disturbances in Mewar territories and collected *Chauth* from these area. Interestingly Sahu was not happy with such developments. There are some letters, which suggest that when Shahu's attention was drawn towards these violations of sovereign rights of Mewar. He directed the different Maratha *sardars* like Udaji Pawar, Khande Rao Dabhdi, Raghoji and Kanhoji, etc.,, not to interfere and create disturbance in the Mewar territory.[79] True as it was, the Marathas kept creating all sorts of problems on the border region of Mewar attached to Malwa. This was the period when the Peshwa was trying to increase his authority and influence on the Maratha sardars at the expanse of the Maratha ruler. He was encouraging raids in the north for *Chauth* collection. The correspondence of this period show that many of the Maratha sardars were slow to accept this dual control of Sahu on the one hand and the Peshwa on the other and there were constant dispute and wrangling among the the Maratha sardars.[80] The Maratha *sardars*, sometimes under the supervision of

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[78] Leli and Oak, *Dharchya Pawaranchi Mahatra aur Darja*, pp. 30-35.
[79] K.S. Gupta, *op.cit.*, pp. 25-26.
[80] See M.V. Gujar (ed.), *Pawar Dharanycha Itihasachi Sadhnen* (Historical Documents of the Pawars of Dhar), Poona, 1940, Letter No. 14, 16 and 31. Also see V.V Thakur (ed.),

the Peshwa and sometimes at their own kept raiding Malwa region. They raided the area from October to April and then with the onset of monsoon they retreated to their safe bases in Marathwada. Stewart Gordon has given a very interesting account of this phase of Maratha raids in Malwa.[81] These raids in Malwa were quite typical kind of raids confined to important towns and very close to the regular routes.

Thus, on the one hand the Maratha *sardars* were getting themselves involved in more and more *Chauth* collection, their ruler Sahu was acting diplomatically with the major centers of power at that time. He wished to open a diplomatic front in Rajasthan, which was close to Delhi as well as Malwa. And so in 1725 he sent Gopal Pant and Appaji Pant on a diplomatic mission to Udaipur.[82] Few months later he again sent Jadu Rai as his special emissary to the ruler of Mewar, Maharana Sangram Singh. In 1726 A.D. Sahu gave order to his military commanders not to disturb the people of the Piplia village in Mewar.[83] The village was situated on Malwa-Mewar border and the letter was in favour of Rawat Bagh Singh Saktawat, son of Hathi Singh Saktawat of Piplia who was a noble of Mewar.[84] Maharana Sangram Singh had also sent Jai Singh, the son of Bagh Singh Saktawat, to the court of Sahu as his envoy. It is to be noted that all these friendship moves of Sahu were not one sided

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Holkarshahicha Itihasachi Sadhnen (Historical Documents of the Holkars), Vol. I, Indore 1944, Letter No. 4 and 5.

[81] See Stewart Gordon, *Maratha, Marauders and State Formation in Eighteenth Century India*, Delhi, 1994, pp. 30-31.

[82] Raghubir Sinh, *Studies on Maratha and Rajput History*, Jodhpur, 1989, p. 139.

[83] G H. Ojha, *Udaipur Rajya Ka Itihas*, Vol. II, p. 949.

[84] G S. Sardesai, *Selection from Peshwa's Daftar*, Vol. XXX, Bombay, 1933, Letter No. 38.

and the Maharana of Mewar also reciprocated positively. This does indicate that in the beginning of the 18th century the Rajput rulers recognized the Marathas as some entity and perceived them as one political force to reckon with. It is believed that Maharana Sangram Singh in response to Sahu's good gesture inducted few Marathas into his services. In 1727 A.D. he granted Budha *pargana* as Jagir to Narayan Bargal, who was the brother-in-law of Malhar Rao Holkar, a Maratha general and Zamindar of Khandesh.[85] The Budha *pargana* was geographically located in the Mandsaur sarkar of the Malwa Suba adjoining the Mewar territories but was under the control of the Mewar ruler since the Mughal-Mewar treaty in 1613 A.D.[86] Narayan Bargal left the services of Sangram Singh after some time and returned to the Deccan but even then he used to receive the income from his *jagir* regularly.[87] After some time the *jagir* of Budha *pargana* went in the hands of Holkar family Gautami Bai, the wife of Malhar Rao Holkar and sister of Narayan Bargal, looked after the management of these family holdings of the Holkars. In fact she renamed the villages of Kanor and Badsu in the Budha *pargana* as Narayangarh and Malhargarh respectively after the name of her brother and husband.[88] However, all these attempts for continuing for good relations between the Marathas and the rulers of Mewar were of no avail and the raids

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[85] Shyamal Das, *Vir Vinod*, pp 1217-18.
[86] Raghubir Sinh, *Studies in Maratha and Rajput History*, p. 141
[87] L.C. Dhariwal, *Indore State Gazetteer*, Vol. I, p. 578.
[88] V.V. Thakur (ed.), *Holkarshahicha Itihasachi Sadhnen*, Vol. I, Indore, 1944, pp. 1-2 and 1617

of the Marathas continued. We have discussed earlier in this chapter that the Maratha *sardars* had their own compulsions to raid different territories, and so, such friendship moves could not have been possibly continued for want of the survival of the Maratha marauding economics. Here, it is also important to mention that the age-old conservative view that Baji Rao wanted to reestablish 'Hindu Dharma' would have logically meant continuation of friendly relations with the 'Hindu Rajput rulers' and not frequent raids into the territories of the Rajputs. Thus, K.M. Panikkar's interpretations regarding Baji Rao's dealings with the rulers of Rajasthan is questionable when he says that "Baji Rao showed that he was genuinely attached to the doctrine of a *Hindu Pad Padshahi*. That the Marathas in the later period of their authority in upper India forgot this doctrine is no doubt true, but that should not lead us to underestimate its importance during the first period of Maratha advance to the north or Baji Rao's own devotion to that ideal".[89] In reality, Baji Rao I had his own economic and political needs which forced him to raid the northern territories. Despite the levying of *Chauth* and *Sardeshmukhi* on the Mughal Deccan and then on Malwa and Gujarat during the 18th Century, the Peshwa could not finance his recurrent expeditions without taking loans from the *mahajans* who could only be repaid by the proceeds of plunder.[90] Baji Rao's financial difficulties are proved by the whopping debt that he left on the

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[89] See Introduction by K.M. Panikkar in C.K. Srinivasan, *Baji Rao I : The Great Peshwa*, Bombay, 1961, p. XI.

[90] Satish Chandra, *The 18th Century in India: Its Economy and the Role of the Marathas, the Jats, the Sikhs and the Afghans*, Calcutta, 1986, p. 26.

Maratha exchequer. When he died in 1740 A.D., he left a debt of Rs. 14.5 lakhs which had been taken from 30 Mahajans at the rate of Rs. 1/- to 2 1/2 per 100.[91] In 1726, one of the Maratha *sardars*, Baji Bhimrao Retrekar, went to Mewar to realize *Chauth*.[92] At some places the Marathas were able to realize *Chauth* or extract money without much resistance, but at few places they had to face war. For example, in 1728 when Jankoji entered the Mewar territory of Shahpura, the Raja there refused to give them any money and challenged the Marathas for a war. In this battle the Maratha forces were defeated and had to retreat.

These few instances of resistance are significant political developments of the Mewar state and raise a question, till now unanswered, as to why there had not been attempts by the Maharana of Mewar on all the fronts to checkmate the Marathas. Possibly Maharana's acceptance of the Marathas on equal footing would not have been so simple as it appears. When we have presumed that religious unanimity and proximity has nothing to do with the friendly relation before the Rajputs and the Marathas, it is pertinent to extrapolate some other developments and possibilities. The politics inside Rajasthan for supremacy and getting more territories seems to be the crux of the whole development of the early 18th and late 18th century. For example, Aurangzeb had given the *jagirs* of Dungarpur and Banswara to Rawal Ratan

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[91] Kinchaid and Parasnis, *A History of the Maratha People*, Vol. II, London, 1918, p. 272.
[92] Jaipur State Archives, 'Letter from Chhatra Singh of Narwar to Sawai Jai Singh', dated Agahan Sudi 13, 1783 Vikram Samvat (26th November, 1726).

Singh and Kushal Singh respectively because he was angry with Maharana Raj Singh for the protection he gave to Ajit Singh of Jodhpur and also because of his protest against the reimposition of *Jaziya*. But in the fifth year of his reign, the Mughal emperor Farrukhsiyar issued a *farman* conferring the *jagir* of Dungarpur and Banswara to the Maharana of Udaipur. In order to execute it, Bihari Das, the minister of the Maharana, went there with large army and realized the dues.[93] Thus, although Mewar Maharana was the holder of *jagir* of Banswara and Udaipur, but he was not very confident of their allegiance to Mewar. Maharana Sangram Singh very well knew that the two states were ever desirous of breaking off their ties with Mewar. So it is not surprising that when the Marathas entered the territories of Banswara and Dungarpur, the ruler of Mewar did not protest.

In 1728, Baji Rao sent demand letter to Rawal Ram Singh of Dungarpur to pay *Khandani* to Udaji Pawar. Similar demand was also put before Rawal Vishnu Singh of Banswara to pay half of *Khandani* to Malhar Rao and the other half to Udaji Pawar. Again in 1729, Raghoji Kadam Rao and Sawai Kat Singh Kadam Rao ravaged Dungarpur and Banswara and realized Rs. 1.13 lakh and Rs. 50 thousand from these states respectively. However, it is interesting to note that the Peshwa at Satara, Baji Rao, rebuked them for thus trespassing into the province which was the sphere of influence of Baji Rao and directed them to restore to him all the booty and warned them sternly

[93] G.H. Ojha, *History of Rajputana*, Vol. III, part I, p. 23.

against plundering the country in future.[94] Instances like these prove that the tight grip and control of the Peshwa had loosened and were always in a look out for the opportunity to make money through plunder without giving any share to the Maratha state. Another new dimension that has come into play is the emphasis on collection of *Khandani* and we have only few references to collection of *Chauth* and *Sardeshmukhi* in Rajasthan by the Marathas. *Khandani* was a kind of tribute, which was imposed by the Marathas on the different ruling states. So long as the tribute was paid, the Marathas did not interfere in the internal administration of the Rajput states. Many would believe that this tribute collection was not very different from those of the Mughals who used to give autonomy to those Rajput rulers who accepted their sovereignty and paid tribute to the Mughal state. If such was the similarity then why not to consider the Maratha state as a centralized state as well? But there is a difference if we compare the very nature of such collections by the Mughals and the Marathas. The tribute imposed by the Marathas was far heavier than the Mughal tribute. The Mughals had generally demanded only the supply of an armed contingent. Even this demand had carried with it the possibility of an imperial *mansab* and the assignment of additional *tankhwa jagir* apart from *watan jagir* inside and outside Rajasthan. But there was no such prospect of gainful service under the Marathas.[95]And what more, any default in the payment of tribute implied the threat of the claims of a rival prince being

[94] K.S. Gupta, *Mewar and the Maratha Relations*, p. 24.
[95] Satish Chandra, *Medieval India: Society, the Jagirdari Crisis and the Village*, pp. 120-121.

backed by the Marathas. All these persistent and regular tribute payment exhausted the treasury of the affected Rajput states and led to the growing burden on the peasantry. In order to fulfill the demands of the Marathas, the Rajput rulers had to extract more from the peasantry.

RIVALRY BETWEEN MARWAR AND JAIPUR AND THE MARATHA INCURSION:

The rivalry between Jai Singh of Amber and Abhay Singh of Marwar provided a fertile situation for the Marathas to intervene in the internal affairs of the Rajput states. The coming of Abhay Singh to the throne of Marwar and he being over ambitious of acquiring the *parganas* of Ajmer, Sambhar and Didwana and governorship of Gujrat, led to political bitterness among the Rajput rajas, particularly Jai Singh. In 1730 Abhay Singh was able to get he *subedari* of Gujarat from the Mughal emperor.[96] But from there he had to return back to Jodhpur bearing all the administrative responsibilities in the hands of his deputy Ratan Singh Bhandari.[97] This proved disastrous for Marwar in particular and Rajasthan in general because now the Maratha sardars were free to re-establish their control in Gujarat and entered into Rajashtan via Malwa. Malhar Rao Holkar and Ranoji Sindhia entered into Bundi in March 1734.[98] The Maratha sardars came at the invitation of Ram Kachhwahi, the wife of Budh Singh, who offered Rs. 6 lacs in case they are

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[96] *Rajrupak*. Ramkaran Asopa (ed.) Banaras, V.S. 1968, p. 699.
[97] Satish Chandra, *Parties and Politics at the Mughal Court (1707-1740)*, p. 297-28
[98] Surajmal, *Vamsha Bhaskar*, vol. Iv. Jodhpur, V.S. 1956 p 3126-27

successful resloving Bundi to her husband.[99] The objective with which the Marathas came to Bundi was achieved and they were able to place Budh Singh on the throne of Bundi.[100] But soon Budh Singh was displaced and in his place Dalel Singh was made the ruler by Jai Singh of amber. Jai Singh's intervention had become necessary to check the Maratha influcent and to do that Jai Singh soupht help of Abhay Singh as well. Infact they along with many other Rajput rajas met at Hurda to discuss the ways to clock the Marathas.

But when Malhar Rao Holkar and Ramoji Sindhia entered the territory of Jaipur in 1735, Abhay Singh didnot send any help to Jai Singh. And thus started the real trouble in Rajasthan. This was the beginning of the open rivalry between Amber and Marwar and this proved fruitful for the Marathas to increase their activities in Rajasthan. As mentioned above Abhay Singh was in a lookout for getting the subedari of Ajmer. Apparently the Mughal emperor was not infavour of granty the Subedari of Ajmer to him. On the other hand, Jai Singh was going to get the *Subedari* of Ranthambhor. But, the Mughal Emperor decided not to give subedari to any of the two to avoid politicing in the court and this further embittered the differences between Jai Singh and Abhay Singh. Their rivalry had reached to such an extent that Jai Singh advised the Marathas to enter Marwar. The Marathas having no fear of any outside support to Marwar ravanged the territory and left it after securing

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[99] *Ibid.*,vol. Iv, p. 3216
[100] *Ibid.*, vol. IV, p.3220-21

a hugh indemnity. Jai even marched against Jodhpur and proclaimed Ratan Singh as the ruler of Jodhpur.

Thus the political rivalry of the state of Jaipur and Jodhpur courts coaxed them into Maratha system of alliances for the proximity of Rajputana to Malwa and the dislocation of clannish sovereignty in the body politic of Rajputana suited the expansionist designs of Marathas. The close contested rivalry for the throne of Bundi in 1734 was the first of the series.[101] Sir Jadunath Sarkar also held the same view and has termed the Bundi affair as the first Maratha penetration into Rajputana.[102] But the Maratha penetration in Malwa started in 1723-24 and even Bundi and Kota were ravaged in 1726 A D. Buddha was given to Holkar in 1727. Hence, it may be called the first political interference in the internal affairs of Rajput State. In May, 1730 Sawai Jai Singh who wanted to act as arbitrator in Rajputana replaced the ruler Buddha Singh, invited Malharrao Holkar to help her for payment of Rs. 6 lakhs. Even his elder brother Pratap Singh Hada visited south. The letter in *Selection from Peshwa Daftar*, Vol.14, states the same also confirms the fact.[103] Holkar and Shinde proceeded to Bundi on 8th April and took the fort, Khachchwaha queen put 'Rakhi' on to Malhar Rao's wrist and the ruler was restored in Bundi.[104] It is stated that Dalel Singh regained power after Malhar Rao left.

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101 R.K. Saxena, *Maratha Relations with the major States of Rajpoutana*, p. 36a
102 Jadunath Sarkar, *Fall of the Mughal Empire*, Vol.I, p.140.
103 *Selection from Peshwa Daftar*, Vol.XIV, Letter no.11.
104 *ibid*,no.13

The Maratha interference was, however, resented and at the Hurda Conference efforts were made to nullify Maratha influence. The death of Maharana Sangram Singh was a blow to the Rajput unity with his death Maratha ascendancy started yet again.[105] His eldest son Jagat Singh succeeded him but his rulership was challenged by his foster brother with the help of the Marathas.[106] The Maratha interference alarmed the Rajputs states of Rajasthan. Maharaja Jagat Singh invited variuos Rajput rajas on his cononation. Abhay Singh of Marwar, Bakhta singh of Nagor, Durjansal Hada of Kota all joined at Hurda town on the Ajmer-Mewar borders to commence a plan for a joint action against the foe. Rulers of Kishangarh and Bikaner also joined. They all decided to oppose the enemy at Rampura through a joint action.

जगम दूसरो राजड जाणो, तूटे यण समिये तुरकाणे।

राज तो करसी जगतो राणो, होसी रोद दली हिदवाणो।।

The above song is about Jagat Singh being made the leader of Rajput united forces at Hurda and the author imagines the future of Rajasthan.[107]

The following agreements were reached at the Hurda Conference

(a) They shall remain united.

(b) No one would help the defector of another.

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[105] Col. James Tod, *Annals and Antiquities of Rajasthan*, Vol.I, p.320

[106] The foster brother of Jagat Singh asked for *Tika* and royal robe to be sent by Sahu to the new Maharana on his accession. See *Selections form Pashwa Dâftar*, vol. XIV, Letter no.21.

[107] *Pacheen Rajasthani Geet*. Vol. III, Edited by Kavirao Mohan Singh, Rajasthan Vishva Vadhyapeeth, Udaipur, V.S. 2014, p. 83

(c) After the rainy season all the rulers or their representatives shall assemble at Rampura to discuss the situation.

(d) In case of any dispute, the Maharana will try to solve it.

(e) In all the future campaigns every one should join.

The Vazir Kamruddin and Khan Dauran also supported their efforts. The Rajputs assembled and the army numbering to 150,000 marched towards Rampura where they had to face Holkar and Shinde[108] who had seized Khan Dauran, and had entered Jaipur territory and pillaged Sambhar. Looking to the safety of Jaipur, Jai Singh left the camp and tried to mediate between the Marathas and the Mughal emperor. However, the plan failed. The *Jodhpur-Rajya-Ki-Khyat* has described the war in detail [109] The policy of Jai Singh indicates that he wanted peace with the Maratha so that he could at least save his possessions. The failure of earlier attempts proves that his was a wise policy based on practical politics. He cannot be accused for either treachery or inactiveness but Col. Tod held the view that Hurda attempt failed because their internal dissentions incapacitated them to resist Maratha inroads.[110] These developments exposed the weakness of Rajput diplomacy. Now Peshwa could command the respect paid to a conqueror. His mother Radhabai's pilgrimage to the North also was of much importance in this

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[108] *Selections from Peshwa Daftar, Vol.14*, nos.21&23.
[109] *Jodhpur-Rajya-Ki-Khyat*, Vol.2, p.331.
[110] Col. James Tod, *Annals and Antiquities of Rajasthan*, Vol.I, pp.383-384.

connection. When she visited Rajasthan everyone competed to show his hospitality.

Bajirao also entered the area through Lunawara, Gujarat and Dungarpur. He narrated his travel and intention to go to Mewar to his mother wishing her a safe return.[111] A vessel under Maharana Rawal of Dungarpur did not obstruct his passing through the State and offered a tribute of Rs. 3 lakhs.[112] Peshwa's agent at Mewar was already looking to his interest but he also contacted to the Mewar Diwan, Biharidas Pancholi through a letter in Sanskrit on January 1736 A.D.[113] Bajirao was entertained by the Rana and who visited the Jag Mandir Palace which is noted in Marathi records also.[114] It was decided that a fixed sum, or in instalment for the period of 10 years shall be given to the Peshwa.[115] Rich gifts were exchanged and *Mejmani* (hospitality charges) of one lakh were paid to Mewar.[116]

Bajirao's second visit was to Jai Singh and some small chiefs accompanied Bajirao upto Ajmer.[117] Baji Bhivrao from Sanganer wrote to Peshwa that he must have finished his talks with Sawaiji and warned Bajirao that if he was planning to march Delhi he should be cautious for he can not

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111 Ibid., Letter Nos.50-51
112 G.H.Ojha, *History of Rajputana*,Vol.III, part1, p.128.
113 *Bharat Itihas Samshodhak Mandal Quaterly*, July-October,1952, p.180.
114 *Selection from Peshwa Daftar*, Vol.XXX, Letter no.221.
115 *ibid*,Vol.XIII, Letter no.54.
116 *Vir Vinod*, pp.1228-1229.
117 *Marathyanchya Itihasachi Sadhane*, Vol.II, p.73

conquer the world in a day.[118] Bajirao put a long list of his proposals and Jai Singh promised to get them rectified but he warned Bajirao against an assault on Delhi. Moreover, Bajirao deputed his force to Marwar and himself went back to Poona via Nathdwara and Gujarat. Shahpura was attacked and looted by Shinde and Hokar on their route back to their place.

Marathas in Marwar

The real bilateral understanding between the Marathas and the Rajputs could be made only after Shivaji's rule, who was succeeded by Sambhaji. In Marwar the death of Jaswant Singh had created a vacuum because of the absence of any heir to the throne. But soon his widow wife gave birth to a son Ajit Singh. But Aurangzeb did not want him to take the *gaddi* of Jodhpur. Durgadas Rathor the loyal and confident supporter of the family arranged to save the infant's life and sent him to Rajasthan where he got the support of other Rajputs like the ruler of Mewar. During those years only Prince Akbar joined the Rajputs and revolted against the emperor. Durgadas tried to join hands with Sambhaji in Maharashtra. Durgadas and Prince Akbar both went to south. Sambhaji at first though was reluctant to render help, but soon he began relying the two when Durgadas disclosed a plot of Annaji Datto against Sambhaji.[119] He also granted them *Jagir* to maintain them. Durgadas soon was brought in family ties of Kavikalash as the later's wife put a *Rakhi* on

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[118] *Selection from Peshwa Daftar*, Vol. XIV, Letter no. 54 and 56. Baji Bhivrao wrote- "एकच दिवासी पृथ्वी गोला करावी ऐसे नाहि।"

[119] Robert Orme, *Historical Fragments of the Mogul Empire*, 1782, p.105.

Durgadas's wrist and a meeting was arranged between Sambhaji and the two.[120] Perhaps a contact was signed as they helped Sambhaji in his siege against the Siddi of Janjira. Sambhaji tried to win over and repeatedly appealed the Kachhawaha ruler Raja Ram Singh, the successor of Jai Singh but he paid no heed to it. Durgadas with a Maratha force left for Gujarat under the leadership of Ganapati and Dhanaji Jadhav. Aurangzeb come to south with preparations and defeated the allied force of Akbar and Durgadas. Akbar in frustation left the country for Persia as he could not expect any help from the Marathas.[121]

It is argued that Jai Singh instigated Bajirao to attack Marwar. The enemity between the two houses was well known. As Jai Singh was leaning towards Marathas, Abhay Singh joined with the Mughal officers to oppose them. Shahpura was ravaged and Malharrao and Ranaji marched towards Merta, where Pratap Singh of Bundi joined them.[122] Abhay Singh ordered his minister to fight up the battle. *Jodhpur Rajya ri Khyat* gives the details of the battle and skirmishes that took place, but at the end the writer, perhaps to earn the favours, wrote that the Marwar ruler was victorious and the Marathas begged for peace.[123] As a matter of fact, Holkar and Shinde were victorious and Vijay Singh Bhandari had to agree to pay them tribute.[124] Nagor was their

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120 G.R.Parihar, *Marwar -Maratha Sambandh*, p.8.
121 Robert Orme, *op.cit.*, p.292.
122 Ibid., Vo. XIV, letter no. 14
123 *Jodhpur Rajya-ki-Khyat*, pp.232-234.
124 G.R.Parihar,*Maratha-Marwar Sambandh* (1724-1843), p.37

next target and it had to to surrender as well. The Maratha army joined Bajirao at Ajmer on his return march to Deccan. Baji Bhivrao suggested Peshwa that unless and until the *Vazir* group including Kamruddin, Sadat Khan were not crushed nothing favorable could be expected.[125] Hence, Peshwa marched towards north and stationed at Abirwada and deputed Baburao Malhar (Barwe) to Delhi, to get the terms at Bhambola rectified.[126] It may be argued that by 1736 Marathas began to be recognized as some power in Rajasthan and nearly all the small or big powers here had to agree to pay them tribute (*Khandani*) in return for their help in political matters.

There was some respite to different territories of Rajasthan when Baji Rao I died in 1749 A.D. Baji Rao I was truely a capable general as he could control the ambitious commanders like Holkar and Shinde by his tact, power and strength. His tenure of office opened the gates for Rajput-Maratha social and cultural contacts. Artists, painters, architects from Jaipur were invited at Maratha courts. The wall paintings of Shaniwarwada, the palace of Bajirao I painted by the brush of Bhojraj, a Jaipur artist, were the best example of these contacts.[127] Buildings, palaces, temples were constructed at various places through exchange of ideas. Priests like Ratnakar Panundrik, Sudhakar and his nephew Vrajanath Bhatt Dixit were respected at Jaipur court. The members of

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[125] *Selection from Peshwa Daftar*, Vol.XIV, no.54.

[126] G.H. Khare, *Hingne Daftar*, BIMS series 63 (1945), Vol. No. 13 and 14. These letters suggest that Hingne was trying to bring the Mughal emperor to take final decision with regards to Maratha rights over Malwa through Sawai Jai Singh.

[127] V.K. Bhave, *Peshwakalin Maharashtra*, Anand Mudran Mandis Pune, p. 28

this family still live at Jaipur.[128] Sawai Jai Singh had contacts with Brahmendra Swamy of Dhavdasi, the most popular spiritual guide of the Marathas in those days.[129]

Marathas had become the de-jure rulers in Malwa. Hence to keep Rajasthan in tight control was their logical step. Secondly, they were free from Malwa politics. The years, Balaji Bajirao took the charge of Peshwaship to the battle of Panipat was the period of Maratha expansion in the north and interference in Rajasthan politics. They took part in the war of succession of nearly all the important states of this land. By this time their *Kamavisdars* were appointed to collect tribute with a group of officers with them. Such state had Maratha agents as envoys and thus Marathas influence spread over the whole of the Rajasthan, which was still strengthened in the period under review when they become the arbitrators of the fate of Rajputs. Another important features of the period was that as the Maratha principalities were established in Malwa, and though the provincial rulers Holkar, Shinde and Pawars, were technically under Peshwa, yet, their own interest to strengthen their power in the area of influence and to get sanction for those areas through '*Saranjam*' grant from the Peshwa Durbar made them more and more ambitious. These areas for their struggle for power were the weak and quarreling states of Rajasthan. Though Jai Singh mediated in the grant of sub-Subedar's *Sanand* for Malwa to the Peshwa. But in their hearts of heart the Rajputs were worried about this

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[128] I was able to get this information from my personal interview with the Maharashtriyan families living in Jaipur and other parts of Rajasthan.

spread of Martha power. The death of Baji Rao I might have raised their hopes. On their annual meet at Nathdwara, where a religious function was organized by the Malharrao of Kota it was decided to oust the Marathas from Malwa. All the big powers of Rajasthan viz, Amber, Mewar, Marwar and Kota were to unite and decided to march on Mandsaur. They even refused to pay tribute to the *Kamavisdars.* They even thought of inviting Bundela Chiefs to their side but nothing concrete could be done. And suddenly Sawai Jai Singh the towering personality of the 18th Century Rajasthan, passed away on 3rd October 1743, and his eldest son Ishwar Singh succeeded him. He was duly recognized by the Maratha Government as the ruler of Jaipur.[130] Another party under Rana Jagat Singh, Maharao Durjansal Kota and Ummed Singh of Shahpur supported Madhav Singh the son of Jai Singh from the Mewar princess. And probably because of this Ishwar Singh took the help of Marathas to capture the throne.[131]

The succession dispute at Jaipur led to the batle of Rajmahal. A force under Bharat Singh Sisodia accompanied by Durjansal Hada and Ummed Singh of Shahpura was set to put Madhav Singh on the throw but the Maharana could not give his active support. Ishwar Singh sent his mission to Poona and Jayappa Shinde was asked to support.[132] Ishwar Singh also,

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129 V.K Rajwade, *Marathyachya Itihasachi Sadhane* ,Vol. III, Letter no 260

130 G R. Khare, *Hingne Daftar*, (BIMS series), Vol. I, leters no. 28. It is a letter of Balaji Bajirao to Ranoji dated 25th Jan. 1944.

131 Ibid., Letter no. 27

132 Suryamal Mishra, *Vamsha Bhaksar*, Pratap Press, Jodhpur, 1941, pp. 334-337.

pursued the Hada of Kota and bundi. The allied forces supporting Madhav Singh under Mewar's leadership were sent back by Shinde. Col. Tod puts the blame on the Maharana of Mewa for not giving fullfledged suppport. The Maharana now sought for the help of Holkar, who was considered one of the most experienced Commanders among the Maratha. With the assistance of Ramachandra Bawa talks were opened for negotiation. Maharana did not agree with their proposals and after Holkar ravaged Tanda he left for Bundelkhand. In between, Maharana sent his envoy to Poona and through Jayappa Shinde promised to pay 15 lakhs for Jaipur.[133] Holkar supported the cause, and finally sent his son Khanderao with a force, even though Shinde and Ramchandra Bawa opposed it. Maharana wanted that Tonk, Toda, Malpura and Mewai should be given to Madho Singh, Bundi should be given back to the Hadas. Under Bharat Singh Sisodia the war party left to fight the battle. But the Maharana who was very slow in his moves, lost the cause for he could not reach the battle field, Khanderao Holkar did not take active part and the battle was lost.[134] Although the battle was won one of the factious of the Marathas i.e. Shinde and they defeated the allied forces supported by Holkkar this exposed the open dissentions money Marathas. Poona Durbar was not aware of the actual state of things, whereas amongst Shinde and Holkar the latter played a deceitful role. Peshwa insisted on both of them to act

[133] G. H.Khare, *Hingne Daftar*, Vol. I Letter no. 29.
[134] Col. James Tod, *Annals and Antiquitiesof Rajasthan* , Vol. I, p. 338

cordially.[135] This gave a very bad impression about their moral values, about which Ishwar Singh spoke to the Maratha agent Govind Tamaji at Jaipur.[136] Unfortunately being at distance, Peshwa could not do much. All these years of rivalry between Holkar and Shinde further frome oure earlier assemption that the Poona govt. did not have a strong centralized control and check over theri sardars. It is only in 1748 that an arrangement for an agreement between the brothers of Jaipur was made at Mewai.

The Rana wanted the matters to be settled. Though Ishwar Singh promised to cede territory worth 5 lakhs- viz., Tonk, Toda, Malpura and Barwada, but to establish the control Malharrao Holkar attacked Jaipur. The rulers of Bundi and Kota joined but Maharana again wanted to shield himself when Malharrao Holkar wrote to Ummed Singh Sisodia of Shahpura to ask Rana to join him with quick march at Bagru. Ishwar Singh had Jat Sekhawat, Narabe Rajawat and Rajkeshav Bai with him. He was defeated and signed the terms.[137] Malharrao was to get 65 lakhs and so he entered Rajasthan again in 1750 A.D. Knowing about Holkar arrival Ishwar Singh finally committed suicide and as Col. Tod had mentioned 'a dose of poison' gave Madho Singh the *Gaddi*. Now the Marathas under Holkar had a firm hold over Rajasthan. Peshwa's policy was not clear and finally a policy of supporting the chiefs and changing sides gave the Marathas a bad name. They gave an impression that

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[135] G. H. Khare, *Hingne Daftar*, vol. I Letter no. 41.
[136] *Selection from Peshwa Daftar*, vol. II, Letter no. 11, pp. 17-18,
[137] V. V. Thakur,*Holkarshahi Itihasachi Sadhane*, vol. Letter no. 72.

each Rajput state now could hire them for money. It sapped their reputation as is evident from the fact that even the presence of Holkar at the coronation ceremony of Madho Singh was resented at Jaipur by the people and Marathas numbering some 1500 were slain and 1000 were wounded.[138]

At Bundi also the Maratha had their *Kamavisdars*. The ruler regularly used to pay tribute to Shinde. Kota ruler Durjansal Hada, who wanted his own candidate Ummed Singh to be installed was opposing the ruler, Dalel Singh, the son in law of Sawai Jai Singh. After Sawaiji Jai Singh's death the question was reopened. Indra Singh was approached who did not support the action of removing Dalel Singh. Ishwar Singh of Jaipur sent a force with Rajamal and Jayappa Shinde to Kota in 1745[139] for Ummed Singh was troubling the ruler. Jayappa expressed his anger in these words- बन्दीवार उमेद सिह आलात्यागवे या प्रान्तात दंगा मदिलाहा।

Holkar took the side of Durjansal's candidate and Jayappa of Ishwar Singh's. The letters collected in Gulgule Daftar clearly show us that due to Shinde's sympathy with Ishwar Singh group, the Kota ruler did not allow the Maratha settlements at Patan and at Indragarh, Khatole and Sopar also he created disturbances for Shindes. He also refused to pay them the dues for, upto 1744 A.D. previous dues increased to Rs. 1 lakh 76000. The *Kamavisdar* of Kota Balaji Gulgule was asked to collect the dues, without committing to any

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[138] *Selections from Peshwa Daftar*, Vol. XXVI, Letter 64 and 65.
[139] Suryamal Mishra, *Vamsha Bhaskar*, pp. 3374-79.

serious quarrel.[140] The Jaipur candidate was to be deposed and Ummed Singh was to be supported by Holkar. Hence the enemity between Holkar and Shinde may be attributed to their relations with the Rajputs. In future also, in many letters found in Gulgule Daftar (of Balaji Yashwant Gulgule), the *Kamavisdars* of both the sides were complaining about each other.[141] The letter collected in Gulgule Daftar suggest that the anger was expressed by Ranoji and Jayappa. Finally after Ishwar Singh's defeat at Bagru Ummed Singh was restored to Bundi Gaddi and Dalel Singh was turned out.[142] Presents were exchanged and Bundi became a tributary state and the share was fixed at 35 per cent and Rs. 75000 to the Raja of Satara.

When Bundi was under Ishwar Singh's control Shinde wanted that Patam, and Karan should also be brought under his control.[143] Other small *parganas* like Khairabad, Bakani, Piplod already had Maratha *Kamavisdars* appointed at each of these Paragana headquarters.[144] By July 1745 Patam was brought under Shindeshahi control and Shinde appointed Balaji Gulgule as Phadnis there.[145] However Sir Jadunath Sarkar and Col. Tod held the view that it was taken by Holkar in 1748. Actually the Peshwa had divided these areas away Shinde, Holkar, Pawars of Dhar and Dewas who started getting their fixed share at these centers. Originally the share of Bakani, Khairabad

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[140] Anandrao Phalke, *Shinde Shahi Itihasachi Sadhane*, Vol. I, Aliyab Durbar Press, Gwalior, 1929, Letter nos 2 to 15, 24, 26, 27, 29, 30, 32, 42, 45.
[141] Suyamal Mishra, *Vamsha Bhaskar*, pp. 3534-42.
[142] Ibid., p. 3542
[143] Ibid., p.
[144] Anandrao Phalke, *Shindeshahi Itihasachi Shadhane*, vol. Lette no. 11, 20, 21, 38.
[145] Ibid., pp. 68 to 70

was under Pawars of Dhar and Dewas. In general the percentage of share was fixed and renewed as per the division of 1732 A.D.[146]

Shapura was another state which was brought under the control of the Marathas. An unpublished *Khyat* of Shahpura in the collection of Sitamau, by Raghubir Sinh gives a clue to the relations of this state with Marathas. The ruler Ummed Singh sided with the Maharaja Jodhapur in Merta Seige. Holkar and Shinde looted his state and then he met Bajirao I on his way to Jahajpur Nathdwara and agreed to pay dues perhaps. He then sided with Maharana of Udaipur in Jaipur and Bundi affairs and the letters of Khanderao and Malhar Rao clearly show that he maintained good relations with Holkars.[147] Thus, by the end of the first hals of 18th century, the Marathas had been able to bring all the major Rajput states under their control. However, this control was never a direct one based on orders flowing form Pine. Rather different powerful factions of the Marathas like Scindhia, Holkar, Shinde etc. fixed this own terms with different ruling in each of these states in return for payment of huge amount.

By 1736 the Marwar ruler had also accepted to pay *chauth* to the Marathas but as expacted and like the other rulers of Rajasthan he did not pay the dues, so also, Marathas had to face troubles in collecting dues from Sojat, Raipur and Dajaran. In between the enmity between Sawai Jai Singh and Abhay Singh of Marwar had reached its height. Abhay Singh attacked Bikaner

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[146] *ibid.*, no. 21,
[147] Cited in Prabha Srinivashulu, ***Malwa under the Marathas***, N. Delhi, 1996, p. 268.

that was helped by Jai Singh and the Maharana and battle was fought at Ganjwara. Sawai Jai Singh lost and he could not install his candidate on the throne of Jodhpur. On the other hand, Abhay Singh wanted to finish his quarrel with his brother Bakhta Singh who helped him in the war against Mewar and Jaipur rulers. But he was growing powerful for he was conferred with governorship of Gujarat by Ahmad Shah the Mughal emperor who succeeded Mohammad Shah. He also got Narnol, Didwana and Sambhar and all this increased the power of Bakhta Singh.[148]

By this time Holkar had established himself as a hired supporter for the Rajputs and was in Bundi. Hence Abhay Singh sent his agent at Bundi. With the mediation of Bundi ruler the contract for Holkar's help was made for the payment of Rs. 10 lakhs and 11000 per day.[149] Holkar had given support to sought Abhay Singh in the Jaipur war of succession also and in future also Holkar had cordial relations with Jodhpur.

Abhay Singh died on 10th June 1949 at Ajmer. He left a legacy ready to be a prey for his ambitious brother Bakhta Singh. He was confronted with Ram Singh the son of the deceased ruler, who had become very unpopular among the courtiers. Bakhta Singh used the opportunity and look Jodhpur, Ajmer and Merta, and Ram Singh was expelled from Marwar. Ram Singh by changing the traditional enemity with Jaipur and Mewar asked for their support whereas

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[148] G. H. Khare, *Hingne Daftar,,* vol. I no. 32, Also see, G.R. Parihar , *Maratha-Marwar Sambandh*, p. 39.

[149] *Ibid.*

Bakhta Singh also tried to sought Madhav Singh help. Finally Ram Singh sought for the help of Marathas,[150] but Bakhta Singh also sent his agents to Holkar and Shinde Holkar wisely kept aloof but this time Shinde showed his deep concern in the affair. Jayappa Shinde tried to help Ram Singh and sent letters with this effect to the rulers of Kota, Sopar and Bundi to assist him but the allied force of Shinde and Ram Singh were defeated as Bakhta Singh suddenly attacked them near Ajmer. Malhar Rao could not pay much attention to Marwar problem for Madho Singh the ruler of Jaipur, was his friend and he was siding with Bakhta Singh. With Abhay Singh, he had cordial relations as he was getting money for *'Lag' 'Sarah'* and *'Saranjam'*. But the relations between Bakhta Singh and Jayaji remained strained. Expecting a possible encroachment of Marathas, on the initiative of Bakhta Singh, Madho Singh and Surajmal Jat met at Soneli village to think over the measures to expel Marathas beyond Narbada.[151] But Bakhta Singh died on 21st September 1752.[152]

In between the condition at north became worse. The Marathas under Raghoba and Shinde and Holkar engaged themselves in the Northern affairs. As the emperor Ahmad Shah was facing the troubles with his courtiers, they signed a treaty with the emperor on the advise of his vazir Safdarjung.[153] The instability in Northern and Imperial politics attracted and compelled Peshwa to

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150 *Jodhpur Rajya Ki Khyat*, Vol.I, pp. 270-71.
151 *Marwar-ri-Khyat* vol 2. p. 185
152 *Marwar-ri-Khyat*, vol. 2, p.186
153 G. H. Khare, *Hinge Daftar*, vol. I letter nos. 47 to 49.

look to the matters thereto preserve Maratha possessions in the north, south and Malwa. Hence Peshwa's brother Raghoba was sent via Rajasthan with orders to collect arears of tribute from Jaipur, Bundi, Kota.[154] When Raghoba was in Rajasthan Ram Singh met him through Jayappa Shinde but he could not stay there for a long and went to Delhi and installed the emperor to the throne. Bakhta Singh was succeeded by Vijay Singh.[155] Here Malharrao Holkar greeted his accession to the throne, but soon Ram Singh with the support of Jaiyappa Sindhia started conspiring to overthrow him.

Jayappa sindhia had his own personal benefit in mind if he could be able to place Ram Singh on throne. He wanted to secure his possessions at Ajmer and when Holkar was defending the emperor by fighting with the Jats in accordance with the treaty of 1752, the former went to Marwar. He sent a letter to Balaji Yashwant, his agent at Kota about his 'Marwar Mohim' and asked him that the rulers of Kota and Bundi also be informed to help him.[156] Vijay Singh was helped by Bikaner and Kishangarh rulers. But he was defeated by the Maratha forces in the battle at Merta in September 1754 and Merta was piercly looted by the Marathas.[157]

Vijay Singh finding his position week thought over to finish the work of the mastermind working against him. Hence Vijay Singh's men murdered

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[154] Anant Rao Phalke, *Shinde Shahi Itihasachi Sadhane*, Vol.I, letter nos. 92-93
[155] *Marwar-ri-Khyat*, vol. p.1
[156] Ibid., letter nos. 114 to 117.
[157] *Marwar-ri-Khyat* vol, 3, pp. 3-6

Jayappa, on 24th July 1755 at Tausar.[158] But for certain reason perhaps because of Maratha power and prestige in the north, for want of support or with the fear of the earlier defeat and the siege of Jodhpur by the Marathas, Vijay Singh signed a treaty with Jankoji in February 1756 by which conciliation was brought between Vijay Singh and Ram Singh. Ajmer, Garh Bitali (Taragarh) and the surrounding regions were given to the Marathas. According to the treaty Vijay Singh agreed to pay Rs. 50 lakh as war indemnity and an additional amount of Rs. 1 lakh 50 thousand was to be paid annually to the Marathas. The whole of Marwar state was divided in two parts Ram Singh was given the areas of Jalor, Sambhas, Maroth, Ajat Parbatsar and kkekri while Vijay Singh continued to rule at Jodhpur, Najo and Merta.[159] Jankoji Sindhia signed a separate treay with Ram Singh according to which a *Kamvisdas* was supposed to stay in his area to collect *chungi* (duties) everyday. And then the colllected money shall be distributed equally between Ram Singh and the Marathas. Sadashiv was appointed as *Kamvisdas* by the Marathas here. Thus by the time the Panipat battle was fought Maratha supremacy in North India, Rajasthan, Gujarat and nearly whole of India was established. So far as Marwas was concerned the treaty of 1756 made it a tributary state of the Marathas.

The Maratha have generally been accused criticized for the practice of helping the Rajput Rajas one against another for receiving heavy bribes. It

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[158] *Peshwa Daftar correspondence* vol. 2, p 47
[159] See *Peshwa Daftar Corespondence*, vol. 21, nos. 82-84

injured the reputation of Marathas and made them detestable to Rajput. If the Maratha policy is reviewed with impartiality the close study of the events help us to conclude in the following way. By 1751-52 Marathas were supreme in the North. They became protector of the Rajput rulers and rulers of Malwa and Gujaratonly when they found a suitable fertile opportunity to exploit the situation. The Rajput ruling families were themselves enganged in various desputes for power. For example, the murder of Ajit Singh by his son Abhay Singh or the deposition of his son Ram Singh by his under Bakhta Singh or Ram Singh's cousin brother Vijay Singh, installation of Dalel Singh by Jai Singh at Bundi, or Jagat Singh supporting his nephew Madho Singh against the lawful heir of Sawai Jai Singh Maharaj Ishwar Singh. The Rajput rulers also conspired the murder of Maratha leaders like Pilaji Gayakwad and Jayappa Sindhia (by the Rathors). Futher there was wholesale massacre of Marathas after the death of Ishwar Singh at Jaipur and many other untold and unrecorded murders took place in Rajasthan.Then, how the Marathas only asking for tribute on the basis of their strength and power be criticized? Certainly it was the Rajput states of Rajasthan who were themselves to blame for the ever increasing interference of the Marathas in their internal affairs. However, there is no denying the fact that this created a feeling of hatred among the Rajputs against them and this in turn might have worked as a uniting force for the fratmented states of Rajasthan. The interference of the Marathas increased to such an extent gradually that for they unhappy

development within the states the Marathas were blamed. This might have created a feeling otherness among the Rajput rulers and must have helped in the formation of Rajasthan as a region.[160]

The Marathas were badly defeated in the battle of Panipat. The Rajputs were in a look out for such an opportunity to exploit it to their own advantage. The invasion of Abdalli humbled the Marathas and put a stop to their pretensions to universal sovereignty. Now the Rajputs were very hopeful of expelling them from Rajasthan. After Malharrao Holkar's death Marathas had to struggle for lost territories and a period of conflict continued and the Rajput stopped paying the tribute due to the Marathas.

After Panipat, Mahadji Sindhia Pawar and Holkar tried to improve things. After getting the honors of appointment as *Vakil-ul-Mutalik* he tried to collect the dues overdue for the emperor and also for Peshwa,[161] The Marathas again started interfering in the Rajputana politics. The Rajput tried to join unite at Nathdwara but failed.[162] Thus, to the liking of the Marathas, the pre-Panipat situation was created once again. It was in the name of the weak Mughal emperor that Mahadji as his *Vakil* tried to collect his dues and tried to establish his control. Sawai Pratap Singh the then ruler of Jaipur was able to inspire the Rajputs and asked them not to pay dues to the Mughals. On Mahadji's side Najabkuli Khan and Shah Nizamuddin were sent but the

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160 We shall discuss this issue in detail in chaper 5.
161 J. N. Sarkar, *Fall of the Mughal Empire*, vol III, pp. 201-209.
162 *Selections fro Peshwa Daftar*, vol XXIV. Leter o 248.

Rajput-Mughal clash turned into a Rajput-Maratha clash. Mahadji was successful in his early encounters but later on was defeated by the joint Jaipur-Marwa forces. Mahadji had to face the battle at Tunga near Lalsot on 24th March 1787. He could not fight it decisively and had to retreat to Dig.[163]

The Marathas also lost many other areas outside the Rajputs states which were earlier part of Rajput territory. One such area was Rampura. Rampura was originally under Mewar in 1567 A.D. the ruler Rao Durgbhan or Durgarao submitted before Akbar. After the death of Aurangzeb Maharana Sangram Singh got it for himself on 22nd October 1716. As per the concord of Durgadas Rathore Rampura Kasba and 246 villages were given to Chandravat of Rampura and their relatives of Kunija Ghasoi on Aug. 1717.[164] In 24th March 1729 the share of Maharana was given to Madho Singh of Amer who in turn gave it to Malharrao Holkar for his help in the war of succession of Jaipur for the payment of the expenses army. Probably in the last months of 1759 A.D. Rampura and Bhanpura was brought under Holkars. As per the contract made with Rampura the Holkars gave them the seat of Rampura with some villages and the relative of the ruling family also were given some villages. They were received honour and were respected accordingly. Perhaps a wise policy of Malharrao to appease them like the one Akbar followed with Rajputs.

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[163] J. N. Sarkar, *Fall of the mughal Empire*, vol. III p. 201
[164] Shyamal Das, *VirVinod*, p. 950

Hathe Singh Chandravat got Bhatkhedi.[165]

Like the other states in Rajasthan Chandravat Laxman Singh also revolted against the Holkar State after the death of Malharrao on Vaishakh Shuddhe 11 (Tuesday 20th May 1966).[166] Krishna Govind Kamvisdar of Rampura and Krishnaji Randdeo Kamavisdar of Mandsaur with Mirza Adilbeg under Mahadji's service curbed it.[167] Rampura problem was a headech for Ahilyabai also. In 1818 by the Arrangement made by Malcolm with Holkar State the state lost many areas in Rajasthan and some portions like Rampura Khurd, Rampura Basant also to Nawab Merkhan but Rampura and Bhanpura proper remained under the control of Holkar state.

Post Panipat period

When the Maratha got entangled in the battle of panipat with Ahmad Shah Abdali, Vijay Singh of Marwar took advantage of the situation and started capturing the lost territories (after 1756) from Ram Singh. He brought Jalor and Sambhar under his control, but could not bring Ajmer under his rule. The defeat of the Marathas in the battle of Panipat did create a situation when the decline of Maratha power seemed imminent, but partially due to the departure of Abdali in March 1761 from India and also because of disunited Rajput states the Marathas were able to regain their control over Rajasthan. Infact, from now onwards till 1800 A.D. the Maratha interference in Rajashtan

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165 *Selections from Peshwa Daftar*, vol. XXI, later no. 271.
166 V.V. Thakur, *Holkarshahi Itihasachi Sadhane*, vol. I Letter No. 253.
167 Ibid., nos. 141- and 149.


Bajirao's March to Delhi
March 1787
Delhi
Rewari
Kot Putli
Alwar
Manoharpur
Sambhar
Jaipur
Kishangarh
Dig
Mathura
Agra
Firozabad
Fatehpur Sikri
Gwalior
Holkar's Moves
Nanwar
Datia
Jhansi
Orchha
Kota
Return to Pune
Nathdwara
Udaipur
Rampura
0
70
Miles
Bajirao's Movements


Bajirao's March to Delhi
March 1737
Delhi
Yamuna R.
Rewari
Kot Putli
Alwar
Dig
Mathura
Manoharpur
Agra
Firozabad
Sambhar
Jaipur
Fatehpur Sikri
Kishangarh
Holkar's Moves
Gwalior
Datia
Narwar
Jhansi
Orchha
Return to Pune
Kota
Nathdwara
Udaipur
Rampura
0
70
Miles
Bajirao's Movements

became more direct and frequent demands for money were put before the Rajput rulers.

In 1762 A.D. the Marathas began with their demand for regular annual taxes as well as Rs. 3 lakh as compensation for war from Marwar.[168] It is interesting to note that during the second half of the 18th Century the ruler of Marwar, Maharaja Vijay Singh tried to avoid any conflict with the Marathas and preferred to accord to their frequent demands by paying some and promising some to be paid as dues in future. Probably he worked out this policy for maintaining peace within his territory. Many would criticize Vijay Singh for his non-resistant approach to the Maratha demands. But one should not be influenced by end result. It seems that his head than his heart guided Vijay Singh's actions more. Unlike the common attitude of the Rajputs to fight and die in the field he believed otherwise. He might have thought that fighting a battle could prove to be more harmful economically for the state than paying them regularly. Probably Vijay Singh had thought correctly, but the future development proved disastrious for Marwar. He got trapped in spider's web and the Maratha demands kept enhancing day by day and the treasury could never be filled. Thus Vijay Singh did not have enough money and military strength to counter the Marathas and therefore, he tried to keep the Marathas in good humour by acceeding to their demands. At the same time, whenever he saw any opportunity to counter the Marathas he tried make best use of it.

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[168] Letter from Vijay Singh to Mahadji Kartik Bahi 4 V.S. 1820 (26 the oct. 1763), *Arzi Bahi* no. 4, p.24 Jodhpur Records.

For sample, when Ahmad Shah Abdali attached the north Indian territories, Vijay Singh joined the alliance against the Marathas. Similarly in 1766-67 when the Jat rules of Bharatpur Raja Jawahar Singh tried to form an anti-Maratha alliance of the rulers of Rajasthan, he welcomed the move and met Raja Jawahar Singh at Pushkar on 6th Nov. 1767 and exchanged their '*Pagri*' (turban) symbolising brotherhood. However, this alliance failed because Madhav Singh of Jaipur didnot join.[169] Another major attempt to pose a united front of the Rajput Rajas of Rajasthan against the Marathas was made in 1787 A.D. under the leadership of Vijay Singh. The United Rajput front fought a battle with the Marathas at Tunga in 1787 and defeated the forces of Sindhia here and at different places. All the areas under the control of the Marathas were snatched away from them.[170] But this unity of the Rajput Rajas could not continue for long and the Rathors were soon defeated in the battle of Marta in 1790 and Marwar had to pay huge money as compensation to the Marathas.

The interference of the Marathas in the affairs of the Rajput states, specially, Marwar continued as ever before again swing to the same weakness of these states of internal conflict for rulership. The gravity of the political scenario can be discermed from the fact that the Rajput couldnot reap much benefit out of the Sindhia-Holkar rivalry among the Marathas. By the end of the 18th Century the political environment of the state changed to such low that

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[169] *Peshwa Daftar Correspindence* Vol. 29, no 162 and 165. Also se *Marwar-ri-Khyat*, vol. pp. 43-47.

[170] *Maharaja Vijay Singh-ri-Khyat.*

even the internal family matters like matrimonial affairs of the Rajputs were being resolved by the Marathas. The Krishnakumari episode is a proof of the case.

Krishnakumari was the daughters of Maharana Bhim Singh of Marwar. She was engaged with the ruler of Marwar, Bhim Singh in 1799 A.D., but before the marriage between the two could take place, the ruler of Marwar died.[171] After the death of Bhim Singh, Man Singh got the throne of Jodhpur and he sent the proposal to Mewar ruler for marrying Krishnakumari. But Maharana Bhim Singh refused to give her to Man Singh and decided to marry his daughter with Jagat Singh, the ruler of Jaipur.[172] Man Singh of Marwar felt humiliated and decided to take revenge. To do that he asked for military support from Daulat Rao Sindhia and sent Rs. One lakh fifty thousand for such help.[173] Daulat Rao Sindhia sent his suggestion to the ruler of Mewar to marry his elder daughter Krishnakumari to Man Singh and younger daughter to the ruler of Jaipur. But this could not be done.[174] Thus, for the first time the Marathas were invited to interfere and settle the matrimonial disputes as well.

In the mean time Sindhia-Holkar rivalry had reached a breaking point at the end of the 18th Century and they were fighting for their individual dominance in northern territories.[175] But the Rajput states could not revive

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171 *Marwar-ri-Khyat*, vol 4 p 27
172 Ibid., vol. pp. 27-28
173 ' Letter from Man Singh to Daulat Rao,' Magh Sudi 9 V.S. 1862 (28th January 1806), *Arzi Bahi no 5, pp. 3-4. Jodhpur Records.*
174 *Poona Residency Correspondence*, vol. 1, letter no 162.
175 S.C. Mishra, *Sindhia-Holkar Rivalry in Rajasthan*, Sandeep, Delhi, 1891

their strangle hold owing to their involvement in such trivial disputes like the episode of Krishnakumari. The Marwar ruler was infact asked by Daulat Rao Sindhia to settle dispute among the Marathas i.e. between the Sindhias and the Holkars. Till that time the Sindhias were dominant in Rajashtan whereas the Holkar were influential in Punjab. But now the Holkar had started looting the territories of Jaipur as well. This was a challenge to the authority of the Sindhias and so they wanted to make an agreement for their area of interference. Daulat Rao in fact, wrote to Man Singh for working out such agreement between the two.[176] Man Singh could have exploited the situation for making his position politically powerful but instead he used the opportunity to get Krishnakumari anyhow and did not act for the larger cause. The three states of Marwar. Mewar and Jaipur were hell bent on settling scores against each other. The issue of winning over Krishnakumari came to an end in 1810 A.D. only when she committed suicide by drinking poison.[177]

[176] *Poona Residency Correspondence*, vol.XI, no. 178
[177] *Vir Vinod* vol.II, pp. 1738-1739.

CHAPTER: 3

MARATHA DEMANDS AND IMPACT ON MARWAR ECONOMY

As mentioned earlier, the first half of the 18th century saw the disintegration of the Mughal empire. Irfan Habib, Athar Ali and Satish Chandra have explained different structural reasons for it. Although all of them have their own independent view on the issue, but broadly there is unanimity among them.[1] The decline of the Mughal power gave opportunity to different regional centers to enhance their own authority at the expense of the Mughal power. The Rajputs in Rajasthan and the Marathas in Maharashtra were no exception to this. The Rajput states in Rajasthan resumed their earlier process of conquest and expansion which had actually stopped during the second half of the 16th and 17th century under strong centralised Mughal rulership. Sawai Jai Singh of Amber cherished his ambition of establishing his hegemony from Sambhar

[1] Irfan Habib in *Agrarian System of Mughal India*, Oxford University Press, New Delhi, 1999, gives emphasis on the crisis of the agrarian system, which led to the decline of the empire. The author believes that the structure of the empire was erected on the sound agrarian system and revenue collection but when it was disturbed the empire gradually crumbled down. M. Athar Ali in his *The Mughal Nobility Under Aurangzeb*, , New Delhi, 1997 talks about the *Jagirdari* crisis while Satish Chandra in his two books *Parties and Politics at the Mughal Court (1707-1740)*, New Delhi,1959 and *Medieval India· Society, the Jagirdari Crisis and the Village*, Madras, 1982 finds the problem in the medieval Indian economy and the *Jagirdari* system under later Mughals. Muzaffar Alam and Sanjay Subrahmanyam disagree from the above views. However, they feel that rather than insisting too greatly on the existence of a single logic that informs Mughal decline, it might be worthwhile to focus on the vast variety regional experiences See *The Mughal State 1526-1750*, OUP Delhi,1998, p.59

Lake in the west to Agra and Mathura in the east and the Narmada in the south.[2] He took control of *pargana* Bhangarh, Malarna, Amarsar, Umara and Barwar. In 1729 he annexed Rampura district from Udaipur and attempted to bring Bundi under his vassalage by setting up his own nominee on its throne.[3] Similarly Maharaja Ajit Singh of Jodhpur brought many territories under his control. We have seen in the earlier chapter how this had led to a rivalry between Jai Singh and Ajit Singh. Taking advantage of the declining power of the Mughals the Marathas also started their gradual movement and activity in the north and captured Gujrat and Malwa. They frequently raided Rajasthan and even reached upto Delhi. In Rajasthan they collected *chauth* and *Khandani* from the Rajput rajas. With the increasing power of the Marathas and the declining authority of the Rajputs, mainly due to internal feuds, these raids for revenue collection became more frequent and adversely affected the economy of the states like Marwar and Mewar. The effect could have been disastrous in an arid zone like Marwar about which we shall discuss in this chapter ahead.

The financial status of the state was already depressing because of the geographical factor as well as the decrease in the extra revenue coming to the state in the form of *tankhwa Jagir*. Dilbagh Singh has shown an actual contraction of cultivation in eastern Rajasthan mainly because of the Maratha

[2] Satish Chandra, *Parties and Politics at the Mughal Court*, p.186.
[3] Cited in *ibid*, p.186.

raids in the latter half of the 18th century.[4] S.P. Gupta further elabortes on this issue and says that another major factor for decline that operated now was surely the loss of Rajasthan as the favored province of an 'all-India Empire'. With the latter's disappearance, the external revenues ceased to flow in, and internal pressure for revenue correspondingly increased, with its own self defeating consequences.[5] It is important to note here that the situation of Rajasthan was different from that of other Mughal territories, viz. Bengal, Oudh, etc., in the 18th century and so when we talk about the political and socio-economic decline of Rajasthan, we must consider the continuation to some extent of the Mughal administrative system or the administrative system of different Rajput states. In the case of other provinces like Bengal the interference of the East India Company started in the second half of the 18th century and so the region went through a phase of decline.[6] But so far as Rajasthan is concerned, the Rajput ruling houses continued to rule during this period and interference of the East India Company could be observed only towards the beginning of the 19th century.[7]

The declining political and socio economic condition created a disastrous situation for the agrarian system and the land use in Rajasthan. The

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[4] Dilbagh Singh, *The State, Landlords and Peasants: Rajasthan in the 18th Century*, New Delhi, 1993, p. 198

[5] Satya Prakash Gupta, 'Reconstructing the Political and Economic Profile of Rajasthan', Address of the Sectional President, *Proceedings of the Indian History Congress*, 55th Session, Delhi, 1995, p.167.

[6] See Vipul Singh, 'Professional Mobility and Change: The World of Artisans in the Late 18th Century Patna', *Studies in History and Culture*, Vol. 4, No. 2, 1996, pp. 31-37.

[7] Sukumar Bhattacharya, *The Rajput States and the East India Company*, New Delhi, 1972.

production, distribution and exchange relations between the landowners and the land users became all the more exploitative. The land use pattern it encouraged was not related to the land use capabilities and hence was over exploitative. The net result was that the need for preventing very intensive use of land was completely overlooked and the conservation needs of the resource base never figure in the agrarian system and measures of the Rajput rulers. These phenomena were further aggravated by large scale migration of cultivators, especially the *raiyatis* to the more prosperous areas of Malwa and Harouti, leading to an increasing the number of villages classified as *Ujar*, i.e. desolated.[8] It was a normal tendency of the cultivators to leave fallow the poorer quality land in such a situation.[9] The situation was all the more alarming in the region west of the Aravali ranges . The climate in this region was quite arid and there were frequent famines [see Appendix 3.1]. Further 18th century in Rajasthan was a period of state formation. Many *thikanas*[10] came up and Rajasthan was divided into many small princely states. This may also have been a major factor in the transformation of agriculture or forestland

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[8] Dilbagh Singh, *op.cit.*, p. 199.

[9] Marcia J. Frost, 'Coping with Scarcity: Wild Woods and Common Land: Kheda District (Gujrat,India), 1824/ 5', *Indian Economic and Social History Review (IESHR)*, Vol. 37, No. 3, July-September 2000, p. 311.

[10] The Rathor *sardars* who had hereditary claim in their territories of rule were known as *thikanas* and the owner of these *thikanas* were known as *thikanedars*. See Appendix 3.2 for the list of the *thikanedars* at the end of the 17th century.

into dry deserts.[11] We will have to see as to how far was agriculture linked to state formation and whether this actually affected the ecological balance.

After the death of Ajit Singh, the political situation in Marwar became very fragile. His successor Abhay Singh had to face opposition from within the Rathor nobility and so he did not feel very strong as a ruler, even though Muhammed Shah had officially granted him the gaddi of Jodhpur and a mansab of 7000. The decline of the Mughal power and the increasing attacks and raids by the Marathas created a difficult situation before Abhai Singh financially as well. Now the *jagirs* granted to him outside Marwar yielded only meagre revenue and whatever he was able to extract that too was not regular. The Maratha raids into Rajasthan and the internal bickering that ensued after Ajit Singh's death made it compulsory for Abhay Singh to be constantly present in Marwar. His absence could have led to his overthrow or greater political manoeuvering within Marwar. It is important to remember that the policy of Ajit Singh after 1707 A.D. had actually created a conflicting situation within Marwar. In order to get rid of the Champarwat Rathors, who had become very powerful, he promoted the Bhandaries. Although this was actually a defensive measure to create his own political basis and to avoid conflict (discussed in great detail in Chapter 4), ultimately it proved fatal when Abhay Singh came to rule and it led to civil war. Land rights at that time were

[11] R.H.Grove, *Green Imperialism: Colonial Expansion, Tropical Island Edens and the Origins of Environmentalism (1600-1860)*, Cambridge, 1995.

the most influencing factor in all the major upheavals in Marwar. Land rights in terms of *patta* were both the social and economic basis of any ruler. Ajit Singh had disturbed this socio-economic basis slightly by transferring *pattas* to different new sardars. G.D. Shamra believes that this was the primary cause of the rebellion after Ajit Singh's death.[12] The frustrated dislodged *pattardar* were not having any holdings to meet their basic requirement and so they revolted when a new ruler came. Because of these internal revolts Maharaja Abhay Singh could not render any service to the Mughal emperor outside Marwar. This must have affected the economy of the state since *tankhwa jagir* outside Marwar as some sort of bonus for the state. These changes were observed more after Abhay Singh's death under Maharaja Vijay Singh. By his time the Maratha raids had become more frequent. Abhay Singh had introduced a new practice in the land rights. He started collecting lump sum amounts from the *pattadars* to pay a huge amount to the Marathas and to maintain his own internal administrative expenses.[13] Before we move on to discuss the new changes introduced during the phase of Maratha incursion in Rajasthan, let us first discuss the nature and types of land rights and the sources of revenue of the state. In this process we shall also look at the nature of relationship between land and society.

[12] G.D.Sharma, *Rajput Polity*, p. 251.

[13] *Vir Vinod*, p. 1218-21.

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[12] G.D.Sharma, *Rajput Polity*, p. 251

[13] *Vir Vinod*, p. 1218-21.

The Rathors from the beginning of their rule in Marwar had believed in the concept of *bhai-bant*, which meant that all the Rathors (blood-relations) are equal. The Rathor ruler was first among the equals. But gradually the ruler of Marwar emerged powerful and Maldev began asserting himself among his clansmen. He refused to accept the concept of *bhai-bant* and started treating the Rathor *sardars* as *bhai-bant chakar*, implying the subordinate position of the assignees to whom different territories were given.[14] The system of *bhai-bant* was now replaced by the *pattadari* system or revenue assignments. This was a totally new relationship between land and society and the territories were given to the Rathor Clansmen through *pattas*. The *patta* holders called *pattadar* were obliged to render military service within and outside Marwar. They were free to manage their respective territories.

During the 17th century Marwar came under Mughal rule. However, the Mughal emperor gave the Rathor rulers some kind of autonomy to rule their territory.[15] They were given *Watan jagir*.[16] The Rathors were also assigned additional ordinary *jagir* outside their *watan*. The *watan jagirdars* were given autonomy to administer their territory and even sub-assigned it to others. These Marwar rulers were allowed to transfer their rights to land revenue and

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[14] *Marwar–ra–Paragana-ri-Vigat*, vol II, P. 51.

[15] Satish Chandra, *Mughal Religious Policies, the Rajputs and the Deccan*, New Delhi 1993, p 34

[16] S. Inayat Ali Zaidi; The Mughals and the Rajputs 1605 – 1659 A.D., Ph.D. thesis, Aligarh Mulsim University 1982, pp. 200-237, has discussed at length the whole concept of watan jagirdar. He has shown watan jagir gradually displaced the past concept of the Rathor of *bhai-bant*, which was not transferable unlike the normal *jagir* given by the Mughals.

other taxes to their subjects and their classmen through the grants of *patta*.[17] The *patta* was assigned to different Rajput *sardars* against their salary by calculating the income from the land assigned. This calculation was often in terms of *rekh* and not *jama* of the Mughal system of administration. During the 17th and the 18th centuries the connotation of the term *rekh* was more or less identical with the term *jama* or *jamadami*, but the mechanism of assessing in *rekh* was quite different from *jama*. In the Mughal Empire, before assigning the *Jagir* to a *mansabdar*, an estimate net income from the land revenue of the territory was prepared and the *mansabdar* was given the *jagir* equivalent to his salary.[18] This estimate was known as *jama*. Another term that was frequently used in this connection was *hasil*, which was the actual realization, made by the *jagirdar* from the assigned territory. However, the Rajput states in Rajasthan had the unique system of fresh assessment of estimated revenue and this was done as *rekh*.[19] Since in Marwar a *jagirdar* (both *watan jagirdar* and *normal jagirdar*) would sub assign a part of his *jagir*, he needed to have some estimate of revenue on the basis of which he could sub assign. It was these figures of assessment of different villages on the basis of which *patta*

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[17] The use of *patta* as revenue right was confined to Western Rajasthan. In Eastern Rajasthan the Mughal term *jagir* was used. See S.P. Gupta, *The Agrarian System of Eastern Rajasthan (C. 1650-1750)*, Delhi, 1986, pp. 211-210.

[18] For details of the *mansabdari* system see Ifran Habib's article 'The Mansab System (1159-1637)' in *Proceedings of Indian History Congress*, 1967 Also see M. Athar Ali, The Mughal Nobility Under Aurangzeb, OUP, New Delhi, 1997; and Satish Chandra, *Parties and Politics at the Mughal Court, 1707-1740*New Delhi, 1972 pp. XXVII – XXVIII.

[19] The *rekh* began to be mentioned in *pattas* since the time of Mota Raja Udai Singh (1538-95). For more information see Satish Chandra, Raghubir Sinh and G.D. Sharma (eds.), *Marwar Under Jaswant Singh: Jodhpur Hakumat-ri Bahi (1658-78)*, Meerut, 1976, pp. 125-237.

was issued that were know as *rekh*. It is nowhere mentioned in the primary accounts like *Bahis* or *Marwar-ra-Pargana-ri-vigat* how the figure of *rekh* was worked out. But apparently some estimation of revenue realization minus the cost of collection must have served for its basis.[20] It was quite natural that the *rekh* figure would be higher than *jama* figure, because a *jagirdar* assumed that the land revenue on the basis of which he was sub assigning should not be less than the *jama* at which he had received the assignment. Munhata Nainsi has given the statistical details of *jama*, *rekh* and *hasil* for the whole of Marwar, which would give a clearer picture of the three terms associated with land revenue. *Jama* signified the actual capacity of the peasantry to pay, while *rekh* figures were the maximum assessed revenue of the area.[21]

Table: 3.1

Jama, *Rekh* and *Hasil* of Marwar

Year	A Jama	B Rekh	C Hasil	% of C to A	% of B to A	%of C to B
1660	1580625	2586941	1570575	99%	163.6%	60.7%

Source: *Marwar-ra-Pargana-ri-Vigat*

[20] B.L. Bhadani, *Peasant, Artisans and Entrepreneurs*, p. 262.

[21] See G. D. Sharma, *Rajput Polity*, p. 91.

The *pattadar* was authorized to collect other types of taxes as well other than land revenue (*bhog*) like *ghasmari* (grazing tax), *jihat* or *Kharach bhog* (expenditure of collecting the land revenue taken as tax from cultivators), *kayali* and *tolvantai* (weighing tax) and *mal* (some kind of tax other than land revenue).[22] There is another related term, called *lag-bag*, which has been frequently used in *Marwar-ra-Pargana-ri-Vigat*. The term *lag-bag* implied miscellaneous cesses including the taxes to meet the expenses incurred in the collection of the land revenue and the land revenue and the tax levied on posture land.[23] It may also be noted that peasants had to pay many other kind of agricultural and non-agricultural taxes. In *Sanad Parwana Bahi* of late 18th century we get reference to grazing taxes like *pan-charai, patra-charai, ghas-charai, uoont-charai, bhains-barar, bakra-bab*, etc.[24] Col. James Tod mentions about a tax to be paid by the cultivators on the number of ploughs used by them and it was Rs. 5 per plough in Marwar.[25] During the second half of the 18th century, probably after the pressure of heavy Maratha demands, the state started collecting special tax for the maintenance of revenue records called

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[22] The primary accounts mention *mal* as some kind of tax other than land revenue B.L Bhadani believes that it must have been some kind of irrigation tax. See his *Peasants, Artisans and Entrepreneurs*, p. 218. G D. Sharma, *Rajput Polity*, pp. 86-88 and 101 says that *mal* was nothing but land revenue. But for land revenue a term called *bhog* has specifically been used in *Marwar-ra-Pargana-ri-Vigat*, vol. II, pp. 95-97, and *mal* as land revenue was used in Mughal administration as *mal-o-jihat*. See Shireen Moosvi, *The Economy of the Mughal Empire, C. 1595, A Statistical Study*, Delhi, 1987, p. 129.

[23] *Marwar –ra –Pargana –ri –Vigat*, vol.II, p. 89. Also see for a better analysis G.D. Sharma, *op. cit.* pp. 100-101.

[24] *Sanad-Parwana-Bahi*, No.13, V.S.1830 (1773A.D.), Jodhpur Records, Rajasthan State Archives, Bikaner.

[25] *Annals and Antiquities of Rajasthan*, Vol. II, p.160

likhvani.[26] *Sanad-Parwana-Bahi* also mentions that the government appointed a headman in each of the villages known as *choudhary* to assist in the assessment and collection of land revenue. The cultivators were supposed to pay a tax called *choudhary-bab* to be given as renumeration to the *choudhary.*[27] Further, the state made discrimination in collecting revenue from different castes of cultivators. Those who belonged to the higher caste enjoyed certain concessions in revenue as compared to the ordinary peasants. The following figures of revenue burden on the peasantry of different castes worked out on the basis of information provided in *Marwar-ra-Pargana-ri-Vigat*, give a good look on the differential scale of revenue assessment adopted by the state.

Table: 3.2

Revenue Burden on Caste Peasantry

	Rajputs	Banias	Ordinary
Revenue realized as % of produce	25%	33 to 37%	35 to 40%

[26] *Sanad-Parwana-Bahi*, No.6, *Asadh Vadi* 2, V.S.1824 (1767A.D.), f.183, Jodhpur Records, R.S.A.Bikaner.
[27] *Sanad-Parwana-Bahi*, No.14, V.S.1831 (1774A.D.), f.92, Jodhpur Records, R.S.A.Bikaner.



Maratha Demands

The Maratha interference had already started in the second quarter of the 18th century in various states of Rajasthan. But this had not reached to such a proportion so as to affect the economy of these states directly during this period. There are stray references of the Marathas getting money in return for their help to either of the aspirants to the throne of the Rajput states, but these were not regular payments and did not force the rulers of Mewar or Marwar to introduce any new measure and policy to increase the revenue of the state to

adjust the extra expenditure incurred on account of their payments to (demands of) the Marathas till the first half of the 18th century. It is only in the second half of the 18th century that we start getting regular account of payments to the Marathas in terms of *mamlat, Nazrana, Barat, Lashkar Kharch, Fauz Kharch, Darbar Kharch, Khasa Sawari,* etc. Dilbagh Singh has presented before us the case of eastern Rajasthan suggesting that the political weakness of the Rajputs paved the way for the entry of the Marathas into Rajasthan, and to dominate the area in course of time. He is of the opinion that the Maratha incursion together with frequent appearance of famines had serious effects on the agrarian economy of the region during A.D. 1750 and 1800.[28] The Marathas squeezed the already shrinking revenue resources of the state by their constant demand for huge monetary sums by way of war indemnity and annual obligation of *peshkash.*[29] The case of Marwar was not very different. Here too the Marathas squeezed the revenue resources by their frequent demands for money. But the overall pressure on the economy was relatively greater in comparison to eastern Rajasthan owing to the geographical location of the state. The state fell in semi-arid and arid zone of Western Rajasthan and the agricultural land available here was very limited. These agricultural lands had a limited production capacity owing to the total

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[28] Dilbagh Singh, The State, Landlords and Peasants: Rajasthan in the 18th Century, 1990, pp. 198-99.
[29] Ibid, p. 204.

dependence on rain and non-introduction of new agricultural technology during these years.

In the second quarter of the 18th century the money that was being given time-to-time to the Marathas was neither regular nor was it based on any agreement or treaty. But the situation changed in the later half of the 18th century. In February 1756 a treaty was signed between Maharaja Vijay Singh of Marwar and Jankoji (Maratha *Sardar*) and it was agreed upon that the Marwar rulers would pay annual tax called *mamlat* to the Marathas.[30] The then ruler of Marwar, Maharaja Vijay Singh promised the Marathas that he would pay Rupees one lakh fifty thousand every year and this included *nazrana* as well.[31] Apart from these regular annual payments, the Marathas demanded heavy amount time to time depending on the changing political scenario of the Jodhpur state. The burden of these payments used to be so high that the Marwar ruler was never able to satisfy the Maratha demands completely and there always remained a part of the promised amount as due leading to greater burden on the economy of the state. Metcafe in his letter to John Adams had mentioned that almost 10 per cent of such Maratha demands were never met and normally the Marathas wrote off 20 per cent of amount if

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[30] The Selections from the Peshwa's Daftar, Vol. 21, No 82. Vijay Singh agreed to pay 1.5 lakh every year as *mamlat* is also proved by a "Letter from Madhavrao Sindhia to Mahraja Vijay Singh", on Jyestha Sudi 5, V.S. 1826 (1769 A.D.). See *Jodhpur Rajya Patra Vyavhar, V.S. 1769-2003*, Vol. I, Rajasthan State Archives, Bikaner, n.d., pp. 7-8 and 82.

[31] "Letter from Mahadji Sindhia to Maharaja Vijay Singh", Paush Sudi 1, V.S. 1847 (5th January 1791), *Portfolio File 6, Letter No. 67, Dastari Record*, Jodhpur.

demands were met in advance.[32] But this tendency of the Maratha *sardars* to demand constantly and the non-payment of complete amount or payment of only a partial amount forced the Marwar state to fall in debt trap. The cyclical effect on the economy was detrimental. In order to collect the dues, the Maratha *sardars* or their representative often visited Jodhpur and every time some new promises and arrangements were made and fresh time bound installments were fixed. But the Rajput state had to immediately pay some amount in cash known as *barat kharch* and *lashkar kharch.*

The internal feuds had given encouragement to the Maratha interference in Marwar. And the conflict of Abhay Singh with Bakht Singh for the succession of the throne of Jodhpur had made a beginning on a major scale in this regard. In 1748 Abahy Singh had asked for help from Malhar Rao Holkar against Bakht Singh and had agreed to pay Rs. 11000 per day to Holkar for his favour.[33] Then in 1749 A.D. after the death of Abhay Singh, a civil war started between Abhay Singh's son Ram Singh and Bakht Singh for the succession to the throne of Jodhpur.[34] Ram Singh took help of Malhar Rao Holkar once again and from now onwards the Marathas interference in Marwar became very frequent. By that time the power of the Mughal empire had declined as well and the protection and control, which was earlier provided by

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[32] "Letter from Metcafe to John Admas", 15th January 1818, *Foreign Secret Proceedings 6th February 1818*, No 1&2, National Archives of India, New Delhi.
[33] *Marwar-ri-khyat*, Vol. II, Anup Sanskrit Library, Bikaner , p.160.
[34] *Marwar-ri-Khyat*, Vol. II, p. 172, and *Dayaldas-ri-khyat*, vol.II, Anup Sanskrit Library, Bikaner, pp. 72-73.

the Mughal empire to the Rajput states was no more possible. The Marathas, thus, did not have any fear from the Mughal empire. The Jaipur state, which had emerged very powerful during the 18th century, also could not check the Marathas because of their own fragile and weakening authority due to internal family feuds.[35] A combined Rajput force was also not easily possible since the rulership in each of the Rajput states was based on class solidarity or *bhai-bant*. They had once tried to present a united front against the Marathas in 1734, when the first direct interference of the Marathas in the internal affairs of Bundi started, but that too had failed.[36]

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[35] See Dilbagh Singh, op cit p 8

[36] The queen of Rao Raja Budh Singh had sent her envoy to Poona for hiring the Marathas to oust Dalel Singh from Bundi, who was installed as the ruler by Sawai Jai Singh.See Surya Mal Mishra, *Vamsha Bhaskhar*, Jodhpur, 1899, p. 2922. Raghubir Sinh says that she got the help of Malhar Rao Holkar (then Incharge of districts north of the Narbada) and Ranoji Sindhia (the founder of Sindhis dynasty) by paying them Rs 6 lakhs, op cit, p. 163) The two Maratha leaders brought their hordes to Bundi and captured it on 22nd April 1734 and Budh Singh was proclaimed ruler The Kachwahi queen of Budh Singh tied Rakhi on Malhar Rao Holkar's wrist It is significant to note here that on the one hand the queen accepted Holkar as her brother, Buddha Singh on the other hand, did not even come to meet Holkar. This shows that *the Rajputs were not ready to accept the Marathas as equals* Soon after the Marathas left Bundi, a Jaipur force arrived there and restored Dalel Singh to the throne See M.L. Sharma, *Kota Rajya Ka Itihas*, Vol I Kota, p 366 This first penetration of the Marathas into Bundi alarmed the Rajput Rajas of Rajasthan, specially Sawai Jai Singh. He planned to summon a conference of the leading Rajput Rajas Though it was called by Sawai Jai Singh but Maharana Jagat Singh of Mewar was given the honour to preside over its deliberations The conference was attended by Jagat Singh of Mewar, Sawai Jai Singh of Jaipur, Abhay Singh of Jodhpur, Durjan Sal of Kota, Jorawar Singh of Bikaner, Dalel Singh of Bundi, Gopal Singh of Karauli, Bakht Singh of Nagor, and Raj Singh of Kishangarh The conference was held at Hurda, on the outskirts of Mewar, in July 1734 The Rajputs took an oath to unite their forces to resist all Maratha incursions. See Shyamal Das, *Vir Vinod*, Upaiur Raj Yantralaya, pp. 1220-21 But the Rajputs were not able to present a united front because of their internal jealousies The four Rajput Rajas of Jaipur, Jodhpur, Kota and Kishangarh, however, came forward and asked the Mughal court to launch a campaign against the Marathas and promised their support for it. See G S Sardesai, *Selections from the Peshwa Deftar*, Govt Press, Bombay, Vol XIV, Letter 21 & 23, 1927-32. The Mughal emperor deputed Khan-I-Dauran to lead the Mughal forces towards Malwa and he was assisted by the Rajput Rajas as promised earlier. However, the combined forces could not check the advance of the Marathas. Sawai Jai Singh, the Subedar of Malwa, was forced to grant them Rs. 22 lakhs as the *Chauth* of Malwa in 1735. This made his enemies at the Mughal court to remove him from the *subedari* of Malwa.

Thus, now the Marathas had got a freer hand in Rajasthan and the internal political situation in states like Marwar was also very encouraging for them. After the first battle of Merta an agreement was reached between the Rathore ruler of Marwar, Vijay Singh and Dattajee Sindhia in 1756. Vijay Singh agreed to pay rupees fifty lakh as war indemnity. Out of it rupees twenty-five lakh was to be paid within a year and the rest fifty per cent was to be given in two years. Further, Marwar was supposed to pay rupees one lakh fifty thousand every year to the Marathas.[37] Vijay Singh also promised to keep one of his army units at Ajmer at his own expenses to help and protect Ajmer, which had now been handed over to the Marathas.[38] But all these were promises huge enough that could not have possibly been met on time. It became really difficult for Marwar because the state had been going through a phase of continuous famine for the last few years. We have reference to frequent famines from 1755 to 1759 A.D.[39] Maharaja Vijay Singh tried his level best to convince the Marathas of his inability to pay such a huge money, but they were not convinced and threatened to attach Jodhpur and give the throne to Vijay Singh's rival Ram Singh. Vijay Singh was forced to pay the dues promised in 1756.[40]

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[37] *Selections From Peshwa Daftar*, Vol. 21, No. 82.

[38] The Marathas got Ajmer, Garh Bitli (Taragarh) and the surrounding territories in 1756. See 'Letter from Jankoji to Vijay Singh', Asadh Badi 16, 1813 V.S. (26th June 1756), *Portfolio File No. 108-112*, Dastari Record, Jodhpur.

[39] Hukam Singh Bhati (ed.), *Marwar-ri-Khyat*, Jodhpur, 2000, p. 41.

[40] 'Letter from Anand Rao Bavle', Kartik Sudi 12, 1815 V.S. (12th November 1758), *Arzi Bahi*, No. 4, p. 90; *Selections from Peshwa Daftar*, Vol. 2, No. 94, 95, 96.

After 1758 Marwar could breathe a shy of relief for Ahmad Shah Abdali in Punjab had challenged the Marathas. Vijay Singh preferred to support the Afghan ruler against the Marathas and stopped paying any money to them. However, Ahmad Shah Abdali wrote to Vijay Singh in February 1761 that he should send the tax, until then paid to the Maraths, to him and promised for military help in return.[41] But we do not get any account of such payments to Ahmad Shah Abdali by Marwar because soon after in March 1761 A.D. he left India. The whole scenario changed once again after Abdali's departure and the Marathas started demanding their dues from Marwar. Mahadji Sindhia demanded Rs. three lakh as compensation apart from the regular Rs. one lakh fifty thousand as *mamlat*. And their demands were met immediately after a threat.[42]

These huge regular payments to the Marathas left the treasury of Marwar empty. The ruler was not in a situation to pay the amount in cash and so he started making payments in terms of *hudni*. In 1765 Vijay Singh agreed to pay Rs. ten lakh as *hundi*. On many a occasion the Marwar ruler asked the *Sahukars* and *Mahajans* to pay the dues to the Marathas and the state used to pay such loans to these merchants later on. The Jodhpur Records of the period give reference to such payments by the *Mahajans* and *Sahukars*. In 1766 A.D. Nandvana Bohra gave Rs. one lakh ten thousand and in 1806 A.D.

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[41] G.R. Parihar, *Maratha-Marwar Sambandh (1724-1543 A.D.)*, Jaipur, 1977, p. 72.
[42] "Letter from Vijay Singh to Mahadji", Kartik Badi 4, 1820 V.S. (26th Oct. 1763), Arzi Bahi, No. 4, Jodhpur, P. 24; *Marwar-ri-khyat*, Vol. III, pp. 34-37.

Kushalchand gave Rs. fifty thousand as loan to Marwar state.[43] Maharaja Vijay Singh- ri- Khyat also mentions that Vijay Singh took loan from local *Rom* on high interest rate.[44]G.S.L. Derva is quite correct when he says that *Rom* (Mercantile Community) were dependable financiers and friends in times of need of the state.[45]

The primary records of the second half of the 18th century frequently mention of a tax called *rahdari,* which existed earlier also, but there was a perceptible change in the mode of collection now. *Rahdari* was a kind of transit duty taken from the traders who carried various commodities through the territory of Marwar. It is significant to note that during the later half of the 18th century the right to collect *rahdari* began to be given on *ijara* in lieu of a fixed amount, whereas earlier only the state officials realized it. The *rahdari* of Merta was given to Khushal Chand of Jodhpur for Rs.28401 from Magh Vadi 12, V.S.1833 to Magh Vadi 11, V.S.1834.[46] Similarly the *rahdari* of *pargana* Nagor was given on *ijara* for Rs.50001 to Modi Har Nath for period of one year, i.e. from Magh Vadi 1, V.S.1841 to Magh Sudi 15, V.S.1842.[47]This new trend of

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[43] *Arzi Bahi,* No. 4, p. 286, Also see *Sanad-Parwana-Bahi,* , 1824 V.S. (1767 A.D.), Jodhpur Records, R.S.A.Bikaner.

[44] Brajesh Kumar Singh (ed.), *Maharaja Vijay Singhji-ri-khyat,* Jodhpur, p. 72.

[45] 'Land Control and Agrarian Mercantile Classes in Western Rajasthan C. 1650-1700', *in the Proceedings of Indian History Congress,* 58th session (Banglore), Aligarh, 1998, p. 371. Also see Dilbagh Singh, 'The Role of Mahajans in the Rural Economy of Eastern Rajasthan during the Eighteenth Century, *Social Scientist,* May 1974; and S.P. Gupta, *The Agrarian System of Eastern Rajasthan,* Delhi, 1986, pp. 134-44 for the role of *Mahajans* in the economy of Rajasthan.

[46] *Sanad-Parwana-Bahi,* No.17, V.S.1833 (1776A.D.), f.306.

[47] *Sanad-Parwana-Bahi,* No.30, V.S.1843 (1786A.D.), f.334.

MARWAR IN 1756



rahdari collection was probably prompted by the need of the state for immediate and more revenue.

Thus, the economy of Marwar had reached such a low that the state had to look out for financial help from the Mahajans. But this was not enough for the continuous interference of the Marathas and in turn the demand for money. We have mentioned earlier in this chapter that by the beginning of the second half of the 18th century the *tankhwa jagir* outside Marwar had shrinked and Abhay Singh even started collecting lump sum amount from the *pattadars* to pay the Marathas.[48] After him Vijay Singh also continued this practice and infact imposed a lump sum amount of Rupees three hundred for every one thousand *rekh* from the *pattadars* and termed it as *mutallab*.[49] In 1765 Vijay Singh further introduced a new tax called *'Rakhbab'*.[50]

The continuous battle fought between 1752 and 1756 had completely crumbled down the economy of Marwar. The treasury became empty. *Khalisa* land could not be cultivated during these years since the cultivators deserted the area with fear, and as a result a huge source of the income of the state was lost. Jalore *pargana* was given to Ram Singh after the treaty of 1756 where a huge treasury of the Rathors was lying for years. Ajmer, Taragarh and Sambhar also went away to the Marathas by the same treaty. These regions were a major source of income for the state through the salt duties and other

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[48] *Vir Vinod*, p. 1218-21.
[49] Jodhpur Records, *Basta No. 92/7*.
[50] *Maharaja Vijay Singhji-ri-khyat*, p. 72; *Marwar-ri-khyat*, Vol. III, p. 41.

trade duties on various goods. Further the whole of southeast Marwar, which was agriculturally more fertile as compared to other regions of Marwar, went over to Ram Singh. Now Vijay Singh was left with relatively productive areas of only Jodhpur and a major part of semi- arid zone. Thus, on the one hand the income of the state was on decline, whereas the expenditure of Marwar increased by leaps and bounds due to continuous war with the Marathas, internal disturbance and huge Maratha demands. The following map will make the picture clearer.

In 1769 Mahadji Sindhia wrote to Vijay Singh that he should pay all the dues and *nazrana.* He also asked him to send the *mamlat* for the next three years in advance. For such advance payment, Marwar was to get a relief o Rs. forty thousand.[51] Vijay Singh sent Rs. three lakh eighty eight thousand eight hundred and thirty five as the due for 1766 to 1769. He also agreed to pay Rs. five lakh ten thousand as advance *mamlat* for the years 1769 to 1772 This amount also included Rs. twenty five thousand as *nazrana.*[52] In the yea of 1769 Vijay Singh had to pay nearly Rs. nine lakh to the Marathas. But th only relief for him was that he had received Rs. fifteen lakh from Ratan Singh of Mewar for his military support in succession dispute.[53] However, the Marwa ruler had not been able to pay Rs. five lakh ten thousand till 1772 and so h

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[51] "Letter from Majadji to Vijay Singh", Jyestha Sudi 5, 1826 V.S. (8th June 1769), *Portfolio Fi No. 6,* Letter No. 8, Dastari Record, Jodhpur.

[52] "Letter from Mahadji to Vijay Singh", Jyestha Sudi 5, Letter No. 6, *ibid.* The letter mentior the receipt of the amount by Mahadji Sindhia.

[53] *Jodhpur Rajya Patra Vyavhar,* V.S. 1769-2003, Vol. I, Rajasthan State Archives, Bikan n.d., p. 27

received a threatening letter from Mahadji Sindhia.[54] It was only in 1774-75 that Vijay Singh was able to pay this due in two installments. He paid Rs. four lakh eighty nine thousand four hundred eighty three and seven ana in 1774 and then in 1775 he sent Rs. sixty thousand five hundred sixteen and nine ana.[55] Hardly had he cleared the dues for 1769-72 A.D. that another demand for 1772-77 was put forward before him. In 1781 A.D. Vijay Singh managed to pay Rs. nine lakh as *mamlat* for Marwar at the rate of one lakh eighty thousand per annum. He also paid Rs. seventy five thousand as tax for Godwad. In 1784 A.D. Mahadji Sindhia sent his demand letter for the payment of *mamlat* of 1998-82, which stood as Rs. nine lakh. After a rebate of Rs. two lakh Vijay Singh was supposed to pay Rs. seven lakh. However, he could pay only Rs. two lakh in 1784 due to lesser revenue collection in 1782 owing to famine leaving outstanding dues of Rs. five lakh. [56] Before this due could be paid by Marwar another demand of Rs. seven lakh fifty thousand was put forward as *mamlat* for the years 1783-88 A.D. Due to fear of attachment the state paid two installments of Rs. one lakh and Rs. two lakh in 1785 A.D. to the Marathas. Then they paid Rs. one lakh fifty thousand in 1786 A.D.

Now it had become impossible for Marwar to bear the unending burden of taxation by the Marathas. By that time Mewar and Jaipur were also fed up with the Maratha interference in the internal affairs and their continuous huge

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[54] "Letters from Mahadji to Vijay Singh", Chaitra Badi 5, 1829 V.S. (23rd March 1772), Letter Nos. 18-19, *op.cit.*

[55] "Letter from Mahadji to Vijay Singh", *Portfolio file No. 6*, letter Nos 29-30.

demands for *peshkash,* mamlat or *nazrana.* All the Rajput states willingly or unwillingly got united to fight the battle with the Marathas.[57] A battle was fought at Tunga in July 1787.[58] The Marathas under Sindhias lost the battle and the Rathors were able to capture Ajmer and the surrounding regions. Now Marwar stopped paying any money to the Marathas. But this could become possible only for three-four years. Mahadji Sindhia attached Marwar in 1790 (first in June and then in September). The battle at Merta was fought and Marwar lost the battle. The defeat proved disastrous for the Rajput state since the damages claimed after this battle by the Marathas were quite heavy.[59] The following were compensation for the loss and damage suffered claimed was: (a) war indemnity, *nazrana, darbar kharch* and *khasa sawari* of Rs. sixty lakh. Out of these Rs. fifteen lakh was to be paid by Marwar in cash, Rs. eight lakh was to be given on 4th February 1791 and the rest by 4th April 1791. *Bharna, which included jewellary and horses etc.,* was fixed at Rs. three lakh while Rs. fifteen lakh was to be given for the distribution among the Maratha army along with Rs. three lakh worth of *bharna.* Vijay Singh was asked to pay Rs. four lakh *bharna* in equal instalments within two years. He was also supposed to pay Rs. twenty lakh in four years time as annual tax for Navan, Maroth and Parbatsar. Mahadji also mentions in his letter to Vijay Singh that if all these

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[56] 'Letter from Mahadji to Vijay Singh', Shravan Badiz, 1839 V.S. (26th July 1782), *Portfolio file No. 6,* Letter No. 44, Dastari Record, Jodhpur.

[57] See "letters from Gyanmal Muhanot to Zalim Singh", Bhadrapad Badi 12, 1844 V.S. (8th September 1787), *Arzi Bahi No. 4,* p. 221, Jodhpur.

[58] For details of the battle see *Maharaja Vijay Singhji-ri-khyat,* pp. 105-112.

[59] The details of the terms are in 'Letter from Mahadji to Vijay Singh', Paush Sudi 1, 1847 V.S. (5th January 1791), *Portfolio File 6,* Letter 57, 58 and 59, Dastari Record, Jodhpur.

money is paid on time he shall give a rebate of Rs. two lakh. (b) Vijay Singh was also forced to agree on the terms of paying Rs. one lakh fifty thousand as the annual tax of Marwar and Rs. thirty thousand as annual tax of Godwad. Apart from this Marwar also had to cede certain rights of territories like Sambhar, Kherva, Masuda and Bhiay and were given on *ijara* to the Marathas.

As the terms and conditions of the post-Merta war show it was simply impossible for Marwar to manage such a huge amount for the Marathas. A new trend of *ijara* being given to the Marathas started which meant maximum exploitation of the peasantry and in turn of the land.[60] The state under Vijay Singh had fallen in a trap where there was no escape and the only hope was that the Marathas themselves opt to get out. But this could not be done by the end of the 18th century. In fact, it is only after the Marathas started facing the challenge from the British and to a large extent because of amplified rivalry among the Maratha *sardars* that this practice of hopping collection of money decreased.

[60] However, it was Abhay Singh under whom *ijara* system started. See Prem Singh Angris, *Maharaja Abhay Singh*, Jodhpur, 1987, p. 149.

Table 3.3

DEMAND AND PAYMENTS TO THE MARATHAS BY MARWAR STATE

Year	Demand	Payment	Remarks
1756	Rs. 50 lakh + Rs. 1.5 lakh every year	Rs. 25,00,000	Promised to pay the rent
1757	Rs. 12.5 lakh	Rs. 12,50,000	
1758	Rs. 12.5 lakh	Rs. 12,50,000	
1763	Rs. 1.5 lakh + Rs 3 lakh as was indemnity	Rs. 4,50,000	
1765	All the dues at the rate or Rs. 1.5 lakh per annum	Rs. 10,00,000	In Hundi
1769	All the dues and *Nazrana*	Rs. 03,88,000	Agreed to Rs. 5.1 lakh for 1769-72.
1772	Rs. 5.1 lakh + Rs. 25000 as revenue of Godwad and Rs. 5000 *Nazrana.*	Not paid	
1774	All the dues	Rs. 04,89,483	
1775	Rest of the dues + *Mamlat* for 1772-77.	Rs. 00,60,516	
1778	All the dues	Rs. 00,30,500	
1779		Rs. 01,00,000	
1780		Rs. 00,69,000	
1781		Rs. 09,00,000 Rs. 00,75,000	
1784	*Mamlat* for 1778-82 Rs. 7 lakh after rebate of Rs. 2 lakh	Rs. 02,00,000	
1785	Mamlat for 1783-88 Rs. 7.5 lakh	Rs. 01,00,000 Rs. 02,00,000	Stopped paying after defeating the Marathas at Tunga.
1791	Rs. 60 lakh under different heads like *Mamlat*, *Nazrana*, Fauz Kharch, Darbar Kharch, Khasa Sawari.	Rs. 04,00,000	Rest to be paid in instalments
1792	Rest of the dues	Not mentioned Rs. 14,000,000 (Average payment of Rs. 2 lakh a year)	Contemporary accounts mention that regular payments as promised were made.
1800	Rs. 6 Lakh	Rs. 02,00,000	
	Total payment	1,12,26,499.	

Average for 45 years = Rs. 2 Lakh 50,000 approximately.

Thus the regular payments to the Marathas forced the state to generate more revenue and that was only possible either through invading a new territory and bringing in war-booty or extracting more revenue from the agrarian and non-agrarian sectors. Since the state was not in such a strong position militarily the possibility of expansion of the territory is ruled out. The option left before the state was to introduce some new taxes to be paid by the cultivators and the traders. Though the state made immediate gains by the collection of these revenue but the pressure of revenue was so much that many of them deserted the area. This in turn affected the production process. The need for greater land revenue began to be felt by the end of the 18th century and the state started making all efforts to bring back the cultivators who had earlier deserted the area. We have reference to such account, primarily from neighboring territories or Marwar. One such account is of 1796 A.D. when Maharao Ummed Singh of Kota sent a *parwana* to the *patel* of Jodhpura village in *prgana* Madhukargarh and asked him to invite peasants from other villages to settle in his village. Another *parwana* was sent in 1804 A.D.to the *patel* of Bhumbhari Richwa village to bring the entire land of the village under cultivation.[61]

Apart from the non-regular extra taxes from the cultivators, traders and *thikanedars*, Maharaja Vijay Singh of Jodhpur also tried to bring in some

[61] Cited in B.L.Gupta, *Trade and Commerce in Rajasthan during the 18th Century*, Jaipur,1987, p.43.

money from outside the state, but there is a solitary instance from Mewar. In 1769 A.D. Vijay Singh got an opportunity in Mewar where Ratan Singh had revolted against Maharana Ari Singh. Few of the feudatories who were supporters of Ratan Singh wrote to Vijay Singh for help from and for this they promised to pay Rs.15 lakh to him.[62]Since the Marathas were also supporting Ratan Singh, Vijay Singh thought it wise both strategically and financially to help Ratan Singh against Ari Singh of Mewar and earned Rs.15 lakh out of it. However, Vijay Singh had to immediately pay nearly Rs.9 lakh to Mahadji Sindhia that was lying as outstanding due on Marwar.

Munhata Nainsi has also mentioned the total collection of revenue of different *parganas* of Marwar for the five years from 1658 to 1662. We are taking here the revenue realization for the year 1660 in nine different *parganas* of Marwar.

Table 3.4

***Hasil* (Revenue Realized) in 1660 A.D.**

PARGANA	REVENUE in Rs.
Jodhpur	478744
Sojhat	169424
Jaitaran	226306
Siwana	54634
Merta	513321
Phalodi	52299
Pokaran	15668
Sanchor[63]	14163
Jalor	N.A.
	Total = 1524559

[62] 'Letter of the *Samants* to Vijay Singh', Shravan Badi 12, V.S.1825 (9th August 1768). *Portfolio File No.3*, Letter No.3, Jodhpur Records.

[63] The figure for the year 1660 of Sanchor *pargana* is not mentioned in *Marwar-ra-pargana-ri-Vigat*.The earliest available figure is of the year 1663.

The total *hasil* excluding *pargana* Jalor, for which figure is not available, comes to Rs. 15,24,559 and if we compare this figure with the *Jama* figure of Marwar as a whole mentioned earlier (Table No.3.1), i..e. Rs. 15,80,625, the difference is not much. We have already seen that *Jama* was supposed to be the actual capacity of the peasantry to pay. On the basis of these statistical accounts we may conclude that during the 17th century peasants were paying almost equal to their actual maximum capacity to pay and any further deviation upward would mean extra burden on the peasantry. And exactly this is what happened during the 18th century when the Maratha incursion started in Rajasthan. Due to constant Maratha demands the rulers of Marwar were left with no option but to extract more from the peasantry through their *pattadars*. If we compre the *rekh* figure of the early 18th century and the late 18th century, there is a marked increase.

Table 3.5

THIKANAS OF MARWAR IN THE 18TH CENTURY

		Rekh (A) Early18th Century	*Rekh* (B) Late 18th Century
1.	Pokaran	35000 (1765 V.S.)	76608 (1865 V.S.)
2.	Daspan	12500 (808 V.S.)	31500 (1860 V.S.)
3.	Samadiyo	3125 (Vigat)	N.A.
4.	Sirano	N.A.	N.A.
5.	Khiwado	16025 (Vigat)	21125 (1764 V.S.)

6.	Dudod	2000 (Vigat)	N.A.
7.	Muntari Basni	2000 (Vigat)	5000 (1820 V.S.)
8.	Baghavas	N.A.	4000
9.	Pilvo	N.A.	1700
10.	Mervasi	Mentioned	N.A.
11.	Somiyo	N.A.	N.A.
12.	Ransingar	N.A.	13450
13.	Harianano	7500 (1808 V.S.)	9500 /91840 V.S.)
14.	Nosar	N.A.	N.A.
15.	Sarechan	N.A.	N.A.
16.	Bahro	9000 (1769 V.S.)	10250 (1808 V.S.)
17.	Auva	N.A.	22,500 (1768 (V.S.)
18.	Banto	N.A.	5400 (1808 V.S.)
19.	Diwandi	N.A.	5500 (1808 V.S.)
20.	Bhivalio	N.A.	3000 (1810 V.S.)
21.	Janiyano	N.A.	N.A.
22.	Harji	N.A.	3200 (1817 V.S.)
23.	Bamsin	N.A.	3200 (1817 V.S.)
24.	Lambiya	N.A.	N.A.
25.	Bithodo	N.A.	7000
26.	Badsan	N.A.	5000 (1849 V.S.)
27.	Royat	18525 (1766 V.S.)	33350 (1861V.S.)
28.	Ahor	28750 (1766 V.S.)	62000 (1863 V.S.)

29.	Bhanswado	16875 (Vigat)	N.A.
30.	Chavarcho	2000 (Vigat)	N.A.
31.	Kakandi	3125 (Vigat)	N.A.
32.	Chipadvado	N.A.	3000 (1862 V.S.)
33.	Sonari	N.A.	3000 (1808 V.S.)
34.	Barvo	N.A.	1500 (1808 V.S.)
35.	Budtaro	N.A.	6500 (1808 V.S.)
36.	Kharado	N.A.	5000 (1808 V.S.)
37.	Pajod	N.A.	4000 (1801 V.S.)
38.	Khekdali Badi	N.A.	3000
39.	Sarano	N.A.	4100 (1864 V.S.)
40.	Harsolav	N.A.	8000 (1813 V.S.)
41.	Dhandiya	N.A.	3200 (1808 V.S.)
42.	Dhamli	N.A.	4400 (1808 V.S.)
43.	Bapod	N.A.	N.A.
44.	Loroli	N.A.	2000 (1808 V.S.)
45.	Khatu	N.A.	9000 (1808 V.S.)
46.	Chutisar	N.A.	2000 (1808 V.S.)
47.	Varnel	N.A.	4000 (1808 V.S.)
48.	Aivad	N.A.	N.A.
49.	Advad	N.A.	N.A.
50.	Lab	N.A.	N.A. (1808 V.S.)
51.	Aguto	N.A.	N.A. (1808 V.S.)

52.	Pirojpuro	N.A.	N.A. (1808 V.S.)
53.	Dujar	N.A.	N.A. (1808 V.S.)
54.	Oreet	N.A.	N.A. (1808 V.S.)
55.	Chau	N.A.	N.A. (1808 V.S.)
56.	Palot	N.A.	N.A.
57.	Ganthis	N.A.	N.A.
58.	Sarasani	N.A.	2000 (1823 V.S.)
59.	Khadalo	N.A.	N.A.
60.	Dhindhas	6400 (1764 V.S.)	5000 (1808 V.S.)
61.	Asop	17950 (1765 V.S.)	26500 (1860 V.S.)
62.	Chandatval	14000 (1765 V.S.)	26500 (1835 V.S.)
63.	Lantaliyo	5000 (1767 V.S.)	27000 (1852 V.S.)
64.	Gajsingh pura	N.A.	N.A.
65.	Busigodhvad	N.A.	15000 (1828 V.S.)
66.	Siriyari	7000 (1765 V.S.)	10800 (1808 V.S.)
67.	Ramasni	13375 (1765 V.S.)	N.A.
68.	Chandelar	N.A.	N.A.
69.	Mando	N.A.	11875(1808 V.S.)
70.	Dhanlo	N.A.	N.A.
71.	Malsabavri	N.A.	N.A.
72.	Chelavas	4500 (1765 V.S.)	5000 (1817 V.S.)
73.	Nadsar	N.A.	N.A.
74.	Garasani	3500 (Vigat)	N.A.

75.	Vasani	N.A.	2000 (1850 V.S.)
76.	Sivas	N.A.	13275 (1808 V.S.)
77.	Netdia	N.A.	12200 (1808 V.S.)
78.	Bagdi	1500 (1808 V.S.)	19250 (1845 V.S.)
79.	Khokhro	N.A.	13000 (1820 R.S.)
80.	Rayro Bado	1000 (Vigat)	N.A.
81.	Thanvlo	4000 (Vigat)	N.A.
82.	Khando Deval	1250 (Vigat)	N.A.
83.	Sirani	2000 (Vigat)	N.A.
84.	Kannani	10000 (1765 V.S.)	N.A.
85.	Sandari	9500 (1765 V.S.)	10850 (1808 V.S.)
86.	Baghevas	10000 (1765 V.S.)	17625 (1816 V.S.)
87.	Jaiwar	N.A.	7000 (1813 V.S.)
88.	Surpuro	N.A.	1000 (1849 V.S.)
89.	Karniyali	N.A.	4000 (1863 V.S.)
90.	Madhalo	N.A.	5000 (1878 V.S.)
91.	Kitnod	N.A.	N.A.
92.	Chandsano	N.A.	N.A.
93.	Jajoloi	23500 (1766 V.S.)	N.A.
94.	Mudado	N.A.	11200 (1828 V.S.)
95.	Khivsar	20800 (1765 V.S.)	38525 (1829 V.S.)
96.	Panchodi	N.A.	4000 (1865 V.S.)
97.	Nagdi	5250 (1767 V.S.)	5250 (1808 V.S.)

98.	Bhojavas	2000 (Vigat)	N.A.
99.	Umarlai	500 (Vigat)	N.A.
100.	Ghadadi Khervado	N.A.	N.A.
101.	Khari	2000 (Vigat)	N.A.
102.	Anchindo	1900 (Vigat)	N.A.
103.	Dabro (Dambro)	N.A.	N.A.
104.	Soyalan	N.A.	N.A.
105.	Sigad	4000 (Vigat)	N.A.
106.	Harimo	3000 (Vigat)	N.A.
107	Ustaran	4000 (Vigat)	N.A.
108.	Chantaliyo	2000 (Vigat)	N.A.
109.	Manando	20000 (1768 V.S.)	15200 (1817 V.S.)
110.	Tosindo	N.A.	21500 (1808 V.S.)
111.	Roder	N.A.	6000 (1807 V.S.) 12000 (1854 V.S.)
112.	Bandgando	N.A. (1808 V.S.)	10000 (1843 V.S.)
113.	Chitavo	N.A.	1000 (1885 V.S.)
114.	Kukdado	N.A.	5000 (1817 V.S.)
115.	Kidiyad	N.A.	9000 (1842 V.S.)
116.	Jusriyo	N.A.	3401 (1860 V.S.)
117.	Barnel	N.A.	5000 (1808 V.S.)
118.	Dasano	N.A.	1500 (1809 V.S.) 2000 (1851 V.S.)

119.	Mumroli	N.A.	3300 (1827 V.S.)
120.	Dodvado	N.A.	1500 (1813 V.S.)
121.	Khojawas	N.A.	2000 (1813 V.S.) 3000 (1857 V.S.)
122.	Kalvo	N.A.	7500 (N.D.)
123.	Tanglo	N.A.	(1860 V.S.)
124.	Ladoil (Ladoli)	N.A.	(1866 V.S.)
125.	Maroth (Bharto)	N.A.	6750 (1817 V.S.)
126.	Ghatvo	N.A.	12500 (1830 V.S.)
127.	Naranfuro	N.A.	8000 (1814 V.S.)
128.	Mangalanoo	N.A.	3750 (1817 V.S.)
129.	Kuchaman	N.A.	3750 (1817 V.S.)
130.	Riyan	20603 (1765 V.S.)	57728 (1808 V.S.)
131.	Alniyavas	N.A.	16350 (1809 V.S.)
132.	Vijathal	10000 (1764 V.S.)	N.A.
133.	Medavas	5000 (1765 V.S.)	N.A.
134.	Chandarun	N.A.	13850 (1808 V.S.)
135.	Vikharniyo	14500 (1765 V.S.)	N.A.
136.	Idvo	21900 (1765 V.S.)	N.A.
137.	Braloji	14400 (1764 V.S.)	N.A.
138.	Bodavad	15500 (1765 V.S.)	10000 (1808 V.S.)
139.	Chui	N.A.	N.A.
140.	Bhutati	N.A.	N.A.

141.	Kitalsar	N.A.	N.A.
142.	Kaval	N.A.	N.A.
143.	Kirad	N.A.	N.A.
144.	Bheansro Bado	N.A.	N.A.
145.	Varsanu	N.A.	N.A.
146.	Lagor	N.A.	N.A.
147.	Dobdi Badi	N.A.	N.A.
148.	Gothdi	N.A.	N.A.
149.	Dholapav Bado	N.A.	N.A.
150.	Javlo	N.A.	51000 (1813 V.S.)
151.	Gular	N.A.	32750 (1829 V.S.)
152.	Bhakhri	9000 (1769 V.S.)	N.A.
153.	Rohdi	N.A.	10500 (1837 V.S.)
154.	Bayoovas	N.A.	10000 (189 V.S) 12500 (1840 V.S.)
155.	Jajito	N.A.	N.A.
156.	Netiyavas	N.A.	N.A.
157.	Sil Bhokri	N.A.	N.A.
158.	Badu	N.A.	28500 (1844 V.S.)
159.	Sabalpuro	N.A.	30750 (1813 V.S)
160.	Budasu	N.A.	35500 (1827 V.S.)

Based on Hukam Singh Bhati (ed.) *Marwar-ra-Thikana-ri-Vigat*, Rajasthani Shodh Sansthan, Jodhpur, 1998.

We have mentioned earlier that Abhay Singh had introduced a new practice of collecting lump sum amount from *pattadars* to pay huge amount in turn to the Maratha. After his death Maharaja Vijay Singh in 1755 A.D. started collecting a fixed lump sum amount of Rs. 300 for every 1000 *rekh* from the *pattadars* called *Mutalba*.[64] Another new development of the 18th century after the Maratha raids was the introduction of the *ijara* system by the state. The *ijaradars* were supposed to pay Rs. 650 on the *rekh* by Rs. 1200 in *Khalisa* lands.[65]

Since we are not in access of exact *hasil* figures of the 18th century, some hypothetical position is presumably possible by extrapolating our analysis on the basis of the scattered data for the 18th century. We are in access of *rekh* for the year 1660 A.D. We have mentioned above that the *pattadars* started praying Rs. 300 for every 1000 *rekh* after 1755 A.D. So keeping the least possible *rekh* amount of Rs. 25, 86, 941 in consideration the extra burden on *pattadars* comes to roughly Rs. 8,06,231. It is this minimum amount that the *pattadars* have to extract more from their territories. In other words, Rs. 8,06,231 is an extra burden on peasantry and if we add the figure to *hasil* it comes to Rs.3330790, which is, much more than *jama* figure. As discussed earlier also, since *jama* was the actual maximum capacity of the

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[64] *Jodhpur Records, Basta no. 92/7*, Rajasthan State Archives, Bikaner. In Basta no. 97/2 of Jodhpur Records there are references to the amount realized from various *pattadards* by Abhay Singh.

[65] Cited in G.D. Sharma, *Rajput Polity*, p. 260.

peasantry to pay. Anything more than that might have forced them to make intensive use of land, and if the situation did not improve possibly it had led to land degradation. In the absence of new agricultural technology the fertility of the soil might have been affected. The following diagram can be prepared on the basis of the above discussion.


Frequent Maratha raids
Decline of the Mughal Empire
Demand for *Chouth* and *Khandani*
Contraction of *tankhwa jagir*
Thikana formation
Land degradation
Rajput rajas forced to extract land revenue in greater amount
Effect on productivity of land
Burden on peasantry
Soil erosion
A. Deserted the area
B. Took to Pastrolism[66]
Green area used for grazing
C. Peasantry looked forward to produce more
Intensive use of land
Frequent ploughing

[66] S.P.Malhotra and H.S.Mann in "Desertification and the Organization of Society" have linked up pastrolism with land degradation in Brian Spooner and H.S.Mann (eds.),*Desertification and Development*, London, 1982, pp.306-308. Edward S.Haynes has also tried to visualize the impact of pastrolism in "Land Use, Natural Resources and the Rajput State, 1780-1980", Rakesh Hooja and Rajendra Joshi (eds.), *Desert, Drought and Development*, Rawat Publications, Jaipur, 1999, p.78.

An important thing to understand here is that the state had to anyhow collect an average amount of Rs.2 to 3 lakh for the extra payment it had to make to the Marathas. The ruling authority of Marwar began to work out more ways to collect extra revenue from the peasantry. The following feelings of one of the Rathore *sardars* is an ample proof of that: '*...सिंहओ खूबचन्द अरजइ किवी के मूलक में बाब घालिया खरची पुगसी।*'[67] It means that special taxes will only fulfill the need. The economic pressure was so much on the state that the center of power at Jodhpur began to feel weak and the *pattadars* started defying orders of the state and began collecting money from the peasantry forcefully. The following version in one of the contemporary accounts makes the picture more clear: '*...सु विशनसिंह सु मिल उना ने मिल पकड रुपिया बावन हजार माथे किया, जना दिया काना सु। फेर रुपिया लिया सो एक लाख रुपिया पेदस किया। ने सवाइ रामजी ने गोरधन जी ने कवायो के थे बैठा ही मारो पडकर खोसे है। ...*'[68] Such forceful extractions became very common in Marwar during the second half of the 18th century. All these aspects are possibly pointer to the fact that despite increased production and increase *hasil* (actual realization) the pressure on peasantry increased with the passage of time due to greater Maratha demands worsening the already dilapidated state economy.

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[67] *Maharaja Vijaysingh-ri-Khyat*, p.114.
[68] *ibid*, p.93.

PEOPLE'S CONCERN

It is relevant to add that people's concern and consciousness and concern for natural phenomena and catastrophe finds full mention in the popular sayings and folklore of Rajasthan of 19th century.[69] Our assumption is that drought prediction, which became an integral part of folk culture within the society, reflects the concern of the commoners in general. Prediction of the nature of the coming year was considered a traditional skill in Rajasthan. Its origin could be traced back to the 13th century when Harbuji Sankhla became a very popular predictor (*seer*) of his age. He was a *Jagirdar* of a village in Phalodi *tahsil* in central Rajasthan. The man is said to have observed birds and animals, which implies that they were assumed to be in some way closer to the physical processes of nature, in order to find ways of predicting droughts. Because of his success the skill to predict became the monopoly of the Rajput caste, some of which inherited this skill in each generation. Tne prediction was said to be divinely guided. The importance of the man in society having this ability can be gauged from the fact that from the day of conception a Rajput mother would make the pious intent to rear her child as a predictor. She used to put water in a pitcher by a tree throughout her pregnancy period so that the birds could drink from it. After the birth of a male

[69] L.P. Bharara, 'Notes on the Experience of Drought Perception, Recollection and Prediction', in B.Spooner and H.S. Mann (ed.), *Desertification and Development: Dry land Ecology in Social Perspective*, New York, 1982, pp. 358-360. the author has been able to collect the sayings and folklores after various interviews of old men and of those who inherited these information in Rajasthan

child he was given the first drink from tha' pitcher. If the child managed to come out successfully after consuming this drink, i.e. he survived, he was believed to have commanded the language of the local birds and animals and became a *sugni*, an omen *seer* or predictor. With the passage of time the lore concerning natural phenomena and drought prediction became a matter of common knowledge. Today there are many sayings in the form of lore, which reflect the perception of the people of Rajasthan about nature. These sayings have been traditionally carried forward from one generation to another.

Winds

सावन[70] में सूरयो चले, भादुरवे पूरवाई
असोज मे पिचावहा चले, भर भर गारा लाई

If northwestern wind blows in *Savan*, the eastern wind blows in *Bhadun*,or the western wind in *Asoj*,then they bring carts full of grain.

जद बहे हाडा हवा कुन
बंजारा लादे लुण।

When the southwestern wind blows,the Banjaras load salt.

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[70] Rajasthani months and the equivalent English months:

1.*Chetra*	March-April
2.*Baisakh*	April-May
3.*Jyestha (Jeth)*	May-June
4.Asadh	June-July
5.*Savan*	July-August
6.*Bhado*	August-September
7.*Asoj*	September-October
8.*Kartik*	October-November
9.*Mighsar*	November-December
10.Pus	December-January
11.Magh	January-February
12.Phalgun	February-March

नाडा टंकन बालद बिकावन
तू मत चले आधा सावन

O eastern wind,who cause people to hang up the rope that fastens the yoke and to sell the ox, don't blow up to mid *Savan*.

जेठ बीती पहली पर्व कथक अम्बर हारें
असाढ सावन खेत सुखो, भादर हवे बिरखा करे

Thunder on the first day after the end of Jeth means two dry months and no rain before Bhadun.

Clouds

तीतर पखी बदली, विघवा काजल रेख
ऐ बरसे ऐ घर करे, इनमें मीन ना मेख

Clouds with wings like a patridge,and a widow with kohl in her eyes,bring rain without doubt.

सावन सुरंगी खेजडी, कटी बिरंगा खेत
सावन बिरंगी खेजडी, कटी सुरंगा खेत

If the khejri is colourful in Savan the fields are colourful in Kati.If the khejri is colourless in Savan,the fields will be colourful in Kati.

Stars

दिवा बीती पंचमी, सोम, सुकर, गुरु मूल
डंक कहे हे भादली, निपाजे सतून तूल

On the fifth lunar day after the Diwali holiday,if mul (an astrological position of the moon)falls on Monday,Thursday or Friday,then the Brahmin says all the

seven grains will grow.

सुदी आषाढ में बुध को उदय जो पेख
सूक्र अस्त सावन रहे महा काल आवा रेख

If Mercury is seen rising in the bright half of the lunar month of Asad,if Venus is sinking in Savan,a great famine will occur.

जेठ बडी दशमी दिवस जे शनीचर होय
पानी होय ना धारन में बिरला जीवन कोय।

If Saturday falls on the tenth day of the dark half of Jeth,there will be no water on the earth and only a few people will remain alive.

Animal Behaviour

दिन मेसयाल सबद जो करे
निश्चय ही कल हलाहल पडे

When the jackal howls during the day,a great famine is certain.

अगम सुजाय संदानी दौडे थालन अपार
पग पटाके बैसे नहीं जद में हवन हार

The she-camel knows beforehand and runs to and fro. She stamps her feet and will not sit when rain comes.

चिडी नहावे धूल में, तो पानी आवे
जल में नहावे चिड़कली तो पानी जावे

When the sparrow bathes in the dust the rain will come, and when the sparrow bathes in the water the rain will go.

Social Relations

पग पुंगल, सर मेडत, उदराज बीकानेर
भूलो चूको जोधपुर, थावो जैसलमेर

Feet in Pungol,head in Merta,stcmach in Bikaner.Famine may move to Jodhpur,stay in Jaisalmer.

अखत जी दूज की रे जे अचानक जचे से
कचक बिक मॉगे नाथ जे तो जनीजे कल सुभे
हॅसकर दे नाते नहीं कोय माने साही जमानो होय

The night before the Akhatij festival in March, if one should go suddenly to a friend's house and ask for something and it is refused, there will be a famine; if he gives gladly the year will be good.

The above sayings indicate a concern and consciousness of the people of Rajasthan and they tried to rationalize various events with different natural phenomena. The consciousness of the people about the drought situation and their concern to get good harvest shows that the state could have done very little and was more concerned about collecting maximum revenue from the *raiyats.* And so the people had come out with their own method based on common sense rationalization.

We, therefore, observe that the human factor in the form of exploitative Rajput ruling houses might have led to the economic disintegration of the agrarian system of Rajasthan and the consequent land degradation. The ruling authorities lost the control over land use and were anxious more for land distribution and revenue extraction. This tendency proved disastrous for an arid region like Rajasthan, where famines were more frequent. Here the impact of greater exploitation could become visible only in few decades as

compared to the doab region and rain-fed areas[71] where the effect of exploitation without infrastructure development was felt after much longer period of time.

The pressure of revenue was so much in Rajasthan that it led to intensive use of land. It has to be noted that this was a region, especially Western Rajasthan, where one had limited cultivable land available to the peasantry. Further, the region had only a brief period of moisture availability to sow the seeds. And so the peasants had the tendency to exploit this limited period of moisture availability for agriculture. This created the main erosive hazard to the fertility of the soil because of human activity. Since the peasants were under constant pressure they had no option but to either till the soil or to desert the area. The moisture less soil was disturbed by these 'forced ploughing' and because of scarcity of water, surface soil used to get dried out and led to greater wind erosion of the soil. Soil is one of the main processes of land degradation and consists of physical detachment of soil particles by wind. This was a very common feature of Rajasthan and it led to the deterioration of the overall productive potential of the soil. In turn, soil degradation resulted in decrease of the productive land ultimately forcing the farmers to encroach upon unsuitable and vulnerable lands-wastelands, slopes and other marginal areas, and the 'village commons'. It is but natural that per capita productive

[71] Chetan Singh's *Natural Premises: Ecology and Peasant Life in the Western Himalaya, 1800-1950*, Delhi, Oxford University Press, 1998, is one such book which shows as to how environment was affected by human activity over a sizeable period of time in the Western Himalayan Region during the 19th century.

land and soil quality rapidly diminished and the cycle of soil degradation and the pauperization of peasantry continued even faster.[72]

During the period of our study the cultivators made more and more constant use of land for cropping and thus disturbed the earlier practice of leaving it fallow for replenishing its fertility. This resulted in the use of land beyond its ecological capabilities and as a consequence its productivity must have been affected.[73] Further, in Marwar area there was a tendency to shifting cultivation and during the 18th century there was shrinkage in this practice as well.[74] The settlement Report of 1930's also say that after three years of cropping, the land was left fallow for the next three years indicating that this was a common practice in the arid zone of Marwar.[75] We must note that during the 18th century when pressure of revenue increased due the frequent Maratha demands the concept of leaving the land fallow was gradually being

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[72] Tapeshwar Singh, 'Challenges of Land Degradation and Appropriate Conservation Measures', *op.cit*, p 53

[73] See S.P.Malhotra's analysis in 'Man and Desert' in Rakesh Hooja and Rajendra Joshi (eds.), *Desert, Drought and Development*, Jaipur, 1999, p.26.

[74] B.L.Bhadani, *Peasants, Artisans and Entrepreneurs: Economy of Marwar in the Seventeenth Century*, Jaipur, 1999, p.39.

[75] *Settlement Report- Rent-Rate Report of Pargana Merta, Parbatsar and Sambhar*, Hawala File No.40\4, (typescript) Part I, Mehkama Khas, Govt. of Jodhpur, Rajasthan State Archives, Bikaner.

forgotten and so the impact on the fertility of the soil was negative. Contrary to the general practice of the cultivators to leave the land fallow to regain its fertility, there was another kind of shifting cultivation under practice called *walar* system. In this system of shifting cultivation there was a direct human assault on forested area by the Bhil and Girasia tribes. They used to cut and burn the jungle and sowed the seeds in the ashes. This method of cultivation was also destructive for the fertility of the soil. But here since we are mainly concerned with the fallout of the Maratha incursion we shall not go into the details of such human factor in land degradation.[76]

We are not in access of detailed statistical data for the 18th century Marwar and so we are not able to work out exact area of land use for cultivation. But we do have figures for the second half of the 17th century and the end of the 19th century for different *parganas* of Marwar. A comparison of the two periods would reflect the trend of the continuation or changes if any of the land use pattern. Let us evaluate the figures of the two periods for *pargana* Merta of Marwar.

[76] For details see *Rajasthan District Gazetteer, vol.2, Sirohi,* Compiled by B.N.Dhoundiyal, Jaipur, 1967, pp.33 and 103. Also see *Rajasthan District Gazetteer, Vol.14, Dungarpur,* Compiled by K.K.Sehgal, Jaipur, 1974, pp.8-9. The ecological destructions of Bhil cultivation has also been reported by A.E.Lourie on Jodhpur Forests, dated 14th February 1885, *Marwar State Records,* Basta No.1, File 3\2, Rajasthan State Archives, Bikaner, p.22; and also by Rao Sahib Padmanabha Pillai, Chief Conservator of Forests, Marwar State, 'Note on the Kushalgarh Forests', dated 25thJanuary 1942, *Rajputana Agency Records,* File P\28-27, 1942-44, p.2.

Table 3.5

LAND-USE IN *PARGANA* MERTA[77]

Year	Cultivable Land[78]	Uncultivable Wasteland	Fallow	Total Measured (in *Bigha*)	Primary Source
1572-73	N.A.	N.A.	N.A.	21, 14, 773	*Ain-I-Akbari*
1660[79]	18, 11, 347	1, 62, 833	N.A.	20, 33, 726	*Marwar-ra-pargana-ri-Vigat*
1898-99	18, 78, 420	3,22, 620	6, 98, 500	22,01, 040	*Agricultural Statistics of India Series*

[77] *Pargana* Merta was under the imperial Mughal administration under *sarkar* Nagaur and did not belong to the state of Marwar proper during the 16th century. But during the 18th century it became part of Marwar with the decline of the Mughal Empire

[78] The figure for the year 1898-99 of the cultivable land includes cultivable wasteland and fallow land. I have deliberately calculated this figure because for the earlier period cultivable land area (figure) included fallow land. The definition of fallow land varied widely among different states of Rajasthan. See *Rajputana Agency Records*, file No. 467-G/1946, National Archives of India, N.Delhi. It gives information on the current fallow in Rajputana states. The record mentions a wide range of trend of leaving the land uncultivated from Bundi's one year to Marwar three to five years In fact, in Marwar 'long fallow' included all areas that had been under cultivation 'within memory' Posibly it is because of this reason that the figure of cultivable land during the 17th century has been such large It is larger than the area under cultivation in 1898-99

[79] The figure mentioned in *Vigat* is in terms of *bigha-i-sikandari*, but I have converted it in *bigha-i-Ilahi.*. *Bigha-i-Sikandari* was based on *Gaz-i-Sikandari* and it was replaced by Akbar in 1589 A.D. by *Gaz-i-Ilahi*. *Gaz-i-Sikandari* was 39/41 of *gaz-i-Ilahi*. See Shireen Moosvi, *The Economy of the Mughal Empire, C.1595: A Statistical Study*, OUP, Delhi, 1987,p.74. Also see Irfan Habib, *Agrarian System of Mughal India (1556-1707)*, Bombay, 1963,pp.355-368.


2500000
2000000
1500000
1000000
500000
0
Cultivable Land
Uncultivable Wasteland
Fallow
Total Measured
1572-73
1660
1898-99

Table: 3.6

Uncultivable Wasteland in *Pargana* Merta

Different wastelands	**Area in *bigha- I- Sikandari***
Gaon khere (habitable)	12721
Nalla khohla (water drainage)	15687
Nadi (river)	13341
Rah (road)	2032
Thali (desert)	11921
Haudach (pasture ground for elephants)	45785
Sorkalar (salty or saline land)	24138
Sigdanto (pasture land for cattle)	3725
Pahari (hilly area)	36399
Total	**165749**



If we compare the two tables we find that Munhata Nainsi's own figure of uncultivated wasteland (Table no.3.5) is contradictory to the total of the breakup of the different wastelands given by him. We may presume that he has missed some category of wasteland while giving details. The difference comes to 49681 *bigha (Sikandari)*. Probably this could have been shrub and grass area, which is generally found in abundance in arid and semi-arid zone like Marwar. Further, there is not much of a difference in the total measured area from 1572-73 down to 1898-99. There is also not any major increase in the cultivable land area. This proves our earlier assumption that maximum possible area was brought under cultivation during the Mughal period itself and therefore, in the absence of further scope for expansion the peasantry had to make intensive use of the available cultivable land beyond its productive capacity. It has also been highlighted by B.L.Bhadani with evidence of *pargana* Sojhat that the area was fully cultivated.[80]Infact, in the whole of Marwar the situation was almost the same with possibility of slight variation. The state of cultivation here during the 17th century and even in the 18th century was not very different in terms of area tilled from what existed in the first half of the 20th century.[81]

It is important to mention here that after the decline of the Mughal empire many other regions also went through a phase of economic decline

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[80] B.L.Bhadani, "Population of Marwar in the second half of the 17th century", *IESHR*, Vol.XVII, Oct.-Dec.1979, pp.415-27.

[81] B.L.Bhadani, *Peasants, Artisans and Entrepreneurs, p.41.*

and naturally the pressure was felt most by the peasantry. But in these areas as compared to Rajasthan, specially Western Rajasthan, fertility of the soil was not affected. When the burden became heavier on the peasantry, they either revolted or chose to desert the area and moved to some other region or even brought much new barren land under cultivation.[82] Seemingly the situation of the Mughal territory even during the heydays was not very conducive for the peasantry. The exploitation of the surplus produced was always there. The state was never lenient in collecting revenue from the peasantry. However, the situation in Rajasthan as a matter of fact was totally different. There was a limit to surplus of exploitation here. Before the 18th century the rulers were in a comfortable position financially without putting any extra burden on the peasantry and by bringing the maximum possible area under cultivation. The large income of Marwar rulers enabled them to accumulate huge treasure. Khwaja Agar, formally the *diwan* of Jaswant Singh, who finally joined the services of Aurangzeb, informed the emperor that Jaswant Singh had a treasure hoard of Rs.57 crore and Rs.1000 was deposited everyday in the fort's treasury.[83] *Ajit Vilas* also records that Jaswant Singh had left a huge treasury when he died.[84] But Rajasthan was a region which was not abundant in quality and cultivable barren land as compared to

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[82] We do get reference in *Sanad Parwana Bahi* to the instructions given by the state to the *thikanedars* to bring barren land under cultivation, but they are very few since maximum possible cultivable land was in use.
[83] C.f. *ibid*, p.381.
[84] *Ajit Vilas*, p.29.

other territories of the Mughal empire. So when the p essure for revenue intensified, because the recurrent Maratha demands it was but natural that efforts were taken to extract more and more from the available cultivable land. It is pertinent to note here that land revenue had been the major source of income of the state from time immemorial. In contrast, the other areas of the Mughal empire like Awadh, Bengal, Malwa etc. were able to accommodate and adjust itself to pressure by expanding the cultivable area. The new barren land were brought under use and they acted as cushion or safety-valve and lessened the effect of over-exploitation of the peasantry through land revenue. Thus, Rajasthan was an area with a difference because of its geographical limitations and limited quantity of cultivable land. And any extra burden on the peasantry meant forcing them to cultivate more and produce more and it might have affected the fertility of the soil as well. But this should only be taken as presumption since it is impossible to get any data on the fertility of the soil over a period of time during the 18th century.

To conclude the discussion, the Maratha *sardars* did not put forward their demands directly to the cultivators or the traders. The primary records give reference to rare instances of forceful collection by the Marathas from the cultivators and the traders. We do get account of forceful collection of grains from the villages that fell on the route taken by the Maratha *sardars.* But generally speaking they in common did not loot the people. The records show that there are only a few instances of the traders being looted by them. In fact,

the Maratha ravages were mainly confined to the realization of *chauth, mamlat* and *nazrana* from the rulers. The trade *carvans* were rarely the target of the Maratha invaders in Rajasthan.[85] But in the ultimate analysis the Maratha demands did affect the economy of Rajasthan adversely.

[85] B.L.Gupta, *op.cit., p.243.*

Appendix 3.1

Famines in Marwar[86]

Marwar, lying on the fringe of the Great desert, is more prone to famines than many other parts of the country. Our sources of the 17th and 18th Centuries provide us much information of the frequency of natural disasters that struck Marwar. A Jain Muni traveler gives a detailed description, which extends over the regions of Marwar, Bikaner, Mewar and sometimes other parts of the country for a period of 60 years. Naturally, all people did not feel the impact of a particular famine in an equal degree. Nor did it uniformly affect the various tracts. The failure of the rains did not have the same devastating effect on the *parganas* bordering the Aravalli hills or on those that lay in the Luni basin zone (Sojhat, Jaitaran and some portions of Jodhpur and Merta) as it did on the western and north-western *parganas*. This is because the agriculture of the former set of *parganas* was not totally dependent on rains as was the case with the latter. The *parganas* in the Luni basin had facilities of well irrigation and yielded both *rabi* and *kharif*.

Abul Fazl records that 1596 was a year of genral insufficient rain. It is not definite whether Marwar was affected by this scarcity. Marwar appears to have escaped the great famine that visited the adjoining province of Gujarat in 1630-32. In 1634, however, there was a famine in *pargana* Jalor, and it is

possible that it might have affected other parts of Marwar as well. In 1647, there was a drought in Marwar which "hath occasioned a famine, in so much that these parts are, either by mortality or peoples flight, become wholly depopulate and impassable". Rain was very scarce in all parts of India in 1650 and it affected the country between Agra and Ahmadabad. It was obviously as a result of this famine that the state was known as '*patal bhog*'. The revenue figures of 1657-58 also suggest a severe famine in Marwar. The Jain traveler also noted this year as that of a dreadful famine in the whole of Rajasthan. In the year 1658-59, excessive rains destroyed crops. Due to the famine in these three years (1658-60), there was a great scarcity of grain in the whole of Rajasthan. The Jain traveler writes that even the *Sahs* (bankers), let alone the common masses, gave away their children to the saints to be fed by begging? After two years, in V.S. 1720/ A.D. 1663, again, there was a failure of rain in the whole of Rajasthan when numerous people died in Marwar and the prices of the grain rose very high. The Jain traveler notes that not only prices went up but the grain was just not to be had. Cattle perished in great numbers. In 1664 the rains were normal in Rajasthan but there was a local famine in Sojhat. Not only large numbers migrated, but many were sold away as well. During the first two months (*asadh* and *sawan*) of 1670, failure of rain compelled the people to sell their belongings and migrate. The year 1672 was a hard one for ordinary people, and the next failure of rain in the beginning of 1673 intensified

[xo] Based on B.L.Bhadani, *Peasants, Artisans and Entrepreneurs* and O.P.Kachhawaha, *Famines in Rajasthan*, Hindi Sahitya Mandir, Jodhpur, 1985.

the distress, leading to the sale of belongings of the people and migration. The crops depended totally upon wells; and only the rains in the latter part of the year saved the people form a great disaster. An eyewitness account describes how, though the rain in 1674 was quite sufficient, wheat and probably other food grains of the *rabi* harvest were attacked by mice. Even then the people did not feel any hardship because of the hoarded grain in the *Kothis*,(grain store-houses). Indeed, the food grains remained at low prices. The rain was quite promising in 1675 but locusts, causing great hardship to the people in Jodhpur, destroyed the crops. The people of Marwar are said to have suffered from two major calamities in 1678. A great famine occurred due to partial failure of rain. When Maharaja Jaswant Singh died, Emperor Aurangzeb tried to take the *parganas* of Marwar into *khalisa*, but the resistance off the Rathor *sardars* generated a struggle, which devastated large areas under crop. Both parties plundered the people and the traders. The migration of the people to forests and mountains must have adversely affected agriculture in the region. The years 1681-82 saw a fresh visitation of famine. First, the rain partially failed and consequently prices went up. Secondly, the bubonic plague ravaged the land, and people and cattle died in great numbers. The impact of the plague was said to be more severe in Bikaner, Nagaur, Sojhat and Ajmer than in Jodhpur, Merta and Jaitaran. In 1682 not only were the prices of grain high but also the *banias* reveled in usury, charging interest five times the amount of the principal. Excessive rains in 1692 destroyed the kharif crop and

even the accumulated grain in the storage was wasted. In 1694, a severe famine again occurred and the grain prices were reported to have risen a great deal. Even some *thakurs* had to migrate. The condition of the *banias* and the *brahmans* was so bad that they did not even care about their social status or tradition. The parents sold their children for bread. The poet compares this famine with that of 1630 of Gujarat. It is apparent that whenever famine occurred in Rajasthan, People tended to migrate to Malwa, Gujarat and sometimes even to as far as Patna. Some people in 1630 went to Patna where Hiraji Sah provided them with necessaries. Perhaps a prolonged period of devastation due to famine began from 1696. In Sanchor a partial failure of the rains destroyed the *kharif* crop; however, the *rabi* was irrigated by wells. In 1697, the people of Sanchor suffered from a great famine and large number died of starvation. Next year, the locusts destroyed the crops. The year 1705 was remembered as a year of misfortune, owing to a famine. The people migrated to distant places like Dhaka and Patna.

CHAPTER: 4

ACCOMODATION AND CONFLICT AMONG RAJPUTS AND MARATHA INTERFERENCE

The decline of the Mughal empire gave opportunity to the various regional states to recover their autonomy and attain ascendancy, specially in northern and western India. We have historical reference to the emergence of regional autonomous states like Awadh, Punjab, Banaras, Marathwada etc. Similarly Rajasthan also got this opportunity, but the Rajputs failed to take advantage of this depression of the Mughal Empire. It makes it all the more astonishing when we realize that in the past the Rajput nobles and princes from Rajasthan had fought valiantly on behalf of the Mughal emperors and then were able to handle many of the important administrative posts at the Mughal court. They had played a vital role in the affairs of the Mughal Empire during the second half of the sixteenth and the seventeenth centuries[1] and still they could not restore the Rajput suzerainty. It is important to mention here that attempts were of course made to reap benefit out of the declining Mughal control in Rajasthan and Gujarat by varius Rajput Rajas. But in the absence of any major united effort the end result was failure at different fronts. Marwar and Jaipur got themselves entangled in their ambition to attain maximum *Subedari* from the Mughal emperor. During this period Rajasthan went through

[1] Satish Chandra, *Religious Policy, Rajputs and the Deccan*, Vikas Publishers, New Delhi, 1993, p.44.

political disintegration and general disorder, which followed the decline and fall of paramount power[2]. By the close of 18th century this 'Land of Rajas' was almost in a state of desolation- political, economic, social and moral[3]. The decomposition, which crippled the Rajput states by the end of the eighteenth century, had started in the beginning of the century itself because of the inherent contradiction of the Rajput clan based polity. This very basis, on which the Mughals had been able to keep a check, worked as the decay factor for the ruling houses in Rajasthan. Earlier, the political organization of the Rajputs as a territorial power was entirely based on socio-economic structure of their clan order. This tie to a clan had actually provided autonomous self-governing rights to each branch of it on hereditary lines before the Mughal rule[4]. But the establishment and functioning of the Mughal administration in Rajasthan ultimately threw away all previous arrangements, which were drawn among the various lineage groups and dominant Rajput Powers. During the second half of the 16th and 17th centuries, Rajasthan in general had enjoyed political peace and security for almost 150 years under the control and protection of the Mughal suzerainty. All the major Rajput ruling houses were in the service of the Mughal emperor and thus held the imperial *mansab.*[5] They

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[2] *Rajaputana Gazetteer*, Vol 1 1979, pp 45-46

[3] J.N. Sarkar, *Fall of the Mughal Empire*, vol iv, Calcutta, 1950, pp.68-74.

[4] G.S. L. Devara, ' The Internal Expension of Society and Formation of Medieval Polity', Presidential address, *Proceedings of Indian History Congress*, 59th session (Patiala), Aligarh, 1999, p. 203

[5] The only exception was the Rana of Mewar, who was not in active service of the Mughal Emperor but he held the imperial *mansab* and the *parganas* that the Rana enjoyed were assigned to him against his *mansab*.

were granted *Jagirs (tankhwah)* in lieu for their sa'ary which was fixed according to their *mansab* they held in a particular area. Generally, these Rajput Rajas were assigned the whole of their ancestors' land (*Watan Jagir*), but then it was at the discretion of the Mughal emperor. He could even assign a part of their ancestor's land. There are evidences of *jagir* assignments even outside the native land. The Mughals in this way claimed a kind of paramountancy which implied that the Rajput did not raid each other's territory and did not try to revolve their traditional territorial disputes by resorting to war. Under the Mughal rule the recognition of the hereditary rule of the Rajput Rajas over the territory that they were controlling provided Rajputs opportunity to consolidate their authority further in their respective regions. They had virtually become free from the possibility of internal onslaughts and external aggressions and so they curtailed the excessive powers of their brothers and kingsmen (*Thakurs*)[6]. The Mughal paramountcy in Rajasthan gave peace to the region and established a kind of *pax Mughalica* that enabled peaceful development[7].

The decline of the Mughal empire changed the situation of peaceful co-existence. Now, the Rajput Rajas were free to satisfy their ambition. So they either went on serving the Mughal State and looked for more and more Jagirs assigned to them outside the *Watan Jagir*, or they straight away defied the

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[6] G.S.L. Devra, *op.cit.*, p.205.
[7] Satish Chandra, *Medieval India : From the Sultanate to the Mughals*, Har Anand Publications, New Delhi, 1999, p. 119.

Mughal authority. This often led to inter and intra-state conflicts within Rajasthan. The same clan based polity, which had earlier worked against the unity of the Rajputs during the early Turkish invasion and later under the Mughals, now started to come into open once again. In April, 1809, Broughton, who was the commander of the escort of the British Resident with Sindhia, wrote that ...Chivalrous courage and high sense of honour, by which the Rajputs were formerly so eminently distinguished, seems to have quite deserted them, and to have degenerated into tarneness and apathy, and a despicable love of intrigue and domestic squabbles[8]. The result was increasing Maratha interference inside Rajasthan and at the same time political and economic decline of the region as well. The internal feuds among the Rajput ruling houses for dominance had led to growing intervention of the Marathas. There are various instances of the Rajputs inviting the Marathas to help them in the succession disputes[9].

Here we need to distinguish between the political developments in this first half and the second half of the 18th century. During the first half the Marathas had reached up to Malwa by their victory in the battle of Amjhera in November 1728 and the ruling houses in Rajasthan were unanimously concerned about these developments, in his letter of December 1728, the Maharana of Mewar had written to Sawai Jai Singh, the Maharaja of Jaipur.

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[8] T.D. Broughton, *Letters Written in a Maharatta Camp during the year 1809*, AES, Delhi, 1995, p. 91.

[9] Raghubir Sinh, ' Rajput-Maratha Relations' in A. Pawar (ed.) *Maratha History Seminar Papers*, Kollapur, 1971, pp. 255-269.

'The Deccanis have been regularly coming to these regions and have been causing disturbances. When the matter was previously submitted to you, you said, 'they are wanderers, and one need not worry about them'. But now they have killed the Subedar (Governor of Malwa), and if no steps are taken now, the disturbances will increase so much that your Highness will have to think of it.'[10] There was a meeting of the Rajput rulers of Rajasthan at Hurda, near Udaipur in 1734.[11] They all came to the agreement to unite in every campaign and pledged not to help the defector of another. Although the unity among the Rajput Rajas was purely superficial[12] and could be considered as eyewash, but this must have created an impression before the Marathas of a united opposition. By the close of the first half of the 18th century the internal feuds among the Rajputs for succession and more power became very apparent and the Marathas always took an opportunity to intervene. The presence of the Marathas came to be felt more after the death of Sawai Jai Singh in 1743.

During the second half of the 18th century the Marathas became a major threat to the survival of the Rajput States like Jaipur, Marwar, Mewar, Bundi and Kota. So apparently it is only during the second half that the Marathas seem to have affected the political and socio-economic structure. But our assumption is that this could not have been possible had the Rajput Rajas actually taken some concrete and decisive steps to check the Marathas

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[10] *Jaipur Records*, vol. III, p. 42. Cited in Raghubir Singh, *ibid*, pp. 259-60.
[11] Shyamal Das, *Vir Vinod*, Udaipur, 1886, pp. 212-18-221. Also see Col. James Tod, *Annals and Antiquities of Rajasthan*.
[12] G.D. Sharma, *Rajput Polity*, p. 273.

in the first half itself. Their unity was limited only to their clan in reality during the first half of the 18th century. Although the various Rajas recognized the superiority of the Maharana of Mewar, but at the same time Maharaj Abhay Singh of Jodhpur and Sawai Jai Singh of Jaipur were trying everything to increase their area of influence. Maharaja Abhay Singh was always in a lookout to secure the Subedari of Ajmer from the Mughal emperor. On the other hand, while negotiating on behalf of the Mughal emperor with the Marathas, Sawai Jai Singh's self interest of ensuring the *Subedari* of Agra and Malwa and taking the *subedari* of Ajmer was dominant.[13] Thus, both Abhay Singh and Jai Singh were trying to get more and more concessions from the Mughal emperor and their rivalry led to their intervention in various state succession disputes like Bikaner, Merta etc. There was a continuous war between the armies of Marwar and Jaipur in 1740 and it continued for three years.[14] It was the same clan system of the Rajputs, which prevented effective united action against their common enemy, the Marathas. While one faction of a particular Rajput ruling house sought help from the Peshwa or the Peshwa's local agent, Holkar, the opposite faction asked for help from Holkar's rival Sindhia. The end result of all this was growing pressure on the economy of the state, because after every bit of help from the Marathas, the Rajputs promised to pay large sums of money to them (See Table 3.3). We need to look at these

[13] C.U. Wills, *The Report on the Land Tenure and Special Powers of Certain Thikanadars of the Jaipur State*, 1933, Rajasthan State Archives, Bikaner, pp. 8-14
[14] *Sawai Jai Singh-ri-Jodhpur per Chadhai* (S.no 4287), Orinetal Research Institute, Jodhpur.

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[14] *Sawai Jai Singh-ri-Jodhpur per Chadhai* (S.no. 4287), Orinetal Research Institute, Jodhpur

developments on political front from a slightly different perspective that has not been done by any historian before. We should try to allocate whether these political understandings with the Maratha *sardars* by different Rajput rajas or nobles are in any way reflection of rebellion within.

Andre Wink uses the work, uses the word *'fitna'*[15] which seems closer in meaning to the concept of 'rebellion'. He has attempted to show that the rise of Maratha power cannot be understood without taking into account the readiness of various representatives of society under the Mughal rule to rebel against the authority. He tried to reveal the context within which alliances were made among various rebelling elements. This so simplistic a generalization and interpretation has been refuted by historians like Athar Ali, Irfan Habib etc.. They deny that the concept of dissent was so significant during the Mughal period. They accuse Wink of deliberately underestimating the cohesiveness of the Mughal empires.

Our understanding is that the biggest mistake that wink has made in his interpretation, while dealing in *'fitna'* is his insistence on a continuity between to Maratha history and the Hindu tradition based on very ancient texts. From methodological point of views *'fitna'* or dissent of course sounds very convincing and one cannot deny its total absence from the history of any region. But how much significance could be ascribed to it during the centralized Mughal rule is important to understand We do not want to get

[15] Andre Wink, *Land and Soverrignty in India.*

involved into this dispute whether Wink's hypothesis is applicable to the Mughal empire or not and so would not go into the details of the debate among the historians. But the concept of rebellion does seem relevant at least in Rajasthan after the decline of the Mughal Empire. There were frequent political alliances made among the petty Rajput rajas as well as with the Maratha Sardars outside the Rajput fold during the 18th century. It is pertinent to know the intricacies of these political understandings, which in turn would lead us to the issue whether these were directly challenging the sovereignty of the ruler of a particular Rajput state viz Marwar etc. Should we consider alliances of the nobles or of the family members of the ruler against the wishes of the latter as a rebellion? This question becomes all the more complicated when we come to know that many of the Rajputs holding Jagirs in a particular state were directly related to the reigning clan and the ruler enjoyed his strength through their solidarity. We have numerous instances of rebellion by the Rajput folds in the 18th century when the royal authority weakened. There were frequent conflicts within the reigning dynasty between the ruler, his uncle, brothers and sons. The expression of these rebellions were mainly in two forms - one, by breaking off relations with the Raja and offering allegiance to other rulers or the Maratha *sardar*. Secondly, sometimes they simply appropriated rights and status symbols that would normally be the prerogative of the ruler, and if the ruler tried to reassert they would oppose him openly. In both the cases the ruler perceived it as a mark of disrespect. And he like any

Rajput was quick to regard the slightest sign of disrespect towards him as the worst kind of offense. The basic objective of such rebellions was to gain more and more *jagirdari* right through conciliation. That is why in many cases such revolts rarely led to the total destruction of the opposite side when the rebellion was over and the domain would normally be returned to the *sardars* from whom it had been temporarily confiscated, or at least to one of his relatives or heirs.[16] There were always efforts on the part of the ruler (Maharaja of Jodhpur or Maharana of Mewar) to accomodate the Rajput *sardars* or *thikanedars* and if the efforts failed there were conflicts. But we should not narrow down our analysis on such revolts to a clash between the ruler and his nobles family members for more and more power. One important thing to understand here is that apart from the one who is leading the revolt there were many others who gave him support. So the real significance lies in the fact that they brought many other kinds of ties into play. A Rajput rebel always needed armed forces in order to challenge the sovereignty of the ruler and put pressure on him. And the numbers and strength of the armed forces to a large extent depended on the rebel's own resources. Two sections of the society played a very vital role in this regard - tribal communication and the merchants apart from his own political clout (supporters). He recruited most of his army from tribal communities and the merchants provided him the needed money. Dirk Kolff has shown that significant fringe of the population up to the early 19th

[16] Denis Vidal, *Violence and Truth: A Rajasthani Kingdom Confronts Colonial Authority*, OUP, Delhi, 1997, p.54,

Century in Rajasthan was ready to take part in any armed expectation.[17] Infact, it was easier to recruitment from the tribal communities of the surrounding region because they could be attracted by smaller payments. We have also references to deliberate efforts to settle tribal groups within the domain and maintain special relations with them.[18]

Thus, in Rajasthan political acts leading to rebellion did constitute one of the most important factors at work during the 18th century after the decline of the Mughal empire. There is no denying the fact that there are occurrences of such revolts even before the 18th century, but they were very less.

We get the first clear cut case of accommodation and conflict in the 18th century in Marwar, where the sudden death of Maharaja Jaswant Singh created a vacuum and the situation was left to the vagarias of the Mughal emperor. One group of Rathor *sardars* led by Durgadas wanted Ajit Singh (the son born of Jaswant Singh's wife after his death) to be the next Maharaja, whereas the Mughal emperor Aurangzeb wanted to exploit the situation to increase his influence in Marwar and other territories of Rajasthan. The details of the politics within Marwar has been discussed at length in chapter 1. The episode of our concern in this whole process of occupying the *gaddi* of Marwar is that of after 1707 when Aurangzeb died in 1707 A.D. and the situation became very fertile for Maharaja of the Rathors, Ajit Singh to revive

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[17] Dirk Kolff, *Naukar, Rajput and the Sepoy : The Ethanohistory of the Military Labour Market in Hindustan, 1450-1850*, Cambridge Univ. Press, Cambridge, 1990.
[18] Denis Vidal, *Violence and Truth* , p.49.

old administrative pattern and enhance his power at the expense of the Mughal emperors and other foci of powers.

In the early years before 1707 Ajit Singh had left all the administrative responsibilities in the hands of the *pradhan*, Champawat Udai Singh[19] and Udai Singh and his associates enjoyed all the powers. But after the death of Aurangzeb Ajit Singh started making changes in administration. As a result Udai Singh opened negotiateions with the sone of Raja Indra Singh, Mohkam Singh.[20] This was considered a rebellion by Maharaja Ajit Singh. Ajit Singh knew the importance of the Champawat Rathors and so he dismissed Udai Singh Champawat from the post of pradhan and conferred it on Mukand Das Champawat.[21] At the same time he expelled Mohkam Singh from Merta. It is interesting to note that Ajit Singh from Merta. It is interesting to note that Ajit Singh even didnot like Mukand Das because he conspired against Ajit Singh along with Udai Singh Champawat to dislodge Ajit Singh from *gaddi* of Jodhpur.[22] This was clearly a case of defiance against the Maharaja. But the situation demanded accomodation of either Udai Singh or Mukand Das because they represented a very powerful group within the Rathor nobility that of the Champawats. Ajit Singh was in a tight spot as he was facing the opposition from some of the Rathor Jardars like Moham Singh, who was intriguing to oust him with the help of the Mughal emperor Bahadur Shah.

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[19] *Ajitodaya*, p.16.
[20] *Ajit Vilas*, p.105.
[21] *Ajit Vilas*, p. 154.
[22] *Vir Vinod*, p. 764.

Under these unavoidable circumstances Ajit Singh was left with no choice but to accomodate Mukand Das as pradhan till he regains a favourable situation.

Soon Ajit Singh was able to get rid of Mukund Das Champawat as well. He got him murdered and appointed Bhandari Bithaldas as the *pradhan*[23] from now onwards Ajit Singh gives lesser power to the Rathor, *sardars* and all the important offices like *desh-diwan*, *tan-diwan* and *hakim* were given to the *Bhandaries.* They were also appointed as *hakims* in various *parganas* of Marwar[24]. Thus Maharaja Ajit Singh so far as possible first tried to accomodate the Rathor sardars through conciliation or otherwise, but when there was open definance of his authority he eliminate the Rathor sardars from state administration and promoted somewhat insignificant group of Bhandaris. A large number of Rathor *sardars* who had not supported Ajit Singh were considered as rebel and were deprived of their *patta* land and *thikanas. Jodhpur Rajya –ki-Khyat* gives the names of some of the sardars who were deprived of their *thikanas* and *pattas*[25]. But in most of these cases of cofication of *pattas* and *thikanas*, it was granted to *sardars* belonging to the same family and Ajit Singh never tried to disturb the concept of clan rights over the *patta* lands. Thus, the basic objective of the rules (Maharaj) was to control the land-rights through conciliation and not conflict. Most of the Rajput rajas tried to avoid conflict even in the case of rebellion and confication was only

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[23] *Vir Vinod*, p. 764
[24] Ramakaran Asopa (ed.), *Rajrupak*, Banaras, Vikram Samvat, 1968, p.444
[25] Cited in G.D. Sharma, *Rajput Polity*, p. 206

temproray. It is mainly because of this that Ajit Singh survy of 30, 000 men were still dominated by Rathor and non-Rathor Rajput clans[26]. The names of the Rajput sardars who joined Ajit Singh at the time of his attack on Jodhpur in 1707 A.D. have been given in *Rajrupak*. They were- Champawat Bhagwan Das, Hari Singh, Udai Singh, Vijay Singh, Achal Singh, Sakat Singh, Muhham Singh, Raj Singh, Kisan Singh, Kesari Singh, Hari Singh, Kumbh Karan; Kumpawat Vijay Singh, Ram Singh, Kesari Singh, Bhim Singh, Fateh Singh, Harnath Singh; Jaitawat Fateh Singh and Roop Singh; Jodha Bhim Singh Chandrabhan, Mohan Singh, Jogidas, Sakat Singh and Prithvi Singh; Udawat Jogram singh, Rede Ram, Pratap Singh, Man Singh, Vijay Singh, Dalit Singh, Jujhar Singh and Harnath Singh; Bhati Harnath Singh, Bhan, Amar Singh, Khan Singh. Rinchhodh Das, Surajmal, Jeewan Singh, Khat Singh, Sooa Singh, Lal Singh and Akhi Singh, Chauhan Fateh Singh, Lal Singh and Ajab Singh[27]

Another Similar incidence of conflict comes after the death of Abhay Singh of Jodhpur. Ram Singh was not liked by many of the Rajput *Sardars* of Marwar. So they put Bakht Singh on the throne. Soon Bakh Singh died and Vijay Singh became the ruler. Ram Singh despite knowing the mood of the *Sardars* opposed the coronation of Vijay Singh and rebelled against the Jodhpur ruler. Ram Singh went over to the Marathas for help. He sought the

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[26] *Rajrupak*, pp. 428-32.
[27] *Rajrupak*, pp. 428-32

help of Appaji Sindhia and attacked on Marwar. The battle between the two groups was fought at Merta in 1754 A.D. in which Vijay Singh lost the battle. Vijay Singh reorgnised himself against Ram Singh, but the interesting point to note here is that instead of taking on direct conflict with Ram Singh, he first got Appaji Sindhia killed and tried everything to accommodate Ram Singh. [28]

The general perception of the times was that the Rajputs should not fight amongst themselves and rather put a united effort to oust the Marathas. When Maharaja Vijay Singh of Jodhpur got Kesri Singh of Raos Thikana killed through treachery, it was not considered as the right move by the people. One of the contemporary songs testifies the general perception on the event which is as follows :

झुके झूल बारगा थरक्के गजां पीठ झडा,
केहरी हुचक्के जठै ऊबक्के काघार।
सांमघ्रमो केम चकै जेण आंहै चूकै सूरौ,
जगाणी न रुकै मूरौ विरथो जोधार।
मेडते अथागा जूथ मारे खेत मारहढां,
बिलागां अमरां भुजां अखाडे बीरांण।
आपो राण अहंकार रुप जेण आगां,
माण साखी उग्री बीजा नू जेम भांण।[29]

[28] *Pracheen Rajasthani Geet*, Vol.II, Edited by Giridharilal Sharma, Rajasthan Vishva Vidyapeeth, Udaipur, V.S. 2013, p.180.
[29] *Rajasthani Veer Geet Sangrah*, Vol. II, Edited by Saubhagya Singh Shekhawat, Rajasthan Prachya Vidya Pratisthan, Jodhpur, 1968, pp.55-56.

CHAPTER 5

RAJASTHANI PERCEPTION OF THE MARATHAS

"The Daccanis have come- - -"

The Marathas probably first came in contact with the Rajputs during the period of Shivaji, when Jaswant Singh, the ruler of Jodhpur was deputed to south with Shaista Khan the Viceroy of Deccan to assist him.[1] The second apparent Maratha contact came with Jai Singh of Amber who was serving in the Mughal Court. But all these contacts of the Marathas with the major Rajput rulers were not the direct one and came through the Mughal emperor Aurangzeb. However, we have reference to the smaller status of Rajasthan weaving a net of cordial relations with the Marathas long back.

As early as 1682, Rao Kishore Singh Hada of Kota appointed a Maratha Brahmin officer in his state on the monthly salary of Rs. 200/-. He appointed this Maratha officer to serve as a sort of liaison officer for Kota and Marathwada. Later on a number of Maratha *sardar* were granted small *jagirs* and villages on *ijara*, which was a kind of revenue farming. During the last years of Aurangzeb's reign *ijara* system became popular by letting out the *jagirs* on auction. The *jagir* was leased out to the person who provided the biggest *Qabj* or security.[2]

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[1] Ali Mohammad Khan, *Mirat-e-Ahmadi*, Vol. I, *Bibliotheca Indica Series*, 1869, p. 1869.
[2] Satish Chandre *Medieval India Society, the Jagirdars Crisis and the Village*, Macmillan India Limited, Madras, 1982, p. 163.

Jankoji was granted a *jagir* in Sangod *pargana* worth Rs. 10,607/ per annum. Later on there was a further addition in his *jagir* making it worth Rs. 27,032/-.[3] Asuji was given a *jagir* in the *pargana* Atone worth Rs. 2916/- a year.[4] Raja Shahiji was granted a village on *ijara* in the Sangod pargana worth Rs. 7896/-. Hamir Rao Dakshini, Ajmeri Khan and Mankoji were the other Marathas who were given villages on *ijara* in Atoni pargana.[5] Why is it that suddenly more and more *jagirs* and *ijaras* were being granted to the Maratha *sardars*? The internal revalry among the Rajputs for the succession on *gaddi* was one of the basic carses of the Maratha infiltration into the Rajput administrative and political set up. We shall discuss the background to the Maratha penetration in two Rajput states, Marwar and Mewar; during the 18th Century, but before that let us try to find out if there was any possible contact between the Marathas and the Rajputs during the 17th Century. Here it is important to mention as to why are we trying to link up 17th Century with 18th Century, even though the political situation during the two Centuries were poles apart? (We need not go into those details of political situations because it is certainly clear to all medieval scholars and sundry that 17th Century was a period of strong centralized control of the Mughals in their empire which of course included Rajasthan, whereas 18th Century saw the decline of the Mughal state and their growth of regional powers.

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[3] ibid
[4] ibid
[5] ibid

The political developments during the 17th Century in the Marathwada region had at the least created a larger fighting group in terms of the Marathas under the leadership of Shivajee. Shivajee was able to weld together different sections of Marathas and the *Kunbi* peasants. He persistently claimed for Kshatriya or Rajput status. This claim was not acceptable to the leading Rajput rajas like Mirza Raja Jai Singh, as they considered Shivajee and the Marathas to belong to low caste. So the perception and attitude of the Rajput rajas of Rajasthan must have been crucial even during the 18th Century. Similarly we may also glean through the Maratha perception about the Rajputs both during the 17th Century and the 18th Century. There are possibilities of certain changes in the attitude and the perception of the Marathas because of the decline of the Mughal Empire and in turn in the status of the Rajputs during the 18th Century.[6]

The social structure inside Rajasthan was so fluid and flexible that any body whether from the lower section or any other creed was acceptable to the society. When the Mughals were accepted as rulers then even Marathas would have been easily accepted and got adjusted in the society. But it was never so. The people of Rajasthan kept quoting the Marathas as 'Daccani' without any respect and in derogatory terms. Before we proceed further, let us look at the social structure inside Rajasthan. If one studies the social structure of the ruling class of Rajasthan one can find that clan was the most important social institution in the continuation of one dynasty. The Sisodias,

[6] Satish Chandra, *op.cit.*, pp. 139-146.

Kachhawahs and Rathors after occupying territories evolved a structure based on kinship (*bhai-bant*) and clan to strengthen their power and to keep their brethren united. It was a society in which lineage structure was the framework of political system. Lineage secession had led to Rathor rule in Jodhpur as well as in Bikaner and to Sisodia rule in Udaipur and to Kachhwahas in Jaipur. However, *clan* and *thikana* were two structured divisions of Rajput exogamous polity. Clans were the largest exogamous groups and descent by virtue of which, individual acquired clan status was patrilineal. The power and authority of the ruler was based on familial ties and the genealogy was the base of political heritage running generation after generation. Throughout the medieval period, the Rajput States were often involved in conflict with each other and the dynastic interests and ambitions stimulated their political and military rivalry. Yet the elements of cohesion embedded in Rajput social arrangements and cultural norms provided a countervailing force. Clan ties sometimes crossed states boundaries. Their rules of exogamy required them to seek bride from clans other than their own. The result was to foster marriages across state boundaries and in consequence, to build important inter-clan and inter-state links of an affective interest and even political kind by uniting families, property and dynastic interests.[7] The system of *bhai-bant* provided an opportunity to various Rajput princes of nobles belonging to the various clans to maintain hereditary claims over their respective territory that has been conquered by their ancestors. Their respective territories were known after a

[7] Muhanta Nainsi, *Nainsi-ri-Khyat*, Vol. I, (ed.) P.V. Muni, Jodhpur, pp.15-25.

capital town or village where they kept their families. These were known as *Thikanas*.[8] Thus, we find that every Rajput State was generally one particular clan politically organized into one unit under the pressure of historical circumstances and economic conditions and in every state, the ruling class belonged to one particular clan. In fact the state did not belong to the ruler, rather it belonged to the clan as a whole. But sometimes, individual rulers became very powerful downsizing the power of his clansmen. However, the blood-bond led to the growth of a system in which each important person of the clan, the sons of the ruling king and after him the brothers and uncles of the succeeding king all had to be given some share in the land. This system of making provision for the relatives resulted in the creation of chiefs, who in their turn had their own children to whom they made grants out of their own holding and thus created sub-chiefs and these chiefs later on became powerful nobles exercising much influence over the state affairs.[9] As the clan ownership necessitated sharing the land between blood relations, the land grants played a very important part in forming the socio-economic structure of Rajasthan.

In Mewar, these grants were of three types: (1) movable (2) perpetual and (3) hereditary. The landholders were of two types (I) *grasia* and (II) *bhomia*. The *grasia* chieftain was he who holds *gras* (subsistence) by grant (*patta*) of the price, for which he performed service with specified quotas at

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[8] Muhanta Nainsi, *Marwar-ra-Pargana-ri-Vigat*, Vol. I, (ed.) Narain Singh Bhati, Jodhpur, 1968, pp. 60-70.
[9] G.S.L. Devra, *Rajasthan*, pp. 15-16.

home and abroad, renewable at every lapse, when all the ceremonies of resumption, the fine of relief, and the investiture took place.[10] *Bhomias* were more in number than the *Grasias*. They held grant on prescriptive possession and were called upon to do local service. They were the military landed proprietors and in later days wielded both plough and sword with equal grace. They formed the backbone of the feudal militia.[11] Similarly in Marwar, the Rathor rulers adopted the system of *bhai-bant*, according to which all the territories conquered by them were parceled out among the Rathor *sardars* mainly among the leaders of the sub clans and their off-shoots and their right on land was hereditary.[12] Besides the Rathors, there were the nobles of other Rajput clans as well, such as Bhattis, Chauhan, Tuars, Irde etc., who had been holding their estates prior to the occupation of the country by the Rathors. The Rathors defeated them and reduced them to the position of feudatories. The vanquished chiefs accepted the price of Jodhpur as their sovereign and paid a fixed amount of levy in the shape of what was locally called "*faujbal*" (Military cess). The relation between the ruler and the nobles were fraternal as mentioned by the feudatories of Marwar in a letter which mentions- "when our services are acceptable then he is our lord; when not ; we are again his brothers and kin, and claimants to the land".[13] This system indicates the feudal pattern of society, which provided for a land owning

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[10] Colonel James Tod, *Annals and Antiquities of Rajasthan*, pp. 156-158.
[11] *ibid*, p.158.
[12] *Nainsi-ri-Khyat*, Vol. I, p. 105.
[13] ibid, p. 108.

aristocracy on the one hand and a vast mass of dependent peasant producers on the other. The landowners not only were in the upper strata of society, they constituted an extremely powerful class of which the king was the most important.[14] Only after the Rajput rulers had accepted the Mughal Suzerainty and enrolled themselves as imperial *mansabdar* that the administrative policy of the Rajput underwent change, but even then they were in the upper strata of the society.

The Rajput designated themselves as *Kshatriya*. The term *Kshatriya* is generally used for the ruling families of the oligarchies or it could be called extended kin groups. According to Prof. Romila Thapar literally meaning of the word *Kshatriya* connotes those who have access to power.[15] Literacy products of the period under study indicate that the use of the term *Kshatriya* would be limited to those who traditionally held political power and controlled the most important economic resources - land. Though clan and political structure divided the Rajputs from each other by differences over tribute and authority and differential distribution of status and income they were integrated as community by caste culture and blood-ties and as an order by common political functions, economic interests and social status. The question of how an individual or group attains or loses Rajput status is a contentious one. Generally Rajput fathers accept wives for their sons from clans other than their

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[14] Anjali Chatterji, *Aspects of Medieval Indian Society: Gleanings From Contemporary Literature*, Presidential Address, Medieval India, Indian History Congress, Calcutta, 2001. p.10

[15] Romila Thapar, *History of India*, Vol. I, Penguin, 1983, p. 242.

own whose Rajput status they recognize. Hence, the classical though oversimplified summary of Rajput marriage rules as rules of '*caste*' (i.e., Rajput) endogamy and clan exogamy. The term clan has been used to refer to many different levels of kinship units. Clan ties sometimes crossed state boundaries. Lineage secession had led to Rathor rule in Bikaner as well as in Jodhpur and to Sisodia rule in Banswara as well as in Udaipur. It has also been noted that there was a pronounced pattern of hyper gamy among Rajput groups of different political statuses. It suffices to note that the general pattern of endogamy among Rajputs and hypergamous exogamy among some smaller Rajput kinship units were prevalent.[16] The superior ritual status of the *brahmana* lay in the fact that he provided the validation. The validation of *Kshatriya* status was essentially an attempt to prove status by birth and to acquire the appropriate and legitimate lineage. The system itself became the prototype of all rulers seeking *Kshatriya* genealogies since the *Suryavanshi* and the *Chandravanshi* became the two major royal traditions. In 16th and 17th Century Rajasthan *Vaishyas* were popularly called *Bania*. Nainsi's reference to *Mahajan* or *Bania* includes *Oswal, Mahesawari, Aggarwal* and *Khandelwal* who were engaged in trading and money lending business.[17] The *vaishyas* of Rajasthan in fact enjoyed as influential position in the society and even political authority by virtue of their wealth and entrepreneurship not with standing with their low ritual status. The undependable character of agriculture

[16] *Nainsi-ri-Khyat, op.cit.*p.108.
[17] Nainsi-ri-Khyat, Vol. I, (ed.) P.V. Muni, Jodhpur, 1960.

made sole dependence on agrarian economy impracticable and encouraged them to adopt additional means of employment and subsistence such as trade and industry. The geographical position of Rajasthan between Northern India and Gujarat as well as its natural resources also facilitated the growth of trade and industry to which peace and order under the Mughals gave a further stimulus. However, it is clear from Nainsi's *Khyat* that some times they deviated from the traditional *vasihya* duties by taking up state administrative services. For instance *Oswals* had generally been in the administrative services of the state.[18] They mostly occupied key posts like *Diwan, Hakim, faujbakshi* and *treasurer* etc. (*Ibid*) Nainsi himself was as *Oswal bania* who was appointed as *Desh-Diwan* of Maharaja Jaswant Singh. *Pancholis* generally held the second time of administrative services and sometimes rose to the rank of Faunjbakshi and commander-in-chief of the army. (*Ibid*) Nainsi says that they played an important role in the revenue administration of Marwar and had enjoyed hereditary post of *Qanungo* for many generations. The rise of *Kayasthas* as an occupational group caused by the administrative needs of the state in the field of accountancy and record keeping. Their association with the state administrative enabled them to enhance their position at least in the field of financial administration. Another important occupational group was the *Charan*. They acted as bards to the royal families. Due to their intimate relations with the rulers *charans* enjoyed their confidence and often they acted as mediators in political affairs and also enjoyed

[18] *Nainsi-ri-Khyat*, pp. 49-51.

hereditary *Jagirs* i.e. *Sasan* rights.[19] In the society of Rajasthan *charan* caste and also that of the *bhat* ranks directly below the brahmans and above the Rajputs.

Thus, in Rajasthan individual mobility in political power dimension was not lacking. We come across references to brahaman families who held a high position or worked as an advisor to the ruler of Jodhpur, Jaipur and Udaipur. For instance Asopa Nawal Rai, Pt. Jiwanram, Kriparam etc. were the advisors of the Jodhpur raja.[20] The office of the *Purohita* during the period under review was not only frequently hereditary but also had been politicized. The Brahaman officials could become powerful through acquiring land rights for their services rendered to the king. But the documents referring to such grants do not occur in any significant number. The trade of Rajasthan provided an opportunity for social mobility to the *Vaishyas* who were originally cattle rearer and cultivator. *Vaishyas* were popularly called Bania during this period and in this group belong *Oswals, Maheswaris, Aggarwals, Khandelwals*. They are political and actual power status derived from the economy of the urban centers. With the growth and establishment of the towns these trading communities became the focus of urban life. Moreover the state patronage helped to raise in-group. The authorities invited the traders to reside in their respective states and they were offered trade concessions and in some cases free land for their buildings. Similarly the money landing business also had

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[19] *ibid*, 51.
[20] *Ajitodaya*, Canto 21.

become a source of mobility for the families of *Vohras* and *Maheswaris*. Apart from their high trade activities they were to be found in an important position in the contemporary politics and administration. G.S.L. Devra points out that the *Banias* were given preference over the other castes like brahamanas in the matters of appointments for the civilian posts. Sometimes they were upgraded to the post of Prime Minister. In Bikaner only *Vaishyas* such as *Mohtas* and *Mundhras* were appointed as Prime Minister.

Our point here is that the Rajputs as ruling class had this liberal attitude to include other caste groups into politics and administration. But was this also applicable on the Marathas? Our understanding is that the lower status of the Marathas in society (as they of lower origin) had nothing to do with their acceptance or non-acceptance in Rajasthan. The issue of place in the social structure and hierarchy has its own trajectory and the perception carried in Rajasthan about the Marathas had a totally different trajectory. The way the Maratha collected the tribute, which was far heavier than those of the Mughals, ultimately mattered when it comes to the acceptance or support the Marathas got in Rajasthan. The unending tribute collection and constant threat of the claims of the rival princes backed by the Marathas created some kind of hatred in the society for the Marathas. And unlike the Mughals they were unable to win the loyal support of any of the Rajput princes even for a limited time.

Let us first see how perception develops and takes a concrete form in the society and then we shall try to find out how was the Maratha perception reconstructed in Rajasthan. Perception is the process by which people organize, interpret, and experience process and use stimulus materials in the environment to express their views and feelings. Perceptual inputs are first received, and then processed by the perceiver and the resultant output becomes the base of people's understanding.



We observe in the above diagram that 18th century saw frequent Maratha raids of Rajasthan and there were more and more demand for *chauth* and *khandani* from the Rajput rulers. In this process the Marathas also destroyed the property of the commons and many a times the cropped area of the peasantry. In order to fulfill the demands of the Marathas, the Rajputs were left with no option, in the light of their shrinking *jagir*, but to collect greater

percentage of agrarian production from the peasants as land revenue. This certainly put a heavy burden on the people and they ultimately held the Marathas as responsible for their deteriorating economic condition and developed an attitude of hatred. We find the reflection of such attitude, belief and feelings of the people living in Rajasthan in various letters of the Rajput rajas (*kharita*) and in many of the popular sayings and folklores.

We observe a district change in the perception of the Marathas in the 18th century as compared to the earlier century when the Marathas were politically not so powerful and did not interfere in the affairs of the Rajput states. During those years of the 17th century when Sivajee had emerged as one of the leaders of the Marathas, they were not hated by the people of Rajasthan. It is only the imperial Mansabdars from Rajasthan like Jai Singh who arguably did not like Shivajee. The following folk-song by Jogidas Charan written on Shivajee is a good proof of that.

हणमत सिवौ बरौबरि हुआ, पौरिस बल दाखवै प्रमांण।
अेक गयौ गढ लंक उचीडे, दिली अेक गमणै डांण।
दाणवा तणा फाटिया डाचा, वाया नह ऊपडै विचार।
अणभग सिवौ खाग ऊपाडै, हालियौ लक लगावण हाट।।
रावण साह तणा दल रौले, जोध हिलोलें जुवाजूऔ।
हालियौ सिवौ झांपा मरि हणमत, हेक डंगाल बंगाल हूऔ।।
ढौड़ ठौड गजबंध ढेलतौ, बलवंत गौ काम रै वहै।
ओ सिवराज हणूं जिम ऊमौ, कोटा सिर आग्राज करै।।

Jogidas has compared the episode of Shivajee's escape from the Mughal prison at Delhi with that of Hanuman's escape from the imprisonment of Ravana at Lanka described in the Ramayana This sort of comparison not

only places Shivajee as a hero but at the same time presents the Mughal rule like that of Ravan.[21]

Contrary to the Rajasthani perception of the Marathas which saw a turn around from a positive image during the 17th Century to negative, the Mughal perception of the marathas during the half of the 18th century was interestingly positive. The Mughal court documents and contemporary literature avoided derogatory remarks which was preciously used to explain the Maratha military thrusts. The Marathas who were earlier termed as Daccani, were now being respectfully named as *Sardar*an-i *Maratha* or *Sardar*an-i-janub.[22] The transfer of the centre of gravity from the Deccan to the north brought perceptible change in ideas ad interests of the Mugal ruling class in the post-Aurangzeb era.[23]

The Marathas had completely abenated themselves in Rajputana by thier ravaging activities by the and 18th century. Therefore the Rajputs did not hesitate even to side with foreign invader like Ahmad Shah Abdali against the Marathas. When the news of the arrival of Ahmad Shah Abdali in the Punjab reached the Marathas, the Peshwa ordered Sadashiv Rao Bhau, who was the

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[21] *Rajasthani Veer Geet Sangrah*, Vol II, p 130.

[22] Z U. Malik, 'Persian Historiography of Marathas in the Second Half of Eighteenth Century', *Proceedings of Indian History Congress*, 52nd Session (N Delhi), 1992, pp. 484-485

[23] With the appointment of Mahadji sindhia as Wakil-i- Mutlag by Shah Alam, the prolonged Mughal Maratha struggle finally terminated Shah Aham and Peshwa Madhav Rao narayan worked out system of Mutual cooperation to cope with the growing challenge of British hegemony over north India However, the ethical and regional prejudices persisted, and lack of trust in policy objectives persisted, and lack of trust in policy objectives of the rulers from the Deccan continued to clout the mental outlook and attitudes of the strong vested interests at the court. For details see Z.U Malik, *Ibid*, pp 481-489.

cousing of Peshwas Balaji and had successfully won the battles in the south, to command the Maratha forces and convince the Rajputs to join their side against Ahmad Shad Abdali. But the Rajputs refused to join their side. Rather, Sawai Madho Singh, the Kachwaha Raja, inagreement with 17 kachwaha *Sardars* decided to remain neutral.[24] Sawai Madho Singh also had reached on understanding with Ahmed Shah Abadali to crush the maratha power and in return Ahmad Shah wanted Sawan Madho Singh to keep the Marathas engaged in his dominion so that they might not join the other Marathas in the third battle of Panipat in 1761.[25]

For the Rajput rajas the Marathas had become a name of evil and infact we get reference to even the religious measures taken by the ruler in the form of Jap-Jaap to check the Marathas.[26] It was mainly their method and approach of forceful collection of tribute which had created such a negative perception about the Marathas in Rajashtan. When Jaiappa Sindhia was killed by the men of Maharaja Vijay Singh through treachery it was not condemned inside Rajasthan. Rather it was taken as a revenge for Jaiappa Sindhia' s earlier attack on Merta. In one of the heroic songs the Marathas have been warned against such movements in Rajasthan which is as follows :

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[24] Rajasthan state Archives, *Agreement between Madho Singh and Seventeen kachwaha Saradas*, dated Jaistha Budi 9, 1816 Vikram Samrat (20th May 1759) No. 776, Kapat dwara

[25] Rajasthan State Archives, *Kharita from Ahmad Shah Durrani to Sawai Madho Singh*, dated 17th Moharram, No. 197.

[26] *Marwar-ri-Khyat*, (ed.), Hukam Singh Bhati, p.99

बीजा सकौ प्रथी रा बोलै, विजै विजै री वांणी।
जनकू अनै दतू री जोवै, वाटडिया विलखाणी।।
जिया लिया चाहौ घर चौथा, घर दूजा दिस धाज्यौ।
घर घर में कूके घेतलियां, मुरधर देस म जाज्यौ।।[27]

In the event of help provided by one Rajput raja to other against the Marathas was well appreciated. When Mahadji Sindhia attracked on Jaipur, Vijay Singh of Jodhpur gave whole-hearted support to the Jaipur ruler Swai Pratap Singh and in one of the Contemporary songs his help has been compared with that of god Vishnu.

राडौ फैलता सामद्र रुप अथग्गां कूरमां थाट,
औनाडौ पटेल धसे ग्राह ज्यूं अढेल।
हैकम्पे ढूढाडौ राजा करी ज्यूं बेहाल होता,
आयौ मारवाडो राजा हरी ज्यू उबेल।।१।।
भडां वेग सालुले बाणास चक्र तो भुजां,
धोक तोप जडता जजीरां फंद घात।
अंबनैर नाथगै विजौ गहता वेल आयौ,
नाथ जोधाण ज्यू त्रिलोकवालौ नाथ ।।२।।
मदा पाण छीजता विरुथां फंद गैमरां ज्यूं,
ऋऊजला माहेस राज धाम नाम ज्यूं आराह।
पतौ गै करती ररी नाम पूकार पीडा,
सागै भीड पूगौ श्रीराम ज्यू विजैसाह पीडा।।३।।
पाण चक्र खाग ले गनीमां ग्राह प्रहारियौ
जेण चीज हत्था काज सारियौ जामेर।
आघपत्ती घारयौ आलेख लेज दूै अजै,
अभैराज करे करी तारियौ आमेर।।४।।

–बदनजी मीसण टौ कहनौ[28]

Thus, Rajasthani perception of the Marathas during the 18th century was guided mainly by their exploitative activities. Since the Marathas were not

[27] *Rajasthani Veer Geet Sangrah*, Vol 4, p.277
[28] *ibid*, Vol. 4, p. 11.

able to enjoy direct control over different ruling states in Rajasthan, they were mainly interested in extracting more and more money from the region. There extraction of money was though not directly from the people in general, and they were concerned only with the rulers to provide them with *Khandani, barat kharch* and other expenses, but the effect of such revenue extraction filtered down to the commoners as well as . It were mainly the cultivators who had to bear the burden of revenue requirements of the state and, therefore, negative perception of the Marathas also took a broad base.

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THE MARATHAS IN RAJASTHAN IN THE 18TH CENTURY: A STUDY OF SOCIO-ECONOMIC RELATIONSHIPS

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SUMMARY AND CONCLUSION

The following hypothetical conclusion has been arrived at on the basis of the preceding chapterization. The Marathas had already started creating disturbance in the Deccan area in last quarter of the 17th Century. As soon as the Maratha saw the centralized authority declining, they started raiding the rich province of Malwa and went up to parts of Rajasthan. Malwa was both politically and economically situated on a strategic location and her neighbouring Mewar and Marwar states in Rajasthan were potentially lucrative territories.

The Peshwa did not give these Maratha chiefs any financial support inside the *swarajya*. As a result they were bound to raise their own troops and maintain them through their assignments outside the *swarajya*. They were generally assigned *mokasa* and *saranjams* in the Mughal territory, which the Marathas claimed as *chauth* and *sardeshmukhi* area. We cannot consider the Maratha expansion in the north during the 18th Century as a unified attempt. Neither was it possible for the Maratha *Peshwas* to implement their administrative system as it existed in the *Swarajya*, to all other parts where they ruled-directly or indirectly. The expansion of the Marathas into Malwa, Gujarat, Rajasthan and other northern territories was mainly for extraction of more and more revenue, thereby exploiting the peasantry to the hilt. The

Marathas were not able to implement their administrative system of *Swarajya* in these expanded territories and the Mughal system of administration continued even after their 'slow conquest'. Their dire need for money to finance their military expeditions could have been solved only through a stable revenue policy even outside the *Swarajya*. But that could not be done and so raiding the territories or getting them involved in local internecine rivalries in Malwa, Rajasthan, etc., to collect money in return for help remained the only option. This was the central idea for all the Maratha *sardars* and confederates flowing from the *Peshwa*, but such a common purpose and idea could not have possibly created an empire.

Taking advantage of the declining power of the Mughals the Marathas also started their gradual movement and activity in the north and captured Gujrat and Malwa. They frequently raided Rajasthan and even reached upto Delhi. In Rajasthan they collected *chauth* and *Khandani* from the Rajput rajas. With the increasing power of the Marathas and the declining authority of the Rajputs, mainly due to internal feuds, these raids for revenue collection became more frequent and adversely affected the economy of the states like Marwar and Mewar. One major factor that operated now was the loss of Rajasthan as the favored province of an 'all-India Empire'. With the latter's disappearance, the external revenues ceased to flow in, and internal pressure for revenue correspondingly increased, with its own self defeating consequences. Land rights in terms of *patta* were both the social and

economic basis of any ruler. Ajit Singh had disturbed this socio-economic basis slightly by transferring *pattas* to different new *sardars* and this was the primary cause of the rebellion after Ajit Singh's death. The frustrated dislodged *pattardar* were not having any holdings to meet their basic requirement and so they revolted when a new ruler came. Because of these internal revolts Maharaja Abhay Singh could not render any service to the Mughal emperor outside Marwar. This must have affected the economy of the state since *tankhwa jagir* outside Marwar as some sort of bonus for the state. These changes were observed more after Abhay Singh's death under Maharaja Vijay Singh. By his time the Maratha raids had become more frequent.

The Maratha interference had already started in the second quarter of the 18th century in various states of Rajasthan. But this had not reached to such a proportion so as to affect the economy of these states directly during this period. There are stray references of the Marathas getting money in return for their help to either of the aspirants to the throne of the Rajput states, but these were not regular payments and did not force the rulers of Mewar or Marwar to introduce any new measure and policy to increase the revenue of the state to adjust the extra expenditure incurred on account of their payments to (demands of) the Marathas till the first half of the 18th century. It is only in the second half of the 18th century that we start getting regular account of payments to the Marathas in terms of *mamlat, Nazrana, Barat, Lashkar Kharch, Fauz Kharch, Darbar Kharch, Khasa Sawari,* etc.

The overall pressure on the economy was relatively greater in comparison to eastern Rajasthan owing to the geographical location of the state. The state fell in semi-arid and arid zone of Western Rajasthan and the agricultural land available here was very limited. These agricultural lands had a limited production capacity owing to the total dependence on rain and non-introduction of new agricultural technology during these years. In the second quarter of the 18th century the money that was being given time-to-time to the Marathas was neither regular nor was it based on any agreement or treaty. But the situation changed in the later half of the 18th century.The burden of these payments used to be so high that the Marwar ruler was never able to satisfy the Maratha demands completely and there always remained a part of the promised amount as due leading to greater burden on the economy of the state. Almost 10 per cent of such Maratha demands were never met and normally the Marathas wrote off 20 per cent of amount if demands were met in advance. But this tendency of the Maratha *sardars* to demand constantly and the non-payment of complete amount or payment of only a partial amount forced the Marwar state to fall in debt trap. The cyclical effect on the economy was detrimental. In order to collect the dues, the Maratha *sardars* or their representative often visited Jodhpur and every time some new promises and arrangements were made and fresh time bound installments were fixed. But the Rajput state had to immediately pay some amount in cash known as *barat kharch* and *lashkar kharch*.

The internal feuds had given encouragement to the Maratha interference in Marwar. the power of the Mughal empire had declined as well and the protection and control, which was earlier provided by the Mughal empire to the Rajput states was no more possible. The Marathas, thus, did not have any fear from the Mughal empire. The Jaipur state, which had emerged very powerful during the 18th century, also could not check the Marathas because of their own fragile and weakening authority due to internal family feuds. A combined Rajput force was also not easily possible since the rulership in each of the Rajput states was based on class solidarity or *bhai-bant.* It was the same clan system of the Rajputs, which prevented effective united action against their common enemy, the Marathas. While one faction of a particular Rajput ruling house sought help from the Peshwa or the Peshwa's local agent, Holkar, the opposite faction asked for help from Holkar's rival Sindhia. The end result of all this was growing pressure on the economy of the state, because after every bit of help from the Marathas, the Rajputs promised to pay large sums of money to them.

By the beginning of the second half of the 18th century the *tankhwa jagir* outside Marwar had shrinked and Abhay Singh even started collecting lump sum amount from the *pattadars* to pay the Marathas. After him Vijay Singh also continued this practice and infact imposed a lump sum amount of Rupees three hundred for every one thousand *rekh* from the *pattadars* and termed it as *mutallab.* In 1765 Vijay Singh further introduced a new tax called *'Rakhbab'.*

The continuous battle fought between 1752 and 1756 had completely crumbled down the economy of Marwar. The treasury became empty. *Khalisa* land could not be cultivated during these years since the cultivators deserted the area with fear, and as a result a huge source of the income of the state was lost. Jalore *pargana* was given to Ram Singh after the treaty of 1756 where a huge treasury of the Rathors was lying for years. Ajmer, Taragarh and Sambhar also went away to the Marathas by the same treaty. These regions were a major source of income for the state through the salt duties and other trade duties on various goods. Further the whole of southeast Marwar, which was agriculturally more fertile as compared to other regions of Marwar, went over to Ram Singh. Now Vijay Singh was left with relatively productive areas of only Jodhpur and a major part of semi- arid zone. Thus, on the one hand the income of the state was on decline, on the other hand, the expenditure of Marwar increased by leaps and bounds due to continuous war with the Marathas, internal disturbance and huge Maratha demands.

The effect on economy could have been disastrous in an arid zone like Marwar. In the ultimate analysis we observe that the human factor in the form of exploitative Rajput ruling houses had led to the economic disintegration of the agrarian system of Rajasthan and the consequent land degradation. The ruling authorities lost the control over land use and were anxious more for land distribution and revenue extraction. This tendency proved disastrous for an arid region like Rajasthan, where famines were more frequent. Here the

impact of greater exploitation could become visible only in few decades as compared to the doab region and rain-fed areas where the effect of exploitation without infrastructure development was felt after much longer period of time. The pressure of revenue was so much in Rajasthan that it led to intensive use of land. It has to be noted that this was a region, especially Western Rajasthan, where one had limited cultivable land available to the peasantry. Further, the region had only a brief period of moisture availability to sow the seeds. And so the peasants had the tendency to exploit this limited period of moisture availability for agriculture. This created the main erosive hazard to the fertility of the soil because of human activity. Since the peasants were under constant pressure they had no option but to either till the soil or to desert the area. The moisture less soil was disturbed by these 'forced ploughing' and because of scarcity of water, surface soil used to get dried out and led to greater wind erosion of the soil. Soil is one of the main processes of land degradation and consists of physical detachment of soil particles by wind. This was a very common feature of Rajasthan and it led to the deterioration of the overall productive potential of the soil. In turn, soil degradation might have resulted in decrease of the productive land ultimately forcing the farmers to encroach upon unsuitable and vulnerable lands- wastelands, slopes and other marginal areas, and the 'village commons'.

During the period of our study the cultivators made more and more constant use of land for cropping and thus disturbed the earlier practice of

leaving it fallow for replenishing its fertility. This possibly resulted in the use of land beyond its ecological capabilities and as a consequence its productivity must have been affected.[1] Further in Marwar area there was a tendency to shifting cultivation and during the 18th century there was shrinkage in this practice as well.[2] The settlement Report of 1930's also say that after three years of cropping, the land was left fallow for the next three years indicating that this was a common practice in the arid zone of Marwar.[3] We must note that during the 18th century when pressure of revenue increased due the frequent Maratha demands the concept of leaving the land fallow was gradually being forgotten and so the impact on the fertility of the soil was negative.

In Rajasthan political acts leading to rebellion against the ruler constituted one of the important factors at work during the 18th century after the decline of the Mughal empire. However, efforts were always made by the Rajput rulers to accomodate the opposing Rajput clansmen and breathem to avoid conflict in the face of increasing Maratha interference. The Rajputs as ruling class had the liberal attitude to include other caste groups into politics and administration. The lower status of the Marathas in society (as they of

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[1] See S P.Malhotra's analysis in 'Man and Desert' in Rakesh Hooja and Rajendra Joshi (eds.), *Desert, Drought and Development*, Rawat Publications, Jaipur, 1999, p.26

[2] B.L.Bhadani, *Peasants, Artisans and Entrepreneurs: Economy of Marwar in the Seventeenth Century*,Rawat Publication, Jaipur, 1999, p.39

[3] *Settlement Report- Rent-Rate Report of Pargana Merta, Parbatsar and Sambhar*, Hawala File No.40\4, (typescript) Part I, Mehkama Khas, Govt of Jodhpur,Rajasthan State Archives, Bikaner.

lower origin) had nothing to do with their acceptance or non-acceptance in Rajasthan. The issue of place in the social structure and hierarchy has its own trajectory and the perception carried in Rajasthan about the Marathas had a totally different trajectory. The way the Maratha collected the tribute, which was far heavier than those of the Mughals, ultimately mattered when it comes to the acceptance or support the Marathas got in Rajasthan. The unending tribute collection and constant threat of the claims of the rival princes backed by the Marathas created some kind of hatred in the society for the Marathas. And unlike the Mughals they were unable to win the loyal support of any of the Rajput princes even for a limited time.

A district change is observed in the perception of the Marathas in the 18th century as compared to the earlier century when the Marathas were politically not so powerful and did not interfere in the affairs of the Rajput states. The Marathas had completely alienated themselves in Rajasthan by thier ravaging activities by the and 18th century. Therefore, the Rajputs did not hesitate even to side with foreign invader like Ahmad Shah Abdali against the Marathas and later on with the British to oust the Marathas from Rajasthan.

GLOSSARY

Abwab: The cesses imposed on the land aprat from regular land revenue.

Asami: The revenue payers.

Basi: The place the family of *thikanedar* lived.

Bigha: 2/5th of an acre.

Biswa: 1/20th of *bigha.*

Bohra: A mercantile comunity who used to lend money.

Chauth: The claim to 1/4th of the government's share of the revenue.

Des: The plateau are of Maharashtra which is located cast of the Ghats.

Deshmukh: Head of a family in control of a pargana under the Marathas.

Gaddi: Throne of the ruling state.

Ghasmari: Grazing tax.

Hasil: Actual realisation of land revenue.

Hundi: Bill of exchange.

Ijara: Revenue-farming under which a farm or revenue of a village or *pargana*

Jagir: Assignment of tract of land by the mughal government in lieu of cash salary. The holder of *Jagir* was called *Jagirdar.*

Jama: Assessment of revenue made by the state on land.

Jihat: Cesses collected by the state to meet the expeses of of collection of land-revenue (Also collected *Kharch Bhogh*).

Kamvisdar: Officers oppointed by the Martha to collect tribute.

Khalisa: Land under direct control of state.

Khandani: Tribute paid to the Maratha (did nbot include assessed land revenue)

Kharif: Crops of which harvesting is done in autumn.

Khyat: Historical accounts of the glory and deads of the rulers.

Kunbi: Cultivators (cast) in Maharashtra.

Lag-bag: Miscellaneous cesses to meet the expenses of collection of land revenue.

Mokasa: An assigned portion of government's share of revenue.

Muqqadam: Village headman.

Nazrana: Offering

Patta: A dead issued by the ruler of his *sardars* under which village were granted on *patta* to realize proportion of produce from the cultivators.

Peshwa: Head of the Maratha political structure.

Rabi: Crops of which harvestin is done in spring.

Rahdari: A duty on goods passing from one state to another.

Rakhwalli: Money paid for not devastating an area.

Rekh: Assessed land-revenue which used to be geater than *Jama*. Jama was an assessment of land-revenue by the Mughal government, but *Rekh* was an assessment made by the local ruling authority in Rajasthan.

Sanad: Contarct specifying rights and responsibilities.

Saranjam: Non-hereditary grants by the Maratha government for maintenance of troops.

Sardeshmukhi: The claim to 1/10th of the government's share of the revenue.

Tankhwah Jagir: Jagir in lieu of salary.

Tika: The ceremony of declaring a new ruler.

Tolvantai; Weighing tax

Ujar: Land which is desolate.

Vigat: Description of the past was given on lease.

Watan Jagir: Hereditary land or area of Rajput who servedas a *mansabdar* under the mughals.

Watan: Hereditary land held by the ruling clan families in Rajasthan.